United States of America v. Jason Edward Simmons

ON REHEARING EN BANC
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JASON EDWARD SIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
NORTH CAROLINA ADVOCATES FOR No. 08-4475  JUSTICE; FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF
WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INCORPORATED; OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, for the
Middle District of North Carolina;
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, for the Eastern District
of North Carolina,
Amici Supporting Appellant. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.
Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00077-LHT-1)
Argued: May 11, 2011
Decided: August 17, 2011

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Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON,
NIEMEYER, MOTZ, KING, GREGORY, SHEDD,
DUNCAN, AGEE, DAVIS, KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ,
Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz
wrote the opinion, in which Judges King, Gregory, Shedd,
Davis, Keenan, Wynn, and Diaz joined. Judge Duncan wrote
a dissenting opinion. Judge Agee also wrote a dissenting opin-
ion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judges Wilkinson, Nie-
meyer, and Duncan joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Andrew Brady Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BAN-
ZHOFF, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew
Segal, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Amici
Supporting Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United
States Attorney, Adam Morris, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Christopher C.
Fialko, RUDOLF WIDENHOUSE & FIALKO, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice,
Amicus Supporting Appellant. Claire J. Rauscher, Executive
Director, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Defender, FED-
ERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Federal Defenders of
Western North Carolina, Incorporated, Office of the Federal
Public Defender, for the Middle District of North Carolina,
and Office of the Federal Public Defender, for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, Amici Supporting Appellant.
2 UNITED STATES v. SIMMONS

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OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
After Jason Simmons pled guilty to federal drug traffick-
ing, the district court held that his prior state conviction for
marijuana possession, for which he faced no possibility of
imprisonment, was for an offense "punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year," triggering a sentencing
enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act. This
enhancement doubled Simmons’s minimum sentence. We
affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Sim-
mons, 340 F. App’x 141 (4th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court
vacated that judgment and remanded the case to us for "fur-
ther consideration in light of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,"
130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010). A panel of this court then held that
Carachuri did not require any change in our prior holding.
See United States v. Simmons, 635 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2011).
We voted to rehear the case en banc, and for the reasons that
follow, we now vacate Simmons’s sentence and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
For first-time offenders who possess with intent to distrib-
ute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana, the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (CSA) mandates "a term of imprisonment" of at
least five years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). But for offend-
ers who engage in such conduct "after a prior conviction for
a felony drug offense has become final," the CSA mandates
a "term of imprisonment" of at least ten years. Id. A separate
provision of the CSA defines a "felony drug offense" as a
drug-related "offense that is punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year under any law . . . of a State." Id.
§ 802(44).
On August 6, 2007, a federal grand jury returned an indict-
ment charging Simmons with three counts of marijuana traf-
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ficking under the CSA. The Government subsequently filed a
Bill of Information, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, alleging that
Simmons’s 1996 North Carolina conviction for possession
with intent to distribute marijuana constituted a predicate "fel-
ony drug" conviction triggering the ten-year statutory mini-
mum sentence set forth in the CSA. Simmons pled guilty to
the federal charges but contended that his prior North Caro-
lina conviction could not serve as a predicate for an enhanced
sentence. The district court rejected Simmons’s objection to
the enhancement and sentenced him to ten years’ imprison-
ment.1 Without the disputed sentencing enhancement, Sim-
mons’s Guidelines range would have been 63-78 months.
In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed Simmons’s sen-
tence, although we acknowledged that Simmons "could not
have received a sentence in excess of twelve months" for his
North Carolina conviction. Simmons, 340 F. App’x at 143.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in
this and a number of other cases, remanding the cases to us
for reconsideration in light of Carachuri. See United States v.
Thompson, No. 3:05-CR-294-2, 2010 WL 4236532, *3
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2010) (collecting cases). A panel of this
Court concluded that Carachuri "does not implicate the anal-
ysis at issue in this case," 635 F.3d at 146-47, and so again
affirmed the judgment of the district court. We then voted to
vacate the panel opinion and rehear the case en banc.
1The district court imposed concurrent 120-month sentences for each of
the three counts. Two of the three counts charged Simmons with posses-
sion with intent to distribute under 50 kilograms of marijuana, for which
the CSA establishes statutory maximums of ten years for recidivist posses-
sion and five years for first-time possession. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D).
Simmons thus received the statutory maximum for these two counts. The
remaining count charged Simmons with conspiracy to distribute at least
100 kilograms of marijuana, which triggered the 10-year statutory mini-
mum required by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Therefore, our holding that
Simmons possesses no "prior conviction for a felony drug offense" fixes
his maximum sentence for the two lesser counts at five years, and it
reduces to five years the minimum sentence for the remaining count.
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II.
A proper analysis of Simmons’s sentencing enhancement
requires that we first place his prior North Carolina conviction
in the context of the unique statutory regime mandated by the
North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act ("the Act").
A.
The Act creates felony sentences strictly contingent on two
factors: the designated "class of offense" and the offender’s
"prior record level." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.13(b). Both
factors are established by statute. The Act, or in some cases
another state statute creating the offense of conviction, speci-
fies the class of offense. Id. § 15A-1340.17(a). The Act man-
dates that the sentencing judge determine an offender’s prior
record level by adding together the point levels (which the
Act assigns) of each of the offender’s prior convictions. Id.
§ 15A-1340.14(a)-(b). The State bears the burden of proving
the existence of these prior convictions. Id. § 15A-1340.14(f).
The Act then requires the sentencing judge to match the
offense class and prior record level pursuant to a statutory
table, which provides three possible sentencing ranges—a
mitigated range, a presumptive range, and an aggravated
range. Id. § 15A-1340.17(c). The presumptive range governs
unless the judge makes written findings that identify specific
factors, separately designated by the Act, that permit a depar-
ture to the aggravated or mitigated range. Id. §§ 15A-
1340.13(e), 15A-1340.16(c). Moreover, the Act provides that
a judge may select from the aggravated range only if the State
has provided a defendant thirty-days’ notice of its intent to
prove the necessary aggravating factors, id. § 15A-
1340.16(a6), and a jury has found beyond a reasonable doubt
(or the defendant has pled to) the existence of those factors,
id. §§ 15A-1340.16(a)-(a1).
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Once the judge identifies the appropriate range, the Act
provides that he must choose the defendant’s minimum sen-
tence from within that range.2 Id. § 15A-1340.17(c). After the
judge chooses a defendant’s minimum sentence, a separate
statutory chart then supplies the defendant’s corresponding
maximum sentence. Id. §§ 15A-1340.17(d), (e). The Act,
unlike the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, prohibits a sentenc-
ing judge from imposing a maximum sentence higher than the
one fixed by the statutory chart. Id. §§ 15A-1340.13(b), (c).
B.
North Carolina designates Simmons’s predicate offense—
possession with intent to sell no more than ten pounds of
marijuana—as a Class I felony. Id. §§ 90-94, 90-95(b)(2); cf.
id. § 90-95(h)(1). Under the Act, a Class I felony is punish-
able by a sentence exceeding twelve months’ imprisonment
only if the State satisfies two conditions. First, the State must
prove (or the defendant must plead to) the existence of aggra-
vating factors sufficient to warrant the imposition of an aggra-
vated sentence. Id. § 15A-1340.16(a). Second, the State must
demonstrate that the defendant possesses fourteen or more
criminal history points, resulting in a "prior record level" of
at least 5. Id. § 15A-1340.14(c)(5). If the State fails to satisfy
either of these conditions, a Class I offender can never receive
more than one year’s imprisonment. Id. §§ 15A-1340.17(c)-
(d).
