United States of America v. Gabriel G. Reyes

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5262
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GABRIEL G. REYES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00098-LHT-1)
Submitted: July 9, 2009 Decided: August 12, 2009
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James W. Kilbourne, Jr., DUNGAN LAW FIRM, P.A., Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Gabriel G. Reyes appeals his conviction for damaging
forest products without a permit, in violation of 36 C.F.R.
§ 261.6(a) (2008). Reyes was convicted in a bench trial before
a magistrate judge, and appealed to the district court. 18
U.S.C. §§ 3401(a), 3402 (2006). The district court affirmed
Reyes’ conviction and sentence. Reyes now appeals to this
Court, challenging the constitutionality of the regulation and
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
Reyes alleges that 36 C.F.R. § 261.6(a) is
unconstitutionally vague on its face. Claims of statutory
vagueness that do not implicate the First Amendment “must be
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.”
United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)
(quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)).
Because no First Amendment freedom is affected, our review is
limited to whether Reyes himself had fair notice that the
statute proscribed his conduct. See United States v. Hsu, 364
F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2004). Based on the record, we find
that Reyes had fair notice that the statute prohibited his
conduct. Therefore, we hold that the language of 36 C.F.R.
§ 261.6(a) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Reyes.
2

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3
Reyes also challenges the sufficiency of evidence
supporting his conviction. A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. United
States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1690 (2008). Our reversal of a conviction on
grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the
prosecution’s failure is clear. United States v. Harvey, 532
F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). A verdict must be upheld on
appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support
it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In
determining whether the evidence in the record is substantial,
this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, and inquires whether there is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to establish a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc). Here, we find sufficient evidence in the
record to support the challenged conviction.
We therefore affirm Reyes’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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