4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447 William Quentin Jones v. ROY COOPER, Attorney General, No. 01-25 State of North Carolina

Filed: November 20, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-25
(CA-97-16-5-F-HC)
William Quentin Jones,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
Roy Cooper, etc., et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
O R D E R
The court amends its opinion filed November 14, 2002, as
follows:
On the cover sheet, section 7, line 1 -- the name of counsel
arguing for Appellant is corrected to read “Kenneth Justin Rose.”
On page 2, section 1, line 1 -- the name of counsel on brief
for Appellant is corrected to read “Gretchen Marie Engel.”
On page 7, first paragraph, line 8 -- the word “imminently” is
corrected to read “eminently.”
For the Court - By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor

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Clerk

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444447
WILLIAM QUENTIN JONES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
ROY COOPER, Attorney General, No. 01-25
State of North Carolina; R. C. LEE,
Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh,
North Carolina,
Respondents-Appellees.
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444448
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, Senior District Judge.
(CA-97-16-5-F-HC)
Argued: September 25, 2002
Decided: November 14, 2002
Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________________________
Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Luttig wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Widener and Judge Williams joined.
____________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Kenneth Justin Rose, CENTER FOR DEATH PEN-
ALTY LITIGATION, INC., Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Edwin William Welch, Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Caro-

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lina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Gretchen Marie Engel, CENTER FOR
DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION, INC., Durham, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Roy Cooper, North Carolina Attorney General,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellees.
____________________________________________________________
OPINION
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, a North Carolina state prisoner under sentence of death,
requests a certificate of appealability from this court, to review an
order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contends
that a juror lied on a jury questionnaire and during voir dire, violating
his right to a fair and impartial jury, and that the State of North Caro-
lina suppressed exculpatory information in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). As appellant has not made a substan-
tial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we are without
authority to issue a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, we dis-
miss his appeal.
I.
Shortly before midnight on March 7, 1987, appellant (wearing a ski
mask and carrying an Uzi 9mm pistol) entered a Raleigh area Fast
Fare store and fired several times, wounding Orlando Watson and
fatally wounding Ed Peebles. Appellant then demanded that Charles
Taylor, the store's clerk, open the cash register. When Taylor was
unable to do so, appellant grabbed the register and pulled it out the
front door by its cord and dragged it for several feet before abandon-
ing it and fleeing.
Appellant was pursued on foot by police officers and quickly
apprehended. He was taken to the police station and interrogated
throughout the morning of March 8, 1987, before being transferred to
the Wake County Detention Center. There, a jailor observed him and,
noting appellant's behavior and appearance, recorded in a jail shift
log that appellant was "extremely suicidal." This jail log was never
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turned over to appellant, nor apparently were the jailor's observations
made available to the appellant, despite appellant's discovery requests
for exculpatory information.
Appellant eventually pled guilty to first-degree murder and was
sentenced to death. The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated his
death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing in light of
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 443 (1990). At the re-sentencing
hearing, appellant argued that several North Carolina statutory miti-
gating factors were present, including that he was suffering from a
mental and emotional disturbance (due to being high on drugs), and
that he showed remorse or sorrow for his actions. No juror found
either of these mitigating factors, and the jury sentenced appellant to
death. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this sentence.
On August 29, 1995, appellant filed a Motion for Appropriate
Relief ("MAR"), North Carolina's procedural mechanism for state
post-conviction relief. In his MAR, appellant argued, among other
claims, that a sentencing juror lied on a jury questionnaire and in voir
dire, preventing appellant from being able to challenge her perempto-
rily or for cause. In support of this claim, appellant submitted an affi-
davit from an investigator who had interviewed the juror. The state
court, relying on an unspecified state rule of evidence, quashed the
affidavit and dismissed the MAR.
Some time after the filing of his first MAR, appellant's post-
conviction counsel discovered the location of the jail log and obtained
it, thereby learning the jailor's identity. When interviewed, the jailor
expressed the opinion that appellant, on the morning of his booking
in the Wake County Detention Center, looked as if he were crashing
from a drug high and seemed remorseful while speaking with his
grandfather on the telephone.
With this information, appellant filed a second MAR, alleging that
the State violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), by failing to turn over the jail log and the identity of the
jailor. In the alternative, appellant argued that trial counsel was inef-
fective for failing to uncover this information. The state court rejected
both claims, on the alternative grounds that the claims were procedur-
ally defaulted, as they could have been brought either on direct appeal
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or in the first MAR, and that the information allegedly suppressed
was not material and appellant did not suffer any prejudice.
Appellant then filed a habeas petition in federal court, raising the
above claims as well as several others. The district court dismissed
the petition as to all claims. Appellant now requests the issuance of
a certificate of appealability, contending that the district court erred
when, without at least holding an evidentiary hearing, it dismissed his
claims.
II.
Before an appeal can be taken to the court of appeals from the final
order in a habeas corpus proceeding arising out of process issued by
a State court, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A). "A certificate of appealability may issue under para-
graph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right." Id. § 2253(c)(2). A habeas petitioner
thus must demonstrate that "reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved
in a different manner or that the issues presented were `adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
(1983)).
A.
Turning first to appellant's juror misconduct claim, the Sixth
Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961), requires
that a state provide an impartial jury in all criminal prosecutions.
"[D]ue process alone has long demanded that, if a jury is to be pro-
vided the defendant, regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment
requires it, the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent
commanded by the Sixth Amendment." Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.
719, 727 (1992). If "even one [partial] juror is empaneled" and the
death sentence is imposed, "the State is disentitled to execute the sen-
tence." Id. at 728.
4