The State satisfied neither condition in this case. First, the
State did not provide Simmons notice of intent to prove any
aggravating factors; this foreclosed the sentencing judge from
imposing an aggravated sentence. Second, because as a first-
time offender Simmons possessed a "prior record level" of
2In rare cases in which a judge finds the presence of "extraordinary mit-
igating factors," he may impose a lesser sentence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1340.13(g). But a judge possesses no discretion to impose a more severe
sentence even in extraordinary cases.
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only 1, the Act established a minimum sentencing range of
four-to-six months’ community punishment (no imprison-
ment) and capped his maximum sentence at eight months’
community punishment (again no imprisonment). Id. §§ 15A-
1340.17(c)-(d); id. §§ 15A-1340.11(1)-(2). In compliance
with these requirements, the state judge did not sentence Sim-
mons to a single day of imprisonment, instead imposing only
six-to-eight months’ community punishment.
III.
Nevertheless, the Government correctly notes that if United
States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005), controls here,
Simmons cannot prevail in challenging his sentence. In Harp,
we held that "to determine whether a conviction is for a crime
punishable by a prison term exceeding one year" under North
Carolina law, "we consider the maximum aggravated sentence
that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with
the worst possible criminal history." Id. at 246 (emphasis
omitted). In our original 2009 unpublished opinion resolving
Simmons’s appeal, we followed Harp and held that Simmons
was convicted of an offense "punishable" by more than one
year’s imprisonment. The Supreme Court has vacated that
judgment and ordered us to reconsider the case in light of its
subsequent precedent. After consideration of that precedent,
we now conclude that Harp no longer remains good law.
A.
Last year, in Carachuri, the Supreme Court examined a
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that
allows an alien to seek cancellation of removal only if he "has
not been convicted of any aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)(3). The statute further defines the term "aggra-
vated felony" as including a "drug trafficking crime," id.
§ 1101(a)(43)(B), which another statute defines as including
"any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act,"
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). A final statutory provision limits a
7 UNITED STATES v. SIMMONS

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qualifying "felony" to "a crime for which the ‘maximum term
of imprisonment authorized’ is ‘more than one year.’" Car-
achuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)).
Thus, at bottom the question presented was whether Carachuri
had been "convicted of" a crime "punishable as a federal fel-
ony" under the CSA –- that is, a crime for which the "maxi-
mum term of imprisonment authorized" under the CSA
exceeds one year. Id. at 2583.
In 2004, Carachuri had received a 20-day sentence for pos-
sessing less than two ounces of marijuana in violation of
Texas law. See id. at 2583. In 2005, he received a 10-day sen-
tence for possessing a Xanax tablet without a prescription,
also in violation of Texas law. Id. at 2583. Although Texas
law permitted an enhanced sentence for recidivist possession,
Texas did not seek to use the 2004 conviction to enhance Car-
achuri’s sentence for his 2005 conviction. Id. at 2583.
In contending that the 2005 Texas conviction nevertheless
constituted a predicate "aggravated felony" conviction under
the INA, the Government argued that if Carachuri had faced
federal prosecution for the 2005 offense, he could have "re-
ceived a 2-year sentence." Id. at 2582. This was so because
federal law provides for a sentence of up to two years for drug
possession, as long as the offender has a "prior conviction for
any drug . . . offense chargeable under the law of any State."
21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Given Carachuri’s prior 2004 conviction,
he hypothetically could have received a two-year federal sen-
tence for his 2005 Xanax offense. In view of this hypothetical,
the Government argued that Carachuri’s 2005 conviction was
for an aggravated felony that was "punishable" by imprison-
ment for more than one year, even though he actually
received a sentence of only ten days’ imprisonment. Car-
achuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2587.
Although the Fifth Circuit had accepted this argument, see
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2009),
the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it. Focusing on the
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INA’s use of the phrase "convicted of a[n] aggravated fel-
ony," the Supreme Court reasoned that the "text thus indicates
that we are to look to the conviction itself as our starting
place." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2586. Turning to Carachuri’s
2005 conviction, and noting that it contained "no finding of
the fact of his prior drug offense," the Court held that Car-
achuri was "not actually convicted" of an offense punishable
by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Id. at 2586-87
(internal quotation omitted).
In Carachuri the Government also contended, in an argu-
ment parallel to that pressed here, that the CSA provision
under which Carachuri could have been punished created only
one "offense," and that the existence of a prior conviction was
merely a "predicate for an enhanced sentence, not an element
of the offense." Carachuri, Respondent’s Br. at 24. The Gov-
ernment thus argued that Carachuri’s conviction was for an
"offense"—drug possession—that was potentially "punish-
able" by an enhanced sentence, even though the CSA reserved
enhanced sentences for recidivists.
The Supreme Court also specifically rejected this argument.
It acknowledged that the statutory text of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)
did not "expressly define a separate offense of ‘recidivist sim-
ple possession.’" Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3. But
because "the fact of a prior conviction must still be found . . .
before a defendant is subject to felony punishment," the Court
viewed § 844(a) as containing a "felony simple possession
provision" that is "separate and distinct from the misdemeanor
simple possession offense." Id. Accordingly, the Court held
that Carachuri had been convicted only of the "misdemeanor
simple possession" offense, for which he could have received
a maximum punishment of only one year.
Of course, Carachuri involved use of a predicate convic-
tion for immigration purposes rather than for criminal sen-
tencing. However, in Carachuri the Supreme Court stated that
its "[l]inking" of the "inquiry to the record of conviction com-
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ports with how [it] ha[d] categorized convictions" for criminal
sentencing purposes. Id. at 2587 n.12.3 As support for this
statement, the Court cited United States v. Rodriquez, 553
U.S. 377 (2008). In Rodriquez, the Court permitted reliance
on a recidivist enhancement for the purpose of determining
whether a prior state conviction qualified as a predicate for a
federal sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA). Id. at 393. But the Court cautioned
that when a judgment of conviction, charging document, or
plea colloquy "do[es] not show that the defendant faced the
possibility of a recidivist enhancement, it may well be that the
Government will be precluded from establishing that a con-
viction was for a qualifying offense." Id. at 389 (emphasis
added). In Carachuri, the Court went even further, explaining
that in Rodriquez it had "held that a recidivist finding could
set the ‘maximum term of imprisonment,’ but only when the
finding is a part of the record of conviction." 130 S. Ct. at
2587 n.12 (emphasis added).
B.
With the analysis established in Carachuri and Rodriquez
in mind, we turn to the determination of whether Simmons’s
1996 conviction was for an offense "punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year" and so qualifies as a
predicate felony conviction for purposes of the CSA.
3Thus, the Carachuri Court itself rejected the Government’s suggestion
in this case, adopted by Judge Duncan in dissent, that the Carachuri analy-
sis applies only in the deportation context. Moreover, the ultimate question
facing the Court in Carachuri was whether Carachuri’s conduct was "pun-
ishable" as a felony under the CSA—the same statute that is at issue here.
See Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2582. That Carachuri analyzed the CSA in
the "deportation context" renders its holding no less binding in the "crimi-
nal context," because, as the Supreme Court has explained, courts "must
interpret the statute consistently" across both contexts. Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
10 UNITED STATES v. SIMMONS

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1.
"[T]he conviction itself" must serve as our "starting place."
Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2586. Examination of Simmons’s
1996 state conviction demonstrates that he committed a Class
I felony, but as a first-time offender possessed a prior record
level of only 1, and thus could not have received a sentence
exceeding eight months’ community punishment. N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 15A-1340.17(c)-(d).
Because the state sentencing court never made the recidi-
vist finding necessary to expose Simmons to a higher sen-
tence, Carachuri teaches that the Government cannot now
rely on such a finding to "set the maximum term of imprison-
ment." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2587 n.12 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, Simmons’s conviction exemplifies
the hypothetical to which the Supreme Court alluded in
Rodriquez, i.e. a case "in which the records that may properly
be consulted do not show that the defendant faced the possi-
bility of a recidivist enhancement." Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at
389. In such a situation, the Supreme Court has held that the
Government is "precluded from establishing that a conviction
was for a qualifying offense" on the basis of such a hypotheti-
cal enhancement. Id.; see also Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2587
n.12 (characterizing this as a holding).
To be sure, in Rodriquez the Court also rejected the argu-
ment that "guidelines systems," which "typically allow a sen-
tencing judge to impose a sentence that exceeds the top of the
guidelines range," serve to "decrease the ‘maximum term’ of
imprisonment." 553 U.S. at 390. On the basis of this observa-
tion, the Government argues that Rodriquez forbids us from
relying on the Structured Sentencing Act to "decrease the
maximum term of imprisonment" Simmons could have
served. But the Act does not establish a "guidelines sys-
tem[ ]"; rather, it mandates specific sentences. See State v.
Norris, 630 S.E.2d 915, 917-18 (N.C. 2006). Thus, we do not
rely on the Act to "decrease" the maximum term of imprison-
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ment Simmons could have served, but rather to establish that
maximum term of imprisonment. For, unlike the sort of
"guidelines systems" referred to in Rodriquez, no circum-
stances exist under the Structured Sentencing Act in which a
North Carolina judge may "impose a sentence that exceeds
the top" of the "range" set forth in the Act. Rodriquez, 553
U.S. at 390.
Our conclusion that the Act serves as a legislative mandate
and not as a "guidelines system[ ]" accords with that of the
other courts of appeal to have considered this question. See
United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2008).
In Pruitt, the Sixth Circuit assessed the impact of
Rodriquez on North Carolina predicate convictions under
ACCA, and it found "no reasonable basis on which to distin-
guish the North Carolina" Act from "the recidivism enhance-
ment provision at issue in Rodriquez." Id. at 423. The Pruitt
court thus concluded that "it is necessary to consider the
defendant’s particular prior record level—and not merely the
worst prior record level –- in determining whether a convic-
tion was for an offense ‘punishable’ by a term exceeding one
year." Id. at 424. Although in our earlier unpublished opinion
in this case we held that Rodriquez did not require rejection
of the Harp rule, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis now seems
clearly correct given the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling
in Carachuri. See 130 S. Ct. at 2587 n.12.
Our determination that Carachuri undermines our previous
approach mirrors that made in Haltiwanger. There, the Eighth
Circuit analyzed whether a prior conviction for a violation of
Kansas law qualified as a "felony drug offense" under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). 637 F.3d at 882-83. As in North Carolina,
the "Kansas sentencing structure ties a particular defendant’s
criminal history to the maximum term of imprisonment." Id.
at 884. The Eighth Circuit initially upheld a sentencing
enhancement by looking to the "maximum penalty that could
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be imposed for the same crime on other recidivist offenders,"
but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsidera-
tion in light of Carachuri. Id. at 882-83. Upon reconsidera-
tion, the Eighth Circuit reversed course and held that "where
a maximum term of imprisonment . . . is directly tied to recid-
ivism," the "actual recidivist finding . . . must be part of a par-
ticular defendant’s record of conviction for the conviction to
qualify as a felony." Id. at 884.
2.
Carachuri also forbids us from considering hypothetical
aggravating factors when calculating Simmons’s maximum
punishment. We again focus first on Simmons’s "conviction
itself," Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2586, and his conviction
makes clear that he was neither charged with nor convicted of
an aggravated offense, and that he therefore could not receive
a sentence exceeding one year’s imprisonment. As in Car-
achuri, the "mere possibility that [Simmons’s] conduct, cou-
pled with facts outside the record of conviction, could have
authorized" a conviction of a crime punishable by more than
one year’s imprisonment cannot and does not demonstrate
that Simmons was actually convicted of such a crime.4 Id. at
2589.
The panoply of procedural protections afforded to offend-
ers facing a potentially aggravated sentence further strength-
ens this conclusion. As detailed above, an offender can
receive an aggravated sentence only if: (1) North Carolina
provides him with 30-days’ notice of its intent to prove the
necessary aggravating factors, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
4We recognize that this conclusion is at odds with that of the Sixth Cir-
cuit, which upheld, over Judge Merritt’s dissent, resort to the aggravated
range in calculating an offense’s maximum punishment. See Pruitt, 545
F.3d at 421-22; id. at 426-30 (Merritt, J., dissenting). This holding in
Pruitt, however, preceded Carachuri, in which the Supreme Court
expressly directed courts not to take into account potential facts "outside
of the record of conviction." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2589.
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1340.16(a6); (2) he admits (or a jury finds) the existence of
those factors, id. § 15A-1340.16(a1); and (3) the sentencing
judge issues written findings justifying such a sentence. Id.
§ 15A-1340.16(c).
These protections closely resemble the "mandatory notice
and process requirements," contained in 21 U.S.C. § 851,
which figured in the Carachuri reasoning. See 130 S. Ct. at
2587-88. There, the Supreme Court concluded that to account
for a hypothetical enhancement –- of which the Government
never provided Carachuri notice—would be to "dismiss these
procedures as meaningless." Id. The same holds true here.
North Carolina prosecutors declined to pursue Simmons as an
aggravated offender, and we will not second-guess their judg-
ment. See id. at 2588 (noting that the application of a sentenc-
ing enhancement "after the fact" based on factors that the
State did not allege would "denigrate the independent judg-
ment of state prosecutors").5
IV.
The Government does not dispute that Carachuri held that
"a recidivist finding" can "only" "set the ‘maximum term of
imprisonment’ . . . when the finding is a part of the record of
conviction." Id. at 2587 n.12. The Government also recog-
nizes, as it must, that the only other appellate courts to have
5We note that § 851 (the federal procedural statute analyzed in Car-
achuri) and the North Carolina Act differ in some respects. On one hand,
§ 851, unlike the Act, requires a prosecutor to "file[ ] an information with
the court" specifying the basis for the enhancement. Compare 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(a)(1) with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(a4). On the other hand, the Act
contains two protections that § 851 lacks: a jury’s finding (or an admis-
sion) of aggravating factors and written judicial findings justifying impo-
sition of an aggravated sentence. See id. §§ 15A-1340.16(a1), (c).
Notwithstanding these differences, § 851 and the Act function identically
in providing the elements crucial to the Carachuri Court’s analysis: both
provide the defendant "notice of the Government’s intent," and both "au-
thorize prosecutors to exercise discretion when electing whether to pursue
[an] . . . enhancement." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2587-88.
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considered the question have held that Supreme Court prece-
dent requires rejection of enhancements similar to the one
here. Tellingly, in neither case did the Government seek
rehearing en banc. Nonetheless, the Government insists that
Harp remains good law and that we should distinguish Car-
achuri.6 We find neither of these arguments persuasive.
A.
