Shamia J. Duncan v. United States Postal Service Headquarters

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1818
SHAMIA J. DUNCAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE HEADQUARTERS,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, District Judge.
(1:10-cv-02097-BEL)
Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark E. Herman, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Joseph R. Baldwin, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Shamia J. Duncan appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Defendant and denying her cross-
motion for summary judgment in her civil action seeking damages
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-80 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011), for injuries
she suffered in connection with an automobile collision. Duncan
argues on appeal that the district court erred in concluding she
was contributorily negligent and, therefore, barred from
recovery under the applicable law — the tort law of Maryland —
and that the court erred in denying her cross-motion for summary
judgment. We affirm.
We review a district court’s adverse grant of summary
judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Under Maryland law, a plaintiff who is contributorily
negligent is barred from recovery in tort. See Ramos v. S. Md.
Elec. Coop., Inc., 996 F.2d 52, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
cases). Contributory negligence is defined as “the failure to
observe ordinary care for one’s own safety. It is the doing of

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something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do, or
the failure to do something that a person of ordinary prudence
would do, under the circumstances.” Menish v. Pollinger Co.,
356 A.2d 233, 236 (Md. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude
that the district court did not err in determining that Duncan
failed to exercise due care as a matter of law. The undisputed
evidence establishes that Duncan failed to observe ordinary care
for her own safety by either failing to look for traffic
approaching her at an intersection or looking in such a manner
that she failed to see the vehicle plainly approaching her.
Because such failure contributed to the collision, the district
court properly concluded that Defendant was entitled to judgment
in its favor on the question of liability under the FTCA for the
collision. Summary judgment was thus properly granted to
Defendant and denied to Duncan.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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