Kinyam Jude Tewelikum v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1398
KINYAM JUDE TEWELIKUM,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: November 24, 2015 Decided: January 12, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Danielle Beach-Oswald, Terese Tadros Ibarra, BEACH-OSWALD
IMMIGRATION LAW ASSOCIATES, PC, Washington, D.C., for
Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director,
Bernard A. Joseph, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Kinyam Jude Tewelikum, a native and citizen of Cameroon,
petitions for review of an order from the Board of Immigration
Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration
judge’s (IJ) order denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition for review.
To be eligible for asylum, Tewelikum must show that he has
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected
ground if he returns to Cameroon. Hui Pan v. Holder, 737 F.3d
921, 927 (4th Cir. 2013). Tewelikum may rely on either showing
that he was persecuted in the past or that he has a well-founded
fear of future persecution independent of any past persecution.
Id. If Tewelikum were to establish that he was the victim of
past persecution on account of a protected ground, he would be
entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he has a well-founded
fear of persecution. Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 272 (4th
Cir. 2011). Tewelikum can also show a well-founded fear of
persecution if he presents “candid, credible, and sincere
testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution,” Li v.
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and specific, concrete facts that would lead a
reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution,
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.

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2006). Tewelikum faces a higher standard of proof to establish
that he is entitled to withholding of removal. He must show “a
clear probability of persecution on account of a protected
ground.” Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks
omitted). If Tewelikum fails to meet his burden of proof for
asylum, he is also ineligible for withholding of removal. Id.
The Board’s adverse credibility finding is reviewed for
substantial evidence. Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 206 (4th
Cir. 2015). While we will afford the Board’s conclusion
substantial deference, there must be specific and cogent reasons
for making that finding. Id. An adverse credibility finding
should be based on factors such as the plausibility of the
applicant’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s
written and oral statements, the internal consistency of each
such statement, the consistency of such statements with other
evidence of record, or any other relevant factor. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012); Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 928. A
credibility determination may rest on any of these relevant
factors, even if such factor does not “go[] to the heart of the
applicant’s claim.” § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “A single
testimonial discrepancy, particularly when supported by other
facts in the record, may be sufficient to find an applicant
incredible in some circumstances.” Ilunga, 777 F.3d at 207; see
also Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 273-74 (adverse credibility finding

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may be supported by only a few inconsistencies, omissions, or
contradictions). Because the Board issued its own decision and
did not adopt the IJ’s decision, we review only the Board’s
decision. Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 948 (4th
Cir. 2015). We have reviewed the record and conclude that
substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that there was
no clear error with the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.
Despite the adverse credibility finding, Tewelikum may
establish eligibility for relief through independent evidence.
Ilunga, 777 F.3d at 213. Tewelikum may “meet his [] burden by
presenting a consistent body of circumstantial evidence.” Id.
We have reviewed the Board’s findings and conclude that
substantial evidence supports the finding that Tewelikum’s
independent evidence was insufficient to establish eligibility
for relief. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 278 (“statements that rely on
multiple levels of hearsay can be so highly unreliable by their
nature as to justify the agency in refusing to credit them”).
As a result, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
denial of asylum and withholding of removal. Finally, we
conclude that substantial evidence also supports the finding
that Tewelikum was not eligible for protection under the CAT.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2015).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED

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