Contrary to the Government’s contention, Carachuri
directly undermines the Harp rationale. In Harp we analyzed
a sentencing enhancement that turned on the presence of a
prior conviction for a "crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year." Harp, 406 F.3d at 246 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)). We held that "‘punishable’ is an adjec-
tive used to describe ‘crime,’" and that "it is more closely
linked to the conduct, the crime, than it is to the individual
convicted of the conduct." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, we concluded that a North Carolina conviction is for "a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year" if "any defendant charged with that crime could receive
a sentence of more than one year." Id. (emphasis in original).7
6In a Rule 28(j) letter, the Government contends that McNeill v. United
States, 2011 WL 2175212 (2011), supports its position. McNeill held that
a defendant’s predicate North Carolina drug offenses, for which he had
received 10-year sentences, qualified under ACCA as offenses carrying a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years, even though those state
offenses did not carry a 10-year maximum at the time of his federal con-
viction. Nothing in McNeill undermines our holding here, for crucial to the
McNeill holding was the fact that "North Carolina courts actually sen-
tenced [McNeill] to ten years in prison." Id. at *4. In contrast, no North
Carolina court "actually sentenced" Simmons to any imprisonment. More-
over, because McNeill’s predicate convictions occurred before the Act’s
enactment, the Court held that the Act did not even apply to those convic-
tions. Id. at *6. Thus, as the Government concedes, the issue of how to
calculate the maximum punishment of an offense under the Act was "not
before the Court" in McNeill.
7The principal dissent maintains that, had Congress intended our read-
ing of the statute, it could have defined a "felony drug offense" as an "of-
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This reasoning assumes that an offender’s conduct alone
determines the nature of his "crime." This is of course true for
constitutional purposes. See Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3
(noting that the "Constitution does not require treating recidi-
vism as an element of the offense"). But Carachuri rejected
this conclusion for purposes of analyzing whether a prior state
conviction constitutes a predicate permitting the application
of a federal sentencing enhancement. There, the Supreme
Court made clear that when a state statute provides a harsher
punishment applicable only to recidivists, it creates different
"offenses" for the purpose of federal sentencing enhance-
ments. Thus, even though the statute setting forth the predi-
cate offense in Carachuri, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), proscribed
only one type of conduct—"possess[ion of] a controlled sub-
stance" -– the Court held that it created "separate and distinct"
offenses of "misdemeanor simple possession" and "felony
simple possession." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3. It did
so because "the fact of a prior conviction must nevertheless
be found . . . before a defendant is subject" to punishment
exceeding one year’s imprisonment. Id.; see also id. (repeat-
ing that "the fact of a prior conviction must still be found
before a defendant is subject to felony punishment").8
fense for which the defendant is punished by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year." Certainly, Congress could have been clearer. How-
ever, that argument cuts both ways; if Congress had intended the dissent’s
reading, it could have written the statute in terms of "an offense for which
any defendant could be subject to punishment for more than one year."
8The principal dissent asserts that it too "looks only at the fact of Sim-
mons’ prior conviction." This contention totally misreads Carachuri. By
"prior conviction," the Carachuri Court was referring to a conviction,
imposed prior to a predicate conviction, which transformed a predicate
conviction for "simple" possession into one for "recidivist" possession.
130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3. By contrast, the "prior conviction" to which the dis-
sent "looks" is merely Simmons’s predicate conviction itself. The dissent
completely ignores the fact that Simmons—at the time of that predicate
conviction in 1996—lacked the sort of "prior conviction" that would have
converted the 1996 offense of conviction into a recidivist crime. It is only
by overlooking this absence of a "prior conviction," i.e. a conviction prior
to the 1996 predicate conviction, that the dissent can conclude that Sim-
mons’s predicate conviction was for an "offense" punishable by a sentence
reserved for recidivist possession.
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Rodriquez is consistent with this conclusion. There the
Court held that when a "defendant is given a higher sentence
under a recidivism statute," his sentence "is a stiffened pen-
alty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggra-
vated offense because [it is] a repetitive one." 553 U.S. at 386
(internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). In other words,
repetition transforms the underlying criminal conduct into an
aggravated, different "offense." A first-time offender does not
commit such an aggravated, repetitive "offense"; he therefore
cannot be convicted of any offense "punishable" by a term of
imprisonment reserved for repeat offenders. In this case, Sim-
mons’s 1996 North Carolina conviction was for only non-
aggravated, first-time marijuana possession. Accordingly, his
"offense" was not "punishable" by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year, which is reserved for repeat offenders.
B.
Given these facts, Carachuri and Rodriquez clearly fore-
close reliance on Harp. The Government, while barely men-
tioning Rodriquez, attempts to distinguish Carachuri on three
grounds. We address each in turn.
1.
First, the Government claims that, unlike the statute at issue
in Carachuri, the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act
"does not . . . define separate recidivist offenses." Appellee’s
Br. at 7. This is assertedly so because the Act creates eighteen
sentencing ranges for each felony class. The Government
argues that the Act therefore fails to create separate offenses
because it recognizes "gradations of recidivism," while the
statute in Carachuri differentiated between offenses based
"solely on the fact of recidivism." Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
The Government’s argument rests on a false premise. Con-
trary to the Government’s contention, the statute in Carachuri
did not create distinctions based "solely on the fact of recidi-
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vism"; rather, it provided three sentences corresponding to
three different gradations of recidivism. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 844(a) (providing a maximum of one year’s imprisonment
if a defendant is a first-time offender, two years’ imprison-
ment if a defendant has a "prior conviction," and three years’
imprisonment if he has "two or more prior convictions"). Per-
haps because of this, nothing in Carachuri offers any support
for the Government’s "gradations" argument. The Supreme
Court there inferred "separate and distinct" offenses because
"recidivist . . . possession" (in reality the intermediate punish-
ment provided by the statute) required proof of "the fact of a
prior conviction." 130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3. The same is true
here. Like the statute at issue in Carachuri, the North Caro-
lina Structured Sentencing Act metes out harsher punishment
only when the prosecution proves "the fact" of a defendant’s
prior convictions. Thus, when used as a predicate for federal
sentencing purposes, the Act creates separate offenses that in
turn yield separate maximum punishments.9
2.
Second, the Government suggests that the Carachuri hold-
ing does not apply here because the state predicate for which
Simmons was convicted was a "Class I felony," while the
state predicate for which Carachuri was convicted was not a
"recidivist offense." Appellee’s Br. at 9. This argument too
rests on a false premise; it assumes that the "Class I felony"
for which Simmons was convicted constitutes the sort of "re-
cidivist offense" that Carachuri avoided. But as explained
above, Simmons’s "Class I felony" does not qualify as a "re-
9Contrary to the suggestion of the principal dissent, our holding estab-
lishes no "unworkable rule." Rather, it requires examination of three
pieces of evidence: the offense class, the offender’s prior record level, and
the applicability of the aggravated sentencing range. All three appear
prominently on the first page of an offender’s state record of conviction.
See N.C. Forms AOC-CR-601, AOC-CR-603. From this, it is a simple
matter to refer to the statutory table provided by the Structured Sentencing
Act and compute the applicable maximum punishment.
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cidivist offense," because Simmons’s record of conviction—
like Carachuri’s—lacked the finding necessary to expose him
to a recidivist sentence. Accordingly, the North Carolina
Structured Sentencing Act restricted Simmons’s maximum
sentence to eight months’ community punishment, in the
same way that § 844(a) restricted Carachuri’s maximum sen-
tence to one year.
