United States of America v. Shaquan Dondrel Manson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4874
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SHAQUAN DONDREL MANSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00009-BO-1)
Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 31, 2015
Before DIAZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Robert E. Waters,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Shaquan Dondrel Manson appeals his conviction and 166-month
sentence imposed following a guilty plea to Hobbs Act robbery
and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951
(2012), and using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and aiding
and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)
(2012). Manson’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether
the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable
sentence. Manson was notified of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government moves to
dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver provision in
Manson’s plea agreement. Manson opposes dismissal. For the
reasons that follow, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
We review de novo the issue of whether a defendant has
validly waived his right to appeal. United States v. Davis, 689
F.3d 349, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2012). Where, as here, the
Government seeks to enforce the waiver and there is no claim
that the Government breached the plea agreement, we will enforce
the waiver if it is valid and the issue being appealed falls
within its scope. United States v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217, 221
(4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1579 (2015).

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An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and
intelligently agreed to waive his appellate rights. United
States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012). While
the adequacy of the plea colloquy is central to this
determination, “the issue ultimately is evaluated by reference
to the totality of the circumstances[,] . . . including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” United
States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A] waiver is not knowingly or
voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifically
question the defendant concerning the waiver provision of the
plea agreement during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record
indicates that the defendant did not otherwise understand the
full significance of the waiver.” United States v. Manigan, 592
F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Our review of the record indicates that Manson’s waiver was
knowing and intelligent. The waiver provision was unambiguous
and prominently displayed on the first page of the plea
agreement. Manson was represented by counsel, and he testified
that he had spoken with his lawyer about the agreement. Both
Manson and his counsel signed the agreement, effectively
“represent[ing] by their signatures to the plea agreement that
[Manson] had been fully advised about, and understood, its

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terms.” Blick, 408 F.3d at 169. Additionally, during its
description of Manson’s plea agreement, the district court
advised Manson that he waived his right to appeal. While the
court did not explain the terms or scope of the appeal waiver,
or ask Manson whether he understood the waiver or the court’s
description of the plea agreement, these omissions, “standing
alone, [do] not invalidate the waiver.” United States v.
Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995). Viewing
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the waiver is
valid and enforceable.
Manson agreed to waive his right to appeal both his
conviction and sentence, except for a sentence above the
Guidelines range established at sentencing and claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct
unknown to Manson at the time of his guilty plea. Manson was
sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range, and counsel’s
challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence
falls squarely within the waiver’s compass.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in accordance with
Anders and have identified no potentially meritorious issues
that fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. We therefore
grant the motion to dismiss Manson’s appeal. This court
requires that counsel inform Manson, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

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review. If Manson requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Manson.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED

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