United States of America v. Renicka Hall

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4556
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RENICKA HALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:12-cr-00133-JFM-1)
Submitted: November 8, 2012 Decided: November 16, 2012
Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard J. Link, Jr., KARPEL & LINK, Rockville, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Hollis
Raphael Weisman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Renicka Hall was convicted, following a bench trial
before a magistrate judge, of one count of driving under the
influence, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(1) (2011), and
one count of operating a vehicle without due care, in violation
of 36 C.F.R. § 4.22(b)(1) (2011). These counts merged for
sentencing, and Hall was sentenced to one year of probation.
The district court affirmed the judgment; Hall appeals to this
court. We affirm.
First, Hall contends that the district court erred in
admitting her intoximeter test results because they constitute
inadmissible hearsay. We review a trial court’s ruling on
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c)(1)-
(2) defines hearsay as a statement, not made by the declarant at
the trial or hearing, that is offered in evidence “to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” Hearsay is generally not
admissible in evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
We held in United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225,
231 (4th Cir. 2007) that “raw data generated by [] machines do
not constitute ‘statements,’ and the machines are not
‘declarants,’” concluding that “[a]ccordingly, nothing said by a
machine is hearsay.” Washington, 498 F.3d at 231 (internal

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quotation marks omitted). Therefore, consistent with our
holding in Washington, the intoximeter results do not constitute
hearsay, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting them over Hall’s objection.
Hall also challenges the admission of the intoximeter
results on the ground that they were not introduced in
compliance with 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(c) (2011). Specifically, Hall
contends that: (1) the Government did not lay a proper
foundation that the administering officer was a person qualified
to operate the intoximeter as required by 36 C.F.R.
§ 4.23(c)(1); and (2) the Government did not show that the
intoximeter testing was conducted using accepted scientific
methods as required by 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(c)(4).
We review objections not raised in the district court
for plain error. United States v. Thomas, 669 F.3d 421, 424
(4th Cir. 2012). To establish plain error, Hall must show:
(1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error
affected her substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Even when these elements are met, we will
notice the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Hall fails to establish that the district court
committed plain error. We held in Washington that, when dealing

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with data provided by machines, “reliability concerns are
addressed by requiring the proponent to show that the machine
and its functions are reliable, that it was correctly adjusted
or calibrated, and that the data . . . put into the machine was
accurate.” 498 F.3d at 231. The foundation for the data should
be established through authentication, which can be accomplished
by presenting evidence “describing the process or system used to
produce the result and showing it produces an accurate result.”
Washington, 498 F.3d at 231 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9)). Applying
this standard, the evidence presented at trial adequately
establishes that the test results were produced using “accepted
scientific methods” that are sufficiently reliable as required
by 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(c)(4), and that the machine was operated by
a certified person pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(c)(4).
Also for the first time on appeal, Hall argues that
introduction of the intoximeter results was improper under the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. She urges this court to
reconsider our holding to the contrary in Washington, 498 F.3d
at 231-32, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (holding that statements made to
police in absence of ongoing emergency are testimonial when
primary purpose of interrogation is to establish facts relevant
to possible criminal prosecution), arguing that the

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Confrontation Clause is implicated in her case because the
intoximeter results were prepared with a view toward later
criminal prosecution. However, in Washington, decided the year
after Davis, we held that “statements made by machines are not
out-of-court statements made by declarants that are subject to
the Confrontation Clause.” Washington, 498 F.3d at 230
(internal quotation marks omitted). Hall’s argument that we
should reconsider this decision fails, as “[a] panel of this
court cannot overrule, explicitly or implicitly, the precedent
set by a prior panel of this court. Only the Supreme Court or
this court sitting en banc can do that.” Watkins v. SunTrust
Mortg., Inc., 663 F.3d 232, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Hall also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain her convictions. “In assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence presented in a bench trial, we must uphold a guilty
verdict if, taking the view most favorable to the Government,
there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.” United
States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence
that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288,
310 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

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defendant challenging evidentiary sufficiency “bears a heavy
burden,” as reversal of a conviction is limited to “the rare
case where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United
States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Section 4.23(a)(1), 36 C.F.R., prohibits “[o]perating
or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle” in a
national park area while under the influence of drugs or alcohol
“to a degree that renders the operator incapable of safe
operation.” The arresting officer testified that he observed
Hall leave the roadway and nearly hit a concrete wall before
tailgating another vehicle at highway speeds. Upon approaching
the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol from the
passenger compartment. Hall fell into the open car door when
asked to step out of the vehicle, and gave strong indications of
intoxication during field sobriety tests. Finally, Hall’s
intoximeter reading indicated a breath alcohol content higher
than the minimum level prohibited in § 4.23(a)(2). We find this
evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall
was under the influence of alcohol to a point where she was
unable to safely operate a vehicle.
This evidence also supports Hall’s conviction for
operating her vehicle without due care, in violation of
§ 4.22(b)(1). The magistrate judge made findings of fact

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crediting the arresting officer’s observations of Hall’s
vehicle, including his observation of Hall nearly hitting a
concrete wall and following another vehicle too closely, noting
that “taken together these obviously indicated that somebody was
operating a vehicle without due care.” The magistrate judge
found this evidence sufficient and provided a cogent rationale
for Hall’s conviction. We will not disturb it.
We accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment
affirming Hall’s convictions. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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