Of course, the analysis in Carachuri was more complicated
than that here. The question of whether Carachuri’s predicate
offense qualified as an "aggravated felony" under the INA
turned on whether the "‘proscribe[d] conduct’ of [his] state
offense" was "punishable as a felony under . . . federal law."
Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2588 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales,
549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)). In other words, the INA required
resort to a hypothetical—an assessment of whether Carachuri,
by committing a state crime, had committed a "fictional fed-
eral felony."10 Id. But the Government went further, asking
the Court to consider whether state prosecutors could have
charged Carachuri with conduct that in turn could have corre-
sponded to such a fictional federal crime; the Government’s
argument therefore relied on a "hypothetical to a hypotheti-
cal." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The inquiry here is simpler, because 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B) does not require comparison of Simmons’s
10The principal dissent errs in asserting that this "state-to-federal offense
‘extrapolation’ analysis" explains the Court’s "look at the specific charac-
teristics of Carachuri’s conduct." Rather, this "extrapolation analysis"
required only that the Court assess whether Carachuri’s "state offense . . .
proscribe[d] conduct punishable as a felony under federal law." Lopez,
549 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added). Thus, what the dissent characterizes as
the "Lopez analysis" focuses on the predicate offense, not on the "specific
characteristics" of the defendant’s conduct. The Carachuri Court looked
to those "specific characteristics" because it had to determine the nature
of Carachuri’s predicate "offense." In doing so, the Court concluded that
Carachuri’s predicate offense (like Simmons’s here) was simple, not recid-
ivist, drug possession. See Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3.
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state offense to a fictional federal crime. That simplicity,
however, does not render the Carachuri holding inapplicable
here. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the Government’s
argument in Carachuri had nothing to do with the number of
hypotheticals in the analysis; after all, established precedent
required resort to the initial hypothetical in determining
whether a state offense was "punishable" as a federal felony.
See Lopez, 549 U.S. at 55-56. In Carachuri the Court simply
took issue with the specific character of the Government’s
second hypothetical—the consideration of "facts not at issue
in the crime of conviction . . . to determine whether
Carachuri-Rosendo could have been charged with a federal
felony." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2588 (emphasis omitted).
Such reliance on "facts not at issue in the crime of conviction"
runs afoul of Carachuri, regardless of how many hypotheti-
cals pervade the overall inquiry. Accordingly, because no
findings of recidivism or aggravation appear in Simmons’s
state record of conviction, those enhancements may not be
considered in determining whether Simmons’s offense consti-
tutes a "felony drug offense" under the CSA.
3.
Third, the Government insists that Simmons’s prior convic-
tion, unlike Carachuri’s, was for "conduct that one would
expect would be ‘punishable’ by more than one year in
prison." Appellee’s Br. at 10. But the Government has pro-
vided no evidence in support of the assertion that "one would
expect" Simmons’s first-time possession of less than ten
pounds of marijuana to trigger a sentence of imprisonment
exceeding one year. After all, North Carolina judged Sim-
mons’s crime worthy of no imprisonment—making it in one
sense even less serious than Carachuri’s crime. See Car-
achuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2580 (noting that Carachuri received
prison time). Surely well-established federalism principles do
not permit a federal court to reject North Carolina’s judgment
as to the seriousness of a North Carolina crime, prosecuted in
a North Carolina court and adjudicated by a North Carolina
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judge, merely because the federal court might "expect" a more
serious punishment.
Indeed, it is the Government’s approach—requiring a fed-
eral court to calculate an offender’s maximum punishment by
interpreting a prior state offense in a manner outlawed by the
state—that invites results that are, as in Carachuri, "coun-
terintuitive and unorthodox." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2585
(internal quotation omitted). For example, the Government’s
approach would dictate that a federal court treat a pharma-
cist’s first-time failure to check a minor’s identification before
selling Sudafed –- a misdemeanor for which a North Carolina
offender faces a maximum of only 45 days’ community pun-
ishment, see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-113.52(c), 90-113.56(b),
15A-1340.23(c)—as a predicate offense "punishable" by
nearly two decades of imprisonment. See id. §§ 90-113.56(b)
(providing that a third-time offender commits a Class I fel-
ony), 14-7.1 & 14-7.6 (permitting a "habitual felon" convicted
for a Class I felony to be punished as a Class C felon), 15A-
1340.17(c), (e) (fixing the maximum punishment for an
aggravated and recidivist Class C felony at 228 months’
imprisonment).
Or to take another example: under the North Carolina
Structured Sentencing Act, a daycare provider who willfully
administers any over-the-counter medication to a child, with-
out written parental authorization, commits a Class A1 misde-
meanor for which a first-time offender faces a maximum
sentence of sixty days’ imprisonment. Id. §§ 110-102.1A(a),
(d), 15A-1340.23. Yet the Government’s approach—requiring
calculation of an offense’s maximum term of imprisonment
by reference to an imagined worst-case offender—would
require a federal court to consider this daycare provider as
having committed an offense "punishable" by 228 months’
imprisonment. Id. §§ 14-50.22 (converting any Class A1 mis-
demeanor into a Class I felony if performed "in association
with[ ] any criminal street gang"), 14-7.1, 14-7.6 (converting
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Class I felony committed by a "habitual felon" into Class C
felony), 15A-1340.17(c), (e).
Such an approach—requiring federal courts to treat even
minor state crimes as serious felonies—makes a mockery of
North Carolina’s carefully crafted sentencing scheme. It also
disregards the rationale of Carachuri, which emphasized that
federal courts should not apply hypothetical sentencing
enhancements "after the fact" in a manner that would "deni-
grate the independent judgment of state prosecutors to execute
the laws" of their states. 130 S. Ct. at 2588. No less than the
Texas prosecutors in Carachuri, the North Carolina legisla-
ture deserves our deference here. And that legislature has cho-
sen to adopt a strictly regimented sentencing scheme that
requires sentencing judges to "effectively tailor[ ] the statu-
tory maximum punishment available to each individual defen-
dant." Pruitt, 545 F.3d at 420. We cannot upend this scheme
by lumping all defendants—and virtually all crimes—into the
same category for the purposes of federal sentencing.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Simmons’s sentence
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.11
VACATED AND REMANDED
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I am in complete agreement with Judge Agee’s thoughtful
dissent and write separately only to explain the basis of my
11Before the original panel, Simmons also argued that the district court
erred in "failing to provide a hearing" so that he "could establish that
counsel in his 1996 conviction provided ineffective assistance." Simmons,
340 F. App’x at 144-45. The panel properly rejected this argument. The
CSA establishes a strict five-year statute of limitations governing chal-
lenges to prior convictions, see 21 U.S.C. § 851(e), and Simmons first
raised this argument over a decade after his 1996 conviction.
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conviction that the statutory language must cabin our inquiry.
Although I have the greatest respect for the majority’s
attempts to grapple with Carachuri, I remain unconvinced
that that decision, based on an unrelated, civil statutory
scheme, offers any clear direction here. In that sense, it is not
unique. As Justice Scalia recently observed, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence has hardly distilled ACCA’s murky
waters. Derby v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2858, 2860 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Supreme Court’s
ACCA decisions as "incomprehensible to judges"). In such
circumstances, it is particularly compelling that we navigate
those waters by the plain light of the statutory text.
