Jacob W. Runkle v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 4th Cir. 1986 . The district court ruled that the GWI

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1922
JACOB W. RUNKLE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
THE MONARCH MACHINE TOOL COMPANY; GENESIS
WORLDWIDE, INCORPORATED; GENSYSTEMS
INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellees,
versus
GENESIS WORLDWIDE II, INCORPORATED; NEW STAMCO
INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
STAMCO INCORPORATED; STAMCO, A Division of the
Monarch Machine Tool Company; MONARCH MACHINE
TOOL INCORPORATED; CYGNUS MANAGEMENT ADVISORS;
PEGASUS PARTNERS II, LP; KPS SPECIAL
SITUATIONS FUNDS LP; NEW MONARCH MACHINE TOOL
INCORPORATED,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (CA-03-195-23-2)

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Argued: May 25, 2005 Decided: July 26, 2005
Before LUTTIG and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Eugene E. SILER, Jr.,
Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
ARGUED: Gray Thomas Culbreath, COLLINS & LACY, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellants. Mark Charles Tanenbaum, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mia Lauren Maness, MARK C.
TANENBAUM, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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1Since the issuance of the district court’s order, Runkle has
filed a Second Amended Complaint against the GWII defendants
alleging the additional claim of breach of an independent duty to
warn.
2Runkle filed a motion in the bankruptcy court for
clarification of the effect that the GWI defendants’ bankruptcy
would have on his claims against the GWII defendants. The GWII
defendants filed a cross-motion in bankruptcy court to enjoin the
products liability action. The bankruptcy court determined that
Runkle was not prevented from bringing suit against the GWII
defendants.
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PER CURIAM:
Jacob W. Runkle sued The Monarch Machine Tool Company, Genesis
Worldwide, Inc., and Gensystems, Inc. (the “GWI defendants”) and
Genesis Worldwide II, Inc. and New Stamco, Inc. (the “GWII
defendants”) on claims for negligence, breach of express and
implied warranties, and strict liability arising from an injury
caused by industrial equipment designed, manufactured, and sold by
the GWI defendants. 1 At the time Runkle brought suit, the GWI
defendants were in bankruptcy. The GWI defendants filed a notice
of bankruptcy with the district court and requested a stay in
accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362. The district court granted a
statistical stay over the case and abstained from exercising
jurisdiction until the bankruptcy proceedings concluded.
Before the GWI defendants served a responsive pleading, Runkle
filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to the GWI defendants and
moved the district court to proceed against the GWII defendants. 2
The GWII defendants argued that Runkle’s suit should not proceed

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3Although the GWII defendants appealed the voluntary dismissal
of the GWI defendants as violative of the automatic stay, they
abandoned that claim at oral argument.
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against them because (1) the GWI defendants were indispensable
parties whose absence warranted dismissal of the case under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19(b), and (2) the automatic stay applicable to the GWI
defendants should also extend to them under A.H. Robins Co., Inc.
v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986). The district court
ruled that the GWI defendants were not indispensable parties and
that an extension of the stay was not appropriate under the
circumstances of the case. The GWII defendants appeal both
rulings.3 For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
The GWII defendants first contend that the district court
abused its discretion by finding that the GWI defendants were not
indispensable parties under Rule 19(b). Rule 19(b) authorizes a
district court to dismiss an action where an “indispensable” party
cannot be made a party to the action. In determining whether a
party is “indispensable,” Rule 19(b) provides that “the factors to
be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to
the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which,
by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief,
or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,

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whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.”
At the outset, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction
to entertain an appeal from this order. The district court’s
ruling on the Rule 19 issue is not a final order under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and the district court did not certify this ruling for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The GWII
defendants argue, however, that this decision falls within the
“small class” of nonfinal orders that are immediately appealable as
collateral orders under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
Under the collateral order doctrine, we may entertain an
appeal from an otherwise interlocutory order if that order (1)
conclusively determines the issue before the lower court, (2)
resolves an important question independent of the subject matter of
the litigation, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from
a final judgment in the case. Id. at 546; Under Seal v. Under
Seal, 326 F.3d 479, 481-84 (4th Cir. 2003). Assuming that the
first and second elements of the collateral order doctrine are
satisfied, we are convinced that the district court’s Rule 19(b)
determination is not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment. Should the GWII defendants suffer an adverse
ruling on the merits, we could review the Rule 19(b) issue in an

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appeal from that judgment. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110-12 (1968) (considering
indispensability under Rule 19(b) on an appeal from a final
judgment); Universal Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 312 F.3d 82, 87-89 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); Gardiner
v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 145 F.3d 635, 640-43 (3d
Cir. 1998) (same). Because the district court’s determination that
the GWI defendants are not indispensable parties under Rule 19(b)
is effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, that
determination is not a collateral order under Cohen, and we lack
jurisdiction over this portion of the appeal.
II.
The GWII defendants also challenge the district court’s
decision to allow Runkle to proceed against them despite the
pendency of the GWI defendants’ bankruptcy proceedings. According
to the GWII defendants, the § 362 stay applicable to the GWI
defendants should also apply to them because a judgment against
them is in effect a judgment against the GWI defendants. We held
in A.H. Robins that a § 362 stay protects a nondebtor third-party
defendant in the “unusual situation . . . when there is such
identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the
debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a
judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a

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judgment or finding against the debtor.” 788 F.2d at 999 (internal
quotations omitted). Distinguishing A.H. Robins from this case,
the district court concluded that (1) there was no basis for
automatic indemnification, (2) these proceedings would not impair
the GWI defendants’ ability to liquidate in bankruptcy, (3) these
proceedings would not reduce the property of the bankrupt estate,
and (4) there was not such identity between the parties that the
GWI defendants were the real party defendant. J.A. 351-53. Upon
our own review of the record, we agree with the district court that
“the GWII Defendants have not brought forth any evidence of unusual
circumstances which would justify an extension of the automatic
stay to their protection or that would permit the court to stay the
proceedings on equitable grounds. An extension of the stay would
only delay [Runkle’s] action, with no benefit to the debtor’s
estate.” J.A. 353-54.
III.
In conclusion, we dismiss that portion of the appeal
challenging the district court’s ruling under Rule 19, and we
affirm the district court’s order permitting Runkle to proceed
against the GWII defendants.
DISMISSED IN PART
AND AFFIRMED IN PART

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