United States of America v. Marcus Johnson, a/k/a Jay Johnson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4840
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS JOHNSON, a/k/a Jay Johnson,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00220-1)
Submitted: April 13, 2015 Decided: April 23, 2015
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Schles, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph
Franklin Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Marcus Johnson appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to 18
months’ imprisonment, less 1 day, and 30 months’ supervised
release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding that
Johnson violated a condition of supervised release and whether
the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Although advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, Johnson has not done so. The Government has declined to
file a response brief. Following our careful review of the
record, we affirm.
A district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and
imposing a term of imprisonment is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir.
1992). The district court need only find a violation of a
condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); Copley, 978 F.2d at
831. A preponderance of the evidence “simply requires the trier
of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable

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than its nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621,
631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Johnson violated two conditions of
supervised release. Johnson voluntarily conceded to one of the
two violations, and the evidence clearly supported the court’s
finding that Johnson committed a second violation.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United
States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it falls within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. Id. In making
this determination, we first consider whether the sentence
imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable, applying
the same general considerations employed in review of original
criminal sentences. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438
(4th Cir. 2006). “This initial inquiry takes a more deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion than reasonableness review for [Sentencing
G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if
we find the sentence unreasonable will we consider whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considered the policy
statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable
to revocation sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Webb, 738 F.3d at
641. Although a district court must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence it imposes, it “need not be as detailed
or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be
when imposing a post-conviction sentence[.]” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Our review of the record reveals no
procedural or substantive error by the district court. We thus
conclude that Johnson’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform Johnson, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Johnson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

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Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Johnson. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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