United States of America v. Rauf Abdul Salam, a/k/a Pierre Demaro Banks, a/k/a Radio

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4562
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAUF ABDUL SALAM, a/k/a Pierre Demaro Banks, a/k/a Radio,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:12-cr-00073-GEC-2)
Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: April 15, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Paul G. Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. Anthony P. Giorno, Acting United
States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Daniel P. Bubar, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Franklin Sacha, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, the district court sentenced Rauf
Salam to 292 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute 1000 grams or more of
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),
846 (2012). Salam raises several challenges to his conviction
and sentence. We affirm.
Salam asserts that the district court erred in admitting
testimony by a drug trafficking expert in light of the
Government’s insufficient disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(G) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, testimony by several
coconspirators, and testimony regarding allegedly unrelated drug
activities. We review the district court’s admission of
evidence for abuse of discretion, and we “will only overturn [a]
ruling that is arbitrary and irrational.” United States v.
Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir.) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 157
(2014). Our careful review of the record on appeal leaves us
without doubt that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the challenged testimony.
Next, Salam challenges the district court’s refusal to give
a jury instruction regarding multiple conspiracies. “We review
the district court’s decision to give or refuse to give a jury
instruction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Sarwari,

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669 F.3d 401, 410-11 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A multiple conspiracy instruction “is not required
unless the proof at trial demonstrates that [the defendant]
[was] involved only in [a] separate conspiracy[y] unrelated to
the overall conspiracy charged in the indictment.” United
States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 762 (4th Cir. 2003)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because there was no evidence that Salam was involved in a
conspiracy separate from that for which he was indicted, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to give a multiple-conspiracy instruction.
Salam also argues that the district court erred by refusing
to grant a mistrial based on comments made by the Government
during closing arguments. We review the “denial of a motion for
a mistrial for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Johnson,
587 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2009). The defendant must show that
the comments were improper and prejudicial. See United States
v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 358 (4th Cir. 2012). In making the
prejudice determination, we consider four factors:
(1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have
a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the
accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or
extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of
competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of
the accused; and (4) whether the comments were
deliberately placed before the jury to divert
attention to extraneous matters.

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United States v. Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these standards to
the facts before us and assuming -- without deciding -- that the
challenged comments were improper, we conclude that Salam
suffered no prejudice and that the district court therefore did
not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.
Finally, Salam contends that the district court erred in
applying the leadership role enhancement. To qualify for this
enhancement, a defendant must have been “an organizer or leader
of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants
or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) (2013); see
also id. § 3B1.1 cmt. nn.2 & 4. Because application of this
enhancement involves a factual determination, we review for
clear error. See United States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 415
(4th Cir. 2013). After our review of the record on appeal, we
conclude that the district court did not clearly err by applying
the enhancement.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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