Here, that text does not ask whether the defendant had a
"prior conviction" for which he could be punished by more
than one year of imprisonment. To the contrary, it compels us
to determine whether the defendant had a prior conviction for
"an offense that is punishable" by more than one year of
incarceration under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Under North
Carolina law, Simmons’s Class I felony offense was so pun-
ishable. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.17, 90-95(a). In my
view, that ends our inquiry.
AGEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority opinion correctly identifies the issue on
appeal in this case: whether the analysis set forth in United
States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005), remains good
law in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States
v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008), and Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) ("Carachuri"). Cf. Maj. op. at
7. Because I do not find that either decision compels a result
contrary to the plain language of the relevant statutes, I find
no error in imposition of an enhanced sentence under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) and would affirm the district court’s
judgment that Simmons’ prior North Carolina state conviction
constituted a "felony drug offense" as defined in 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(44).
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I.
The proper starting point is the relevant statutory language.
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, ___, 129 S. Ct. 681,
685 (2009) ("As with any question of statutory interpretation,
our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.")
(citation omitted); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508
U.S. 402, 409 (1993) ("The starting point in interpreting a
statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter.") (quotation and citation omit-
ted). Twenty-one U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) provides that any
person convicted of possession with intent to distribute less
than 50 kilograms of marijuana "after a prior conviction for
a felony drug offense has become final, shall be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years . . . ." As
defined by Congress, a "felony drug offense" is "an offense
that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
under any law of the United States or of a State . . . ." 21
U.S.C. § 802(44). Thus, in order for Simmons to be subject to
the enhanced sentencing provisions of § 841(b)(1)(D), he
must have "a prior conviction for" "an offense that is punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year."
Critical to the analysis is the fact that Congress chose in
§ 802(44) not to define "felony drug offense" in terms of an
individual defendant’s particular sentencing factors, but in
terms of the statutorily created offense. As we explained in
Harp, because the word "punishable" is an adjective that
describes "offense," the plain language of § 802(44) points to
an offense-based analysis rather than a defendant-based anal-
ysis. 406 F.3d at 246 (Punishable "is more closely linked to
the conduct, the crime, than it is to the individual convicted
of the conduct." (quoting United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d
205, 207 (4th Cir. 1999))).
As more fully explained below, the ratio decidendi of nei-
ther Carachuri nor Rodriquez alter this common sense read-
ing of the clear terms of § 802(44). That statute thus requires
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examining whether the statutory offense — not the particular
defendant’s conduct — is "punishable" by more than one year
of imprisonment. See Jimenez, 129 S. Ct. at 685 ("It is well
established that, when the statutory language is plain, we must
enforce it according to its terms."). We must apply the statute
as Congress has written it regardless of how other terms in
other statutes may be construed. United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ("The task of resolving the
dispute over the meaning of [the statute] begins where all
such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute
itself. In this case it is also where the inquiry should end, for
where, as here, the statute’s language is plain, the sole func-
tion of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.")
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Had Congress intended a different result, it could have
written § 802(44) differently. As this court observed in Jones,
Congress could have written § 922(g)(1) differently
had it intended to focus on the individual in particu-
lar rather than the crime for which the individual was
convicted. Instead of the phrase "individual con-
victed . . . of a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year," Congress could have
used the phrase, "individual punished by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year" or even "indi-
vidual sentenced for imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year."
195 F.3d at 207 (first two emphases added). Similarly, the
construction propounded by the majority rewrites § 802(44) to
define "felony drug offense" not as "an offense that is punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year," but as, for
example, "an offense for which the defendant is punished by
imprisonment for more than one year" or "an offense for
which the defendant is actually subject to punishment by
imprisonment for more than one year." This result fails to
give effect to the statute as written, and thus usurps the proper
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role of the Congress. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 376 (1986) ("As we so often admonish, only Con-
gress can rewrite [a] statute.").
While other statutes written differently and covering differ-
ent circumstances (as in Carachuri) may be read in other
ways, § 802(44) says what it says. Nothing in that statute, or
any other, directs us to alter the plain meaning of its terms so
as to ignore the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95 and look
instead to individual defendants’ particular acts. It bears not-
ing, the issue we resolve here is not one of constitutional man-
date, but whether federal jurisprudence set out by the
Supreme Court in other cases involving other statutes alters
the plain reading of § 802(44).
The sentence Simmons actually received or was individu-
ally subject to under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.10, et seq.
("North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act" or "the Act"),
does not impact the analysis performed under § 802(44). Sim-
mons did not contend in the district court, or at any time dur-
ing his appeal, that other defendants charged and convicted
under the same North Carolina statute that he was convicted
of violating could not have been imprisoned for more than
one year. Nor could he have made that argument: N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 90-95(a) is a Class I felony and a sentence of up to fif-
teen months’ incarceration is authorized for its violation. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17. Consequently, Simmons’ convic-
tion was for an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for
a term of more than one year.
II.
The majority concludes the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Rodriquez and Carachuri invalidate our prior reading of
§ 802(44). See, e.g., Harp, 406 F.3d 247. As an initial matter,
the fact that the Supreme Court remanded this case for recon-
sideration in light of Carachuri is not a basis upon which that
conclusion can rest.
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In ordering remand, the Supreme Court did not determine
the merits of this case. A remand indicates only that interven-
ing case law "may affect the outcome of the litigation" and
that the court of appeals should have the opportunity to fully
consider the issue in light of the additional precedent. See
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666 n.6 (2001) (emphasis added).
The purpose of the remand is served by considering the record
anew, taking into consideration the potentially relevant case
law. As Justice O’Connor, sitting by designation with the
original remand panel, explained in oral argument, "it’s cer-
tainly possible that the Carachuri-Rosendo case has no rele-
vance to this case at all. It’s just not the same." (Panel Oral
Arg. 16:32.) With respect for the position taken by my col-
leagues in the majority, I am simply not persuaded that either
Carachuri or Rodriquez dictates a contrary position from our
earlier decision.
As the majority opinion notes, Carachuri involved an
immigration proceeding and the case sub judice concerns
criminal sentencing. I agree with the majority that this distinc-
tion is not a dispositive one in and of itself. What is disposi-
tive, though, is that the immigration statutes interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Carachuri differ in critical respects from
the statutes at issue in the case at bar.
Facing deportation, Carachuri sought to apply for discre-
tionary cancellation of removal, something for which he was
ineligible if he had previously been "convicted of a[n] ‘aggra-
vated felony.’"1 See 130 S. Ct. at 2583 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)(3)) (brackets in original). The relevant inquiry,
then, was whether either of his two Texas convictions for mis-
demeanor simple drug possession, was an "aggravated felony"
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
1As noted by the Supreme Court, the term "aggravated felony" "is
unique to Title 8, which covers immigration matters." Carachuri, 130 S.
Ct. at 2585. This term appears in no other place in the U.S. Code.
27 UNITED STATES v. SIMMONS

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In making that determination, the Supreme Court navigated
a "maze of statutory cross-references" to determine whether
Carachuri’s existing state conviction could have been an
offense that would be punishable as a federal felony under the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") had he been charged and
convicted of such in a federal court. 130 S. Ct. at 2581. The
need for this hypothetical projection of the state offense into
a federal corollary offense arose because under Lopez v. Gon-
zales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), "[u]nless a state offense is punish-
able as a federal felony[,] it does not count" as an "aggravated
felony" for immigration law purposes. Id. at 55; see also 130
S. Ct. at 2582.
The Supreme Court concluded that "except for simple pos-
session offenses involving isolated categories of drugs not
presently at issue, only recidivist simple possession offenses
are ‘punishable’ as a federal ‘felony’ under the [CSA]." 130
S. Ct. at 2581 (emphasis omitted). And in footnote three, the
Court observed that although 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) did not
define separate offenses based on the presence or lack of
recidivism, it would nonetheless "view § 844(a)’s felony sim-
ple possession provision as separate and distinct from the mis-
demeanor simple possession offense that section also
proscribes." Id. at 2581 n.3. Consequently, the Carachuri
Court concluded only "recidivist simple possession" offenses
"might, conceivably, be an ‘aggravated felony.’" Because
Carachuri’s Texas conviction was not for a recidivist simple
possession offense, the hypothetical federal Lopez corollary
offense was not an "aggravated felony" for purposes of 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). Carachuri thus did not fall within the
statute’s prohibition against seeking withholding of removal.
