United States of America v. Humberto Longoria Moreno

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4480
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
HUMBERTO LONGORIA MORENO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Martin K.
Reidinger, District Judge. (2:10-cr-00014-MR-6)
Submitted: July 10, 2013 Decided: July 25, 2013
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denzil H. Forrester, DENZIL H. FORRESTER, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Humberto Longoria Moreno of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and money laundering, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). The
district court sentenced Moreno to a total of 151 months of
imprisonment and he now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Moreno first argues that the district court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. “We ‘review de novo the
district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act.’”
United States v. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 272 (4th
Cir. 2005)). The Speedy Trial Act provides that:
[i]n any case in which a plea of not guilty is
entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an
information or indictment with the commission of an
offense shall commence within seventy days from the
filing date (and making public) of the information or
indictment, or from the date the defendant has
appeared before a judicial officer in the court in
which such charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c)(1) (West Supp. 2013). However, periods of
delay are excludable from this calculation if they result from
the court’s granting of a defendant’s motion for a continuance,
provided that the court grants the motion “on the basis that the
ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best

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interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18
U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2013).
Here, Moreno was indicted in North Carolina, but was
arrested in Texas in September 2010 and initially appeared in a
district court in that state. His initial appearance in the
district court in North Carolina occurred on March 14, 2011, and
his trial, prior to his motion for a continuance, was set for
the May 2011 court term. We conclude that the district court
did not err in concluding that Moreno’s initial appearance
“before a judicial officer in the court in which such charge
[was] pending” was on March 14, 2011, when he appeared before
the court in North Carolina. See United States v. Wilkerson,
170 F.3d 1040, 1041-42 (11th Cir. 1999) (date for Speedy Trial
Act commences upon initial appearance in court where charges are
pending, and not in court from which the case is transferred).
As the delay between the initial trial date and the ultimate
date of trial is excludable under the Act because it was due to
the district court’s granting of Moreno’s motion for a
continuance in the interests of justice, Moreno’s rights under
the Speedy Trial Act were not violated.
Moreno next argues that the Government violated its
obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by
failing to tender to the defense all the memoranda of interviews
conducted by federal agents with Moreno’s coconspirators. “In

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Brady, the Supreme Court announced that the Due Process Clause
requires the government to disclose ‘evidence favorable to an
accused upon request . . . where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment.’” United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d
608, 619 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
In order to establish a Brady violation, Moreno must
demonstrate that the evidence at issue is favorable to him,
either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; the evidence was
suppressed by the Government; and that he was prejudiced by that
suppression. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
Favorable evidence is material if the defendant can demonstrate
that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Caro, 597 F.3d at 619. We have thoroughly reviewed
the record and conclude that Moreno has failed to demonstrate
that the Government failed to comply with its obligations under
Brady.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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