The majority opinion relies on the foregoing statute-
specific analysis in Carachuri to project that Simmons was
not "convicted" of an offense punishable by more than one
year of incarceration under the Act. The majority accurately
notes that Simmons himself — as a first-time offender with
a low criminal history score — could not have received a sen-
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tence exceeding eight months’ community service punish-
ment. Maj. op. at 11. That conclusion, however, does not
axiomatically resolve our case and does not take into account
the text and context of the inquiry in Carachuri. That is, in
order to perform the requisite state-to-federal offense "extrap-
olation" analysis in Carachuri, the Supreme Court had to look
at the specific characteristics of Carachuri’s conduct underly-
ing the Texas conviction. And because the Court was con-
cerned with how Carachuri was actually charged and the
characteristics of his conduct for purposes of determining
whether the hypothetical extrapolation would work, the
Court’s inquiry was necessarily defendant-specific.
By contrast, the issue in the case at bar is whether the North
Carolina offense for which Simmons was convicted was "pun-
ishable" by more than one year of incarceration. It does not
raise the question (from Carachuri) of what hypothetical
offense never prosecuted by a different sovereign the defen-
dant could have been, but was not, charged with, given the
specific characteristics underlying his state conviction. Put
another way, Simmons’ conviction "serve[s] as [the Court’s]
‘starting place’" only insofar as it identifies Simmons’ statu-
tory offense. Cf., Maj. op. at 11 (quoting Carachuri, 130 S.
Ct. at 2586). After that determination is made, the circum-
stances surrounding Simmons’ conviction and the state prose-
cutor’s charging decision are no longer relevant to the
analysis.
Instead, our focus should be on "the terms of the provisions
and the ‘commonsense conception’ of those terms." Car-
achuri, 130 S. Ct. at 25785. Section 802(44) directs us to the
offense prohibited by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95 — rather than
to a specific defendant charged thereunder — to determine
whether a violation of that statute is one for which punish-
ment of more than one year is authorized. The inquiry here
could not be more different from the hypothetical extrapola-
tion and defendant-specific inquiry contained in the Car-
achuri analysis. At bottom, the dispositive question in this
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case is whether Simmons’ conviction is for violating a statute
that provides for punishment exceeding 12 months’ incarcera-
tion. Because a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a) is pun-
ishable by imprisonment of up to 15 months, the answer to
that query is a simple "yes."2 Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1340.17.
For this reason, too, the majority is incorrect that this
approach wrongly "assumes that an offender’s conduct alone
determines the nature of his ‘crime’" for purposes of deter-
mining "whether a prior state conviction constitutes a predi-
cate permitting the application of a federal sentencing
enhancement." Maj. op. at 16 (citing Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at
2581 n.3, and Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 386). Instead, I submit
this approach recognizes that the defendant-specific inquiries
in Carachuri and Rodriquez do not present the same question
at issue here, where the statute directs us to determine how an
offense is punishable, rather than how a particular defendant
is or could be punished. That is, Congress chose to set the per-
missible punishment by the parameters of the state statutory
offense, not in light of an offender’s individual conduct.
In Carachuri, the Government’s position rested on theoriz-
ing what convictions Carachuri could have been prosecuted
for, regardless of his actual state statute of conviction. Here,
the Government’s position — and mine — rests squarely on
Simmons’ actual statute of conviction, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-
95. Unlike the layers of conjecture required to project what
crimes Carachuri could have committed, here no speculation
or extrapolation is needed. The core issue is whether the
North Carolina statute establishes an offense punishable by
2The majority’s analysis of the Act confuses the salient issue by focus-
ing on the permitted sentences for different defendant-specific combina-
tions of criminal history and offense characteristics. While individual
defendants’ maximum sentences will differ according to a multitude of
variables under the Act, the authorized punishment for violating N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 90-95 does not alter absent legislative change; that maximum is fif-
teen months, which meets the plain language of § 802(44).
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imprisonment for more than one year. It does. There is thus
no reason to speculate what Simmons’ conduct also could
have constituted if prosecuted by a separate sovereign under
that sovereign’s different statute.
Contrary to the majority opinion’s implication, the
approach I propose does not implicate, let alone run afoul of
the principle expressed in Carachuri that a federal court may
not "ex post, enhance the state offense of record just because
facts known to it would have authorized a greater penalty
under either state or federal law." 130 S. Ct. at 2586. Indeed,
it is the majority’s approach that looks beyond the statute of
conviction to postulate whether any additional factors can
support additional findings as to the nature and substance of
Simmons’ conduct. In contrast, the approach applying an
offense-based inquiry looks solely to the statute underlying
the conviction and how that offense is punishable and nothing
else. Consequently, in addition to being consistent with the
plain language of § 802(44), this approach promotes unifor-
mity and consistency because (absent future legislative
action) a particular state offense would or would not always
be a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA") for future federal sentencing purposes. Because the
inquiry is offense-specific, all that is needed are the relevant
North Carolina statutes: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95, the offense,
and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17, the statutorily authorized
sentence for that offense. We would not be required to look
at Simmons’ record any further than to identify the offense of
conviction.
The majority opinion puts great weight on footnote 3 of
Carachuri to undergird its position; but that weight is more
than the footnote can bear. What the Supreme Court said,
twice, in that footnote is "the fact of a prior conviction must
nonetheless be found before a defendant is subject to felony
punishment." Id. at 2581 n.3]; see also id. ("But the fact of a
prior conviction must still be found—if only by a judge and
if only by a preponderance of the evidence—before a defen-
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dant is subject to felony punishment."). I submit that is
exactly what this dissenting approach does: it looks only at
the fact of Simmons’ prior conviction to see that the statute
of conviction carries a punishment of up to fifteen months’
incarceration. While the Supreme Court had to parse Car-
achuri’s Texas conviction to complete the Lopez analysis, no
such parsing is needed here.
Significantly, although the Supreme Court had the opportu-
nity in Carachuri to verify what it means for an offense to be
"punishable" as a felony, it did not do so. The Government
argued in Carachuri that "the only statutory text that matters
is the word ‘punishable’ in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2): Whatever
conduct might be ‘punishable’ as a felony, regardless of
whether it actually is so punished or not, is a felony for immi-
gration law purposes." Carachuri, 130 S. Ct. at 2587. Particu-
larly relevant for our case, the Supreme Court did not address
this argument on its textual merits. To quote the Court, the
reason it rejected the Government’s "punishable" language
argument was that in performing the Lopez analysis, "the cir-
cumstances of Carachuri-Rosendo’s prosecution were not
identical to those hypothesized by the Government." Id. That
is, the facts in Carachuri did not align with the Government’s
argument and could not "be reconciled with the more concrete
guidance of [§ 1229b(a)(3)], which limits the Attorney Gener-
al’s cancellation authority only when the noncitizen has actu-
ally been ‘convicted of a[n] aggravated felony’ — not when
he merely could have been convicted of a felony but was not."
Id. The Supreme Court thus had the clear opportunity to
embrace the reasoning of the majority opinion, but did not.
Carachuri and the case at bar are further distinguished on
the charging decisions incident to the underlying state convic-
tions. Carachuri had been convicted of simple drug possession
under Texas law. The Supreme Court noted that Texas law
authorized a sentencing enhancement for such a conviction
only if the prosecutor charged the defendant as having been
previously convicted of that offense or one of a similar class.
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Although the Texas prosecutor could have charged Carachuri
as a recidivist and sought such an enhancement, the prosecu-
tor elected not to do so, and instead charged him only for sim-
ple possession. Thus, under the relevant Texas provisions by
which Carachuri was charged and convicted, the conviction
was for simple possession without a recidivist charge.
Neither does Rodriquez’s discussion of recidivist factors
negate my proposed reading of § 802(44). While a recidivist
finding could have increased Simmons’ sentence to more than
twelve months of actual imprisonment, a multitude of other
factors also could have caused an adjustment of his sentence.
Under the Act at least forty different factors can alter an oth-
erwise presumptive sentence, but not the coverage of the
charging statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(d)-(e).
If anything, Rodriquez would seem to support the Govern-
ment’s position. As the majority opinion recognizes,
Rodriquez rejected the concept that some construct outside the
statute of conviction, like a guidelines range, could alter what
the terms of the federal statutory enhancement covered:
[T]he concept of the ‘maximum’ term of imprison-
ment or sentence prescribed by law was used in
many statutes that predated the enactment of [the]
ACCA and the federal Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, and in all those statutes the concept necessar-
ily referred to the maximum term prescribed by the
relevant criminal statute, not the top of a sentencing
guideline range.
128 S. Ct. at 1792. I would submit it is the majority opinion,
contrary to Rodriquez, that looks to the sentencing factors
under the Act to determine the scope of § 802(44) and not to
Simmons’ state offense of conviction: a crime which the
North Carolina statute provides is "punishable" for up to fif-
teen months’ imprisonment.
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There is no separate recidivist possession charge under
North Carolina law. The offense — N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95
— is the same charge, regardless of a defendant’s criminal
history. Only after a defendant is convicted, at sentencing,
does criminal history come into play. Moreover, over forty
factors, besides recidivism, may go into a North Carolina sen-
tencing decision under Gen. Stat. § 90-95. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1340.16 and § 15A-1340.17. A defendant is convicted
of the same offense — N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95 — regardless
of his criminal history or the specific characteristics of that
offense.
Admittedly, the other components used in determining
where within the Act a particular defendant falls must be
noticed prior to sentencing. If a prosecutor seeks to depart
from the presumptive range to the aggravated range, the State
must provide notice of its intent to prove aggravating factors
and the jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable
doubt. See § 15A-1340.16. However, the aggravated factors
need not be part of the indictment or formal charge, nor is the
conviction itself different from a conviction for the presump-
tive (or, indeed, mitigated) offense.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95 constitutes one offense under North
Carolina law; the distinguishing factors of criminal history
and offense characteristics become relevant only at sentenc-
ing, when deciding a particular defendant’s sentencing range.
They have no bearing on the inquiry here, that is, whether the
statutory offense itself is punishable by more than one year
imprisonment.
The majority opinion also contends its approach is appro-
priate because it is consistent with the "panoply of procedural
protections afforded to offenders facing a potentially aggra-
vated sentence" and is necessary so as not to "second-guess
[state prosecutors’] judgment" that Simmons’ conduct did not
contain aggravated offense characteristics. Maj. op. at 13-14
and 22; see id. at 30 (arguing this approach "makes a mockery
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of North Carolina’s carefully crafted sentencing scheme").
However, reading the plain language of § 802(44) to mean
what it says does not second-guess any component of Sim-
mons’ state conviction. The North Carolina process of charg-
ing, convicting, and punishing Simmons was long decided
and wholly independent of a later-in-time charge by the fed-
eral government for a different crime. As Justice Alito
explained in Rodriquez, this later crime has no bearing on the
earlier state crime and the state crime is merely a factor in
sentencing regarding the later offense:
When a defendant is given a higher sentence under
a recidivism statute—or for that matter, when a sen-
tencing judge, under a guidelines regime or a discre-
tionary sentencing system, increases a sentence
based on the defendant’s criminal history—100% of
the punishment is for the offense of conviction.
None is for the prior convictions or the defendant’s
"status as a recidivist." The sentence "is a stiffened
penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to
be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive
one."
Id. at 1789 (citation omitted). Instead, I suggest the rationale
set out here in dissent recognizes that Congress is the entity
charged with determining the proper punishment for the later,
independent federal offense for which Simmons now stands
convicted.
Exercising its proper authority, Congress decided that the
sentence for a conviction of later violating a federal criminal
statute should be enhanced based on the defendant having a
prior conviction that falls within the definition Congress
chose to write. Congress further decided to define that
enhancement in terms of the prior conviction being for an "of-
fense" "punishable by a term of more than one year" impris-
onment, rather than using language that would require that the
defendant personally was subject to punishment for that
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period. Applying § 802(44)’s plain language when reviewing
the nature of a prior conviction in no way undermines or
second-guesses the prior judgment of North Carolina regard-
ing the earlier independent act that resulted in Simmons’ state
conviction and sentence. This approach provides no commen-
tary about North Carolina’s "carefully crafted sentencing
scheme." The later federal court simply looks at the anteced-
ent statutory offense to fulfill its duty under the federal statute
authorizing an enhanced punishment for the separate federal
crime.
I would also submit the majority’s extrapolation of Car-
achuri and Rodriquez in this case fosters an unnecessary and
burdensome sentencing regime. Instead of simply looking to
the written scope of the antecedent statute of conviction, sen-
tencing courts will be constrained to parse multiple variations
of hundreds of possibly applicable statutes across the country.
The prosecutor, counsel, judge, and citizen will not know
where the defendant’s acts fit upon the federal sentencing
enhancement spectrum without delving into the particular acts
underlying long-settled proceedings. The sentencing approach
resulting from the majority opinion’s reading creates an
unworkable rule that unnecessarily complicates the already
complex arena of federal criminal sentencing.
The reading of § 802(44) outlined in this dissent is, I prof-
fer, one of plain meaning, common usage, and common sense.
It does not suffer the infirmity found by the Carachuri court
to be "counterintuitive and unorthodox." Carachuri, 130 S.
Ct. at 2585 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Neither does it argue "for a result that the English language
tells us not to expect." Id. Perhaps that type of result is what
Justice Souter should have presaged in Lopez when he noted
that "Congress, like ‘Humpty Dumpty,’ has the power to give
words unorthodox meanings." Id. at 2585 (quoting Lopez, 549
U.S. at 34). Clearly, so do courts.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, I do not find that the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Carachuri or Rodriquez require the result
set forth in the majority opinion. The plain language of
§ 802(44) calls for an offense-specific analysis, determining
whether a prior conviction is for an "offense punishable by
more than one year imprisonment." As such, we follow the
mandate of Congress to look to the maximum authorized pun-
ishment for any defendant convicted of the offense. Accord-
ingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of
the district court.
Chief Judge Traxler, Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer,
and Judge Duncan join in this dissent.
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