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In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548
(1984), the Supreme Court set forth a particularized test for determin-
ing whether a new trial is required in the context of juror deceit dur-
ing voir dire or on jury questionnaires. That two-part test states that
in order to obtain a new trial, the defendant "must first demonstrate
that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question . . . and then
further show that a correct response would have provided a valid
basis for a challenge for cause." Id. at 556. The Court noted that a
"trial represents an important investment of private and social
resources, and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the
slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process
because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he
should have obtained from a juror on voir dire examination." Id. at
555. Although in McDonough the juror's incorrect response in voir
dire was an honest mistake, the test applies equally to deliberate con-
cealment and to innocent non-disclosure, as our sister circuits have
held. See, e.g., Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993); Artis v.
Hitachi Zosen Clearing, Inc., 967 F.2d 1132, 1141-42 (7th Cir. 1992);
Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. St. Clair, 855 F.2d 518, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 698 (5th Cir. 1988). Although McDo-
nough was a federal civil case on direct appeal, rather than a state
criminal case on federal habeas review, we have expressly recognized
its applicability also to federal habeas review. See Fitzgerald v.
Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362-63 (4th Cir. 1998). The McDonough test
is not the exclusive test for determining whether a new trial is war-
ranted: a showing that a juror was actually biased, regardless of
whether the juror was truthful or deceitful, can also entitle a defendant
to a new trial. See Fitzgerald, 150 F.3d at 363. Appellant raises both
variations of this juror misconduct claim in his briefs before this court.1
____________________________________________________________
1 It is unclear whether both variations of the claim were raised in appel-
lant's habeas petition in the district court, or whether both were raised in
appellant's MARs filed in state court. We consider both herein. As to
both, we determine that appellant has not made a substantial showing of
a denial of a constitutional right.
5

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B.
In her affidavit, appellant's investigator reported that the chal-
lenged juror stated that several of her relatives had been subjected to
arrests or jury trials; that she had gone to the Fast Fare the day after
the murder and robbery; that she had strong, religiously-motived
views in favor of the death penalty; and that she "knew that [appel-
lant] had previously received a death sentence." J.A. 350-51. The
investigator also reported that the juror had worked with law enforce-
ment on one occasion in 1974, and that she had a strong dislike of
illegal drug use (arising out of her relatives' use and sale of illegal
drugs). Id.
On the jury questionnaire, the juror stated "no" in response to ques-
tions asking whether any friends, family, or acquaintances had been
arrested or subjected to a jury trial. J.A. 217. Assuming the affidavit
to be true, these responses were at least inaccurate. This is, however,
the only inaccuracy established by the affidavit. The other alleged
"lies" could not even be called inconsistencies.
For example, appellant contends that the juror lied during voir dire
when she said she "never went" to the Fast Fare, J.A. 206. But he
ignores the context in which the statement was made. The full collo-
quy follows: "Q: Do you have any knowledge about that particular
incident [referring to the murder at the store]? A: I remember about
when it happened because I was living near the area at the time and
I noticed that the convenience store was boarded up. I didn't use it
very much because the Winn Dixie is right across the street, but I did
notice it was boarded up and I asked why and someone said well,
someone was murdered there. I noticed when it reopened. I never
went there so that's all I know about it." Id .
When viewed in their full context, the juror's statements are per-
fectly consistent with the representations in the investigator's affida-
vit. The juror's comment that she "never went there" (referring to the
Fast Fare) quite easily could have been a colloquial expression indi-
cating that she had rarely patronized the Fast Fare, not that she had
never patronized the store. Indeed, that the juror said during the same
voir dire response that she "didn't use [the Fast Fare] very much" all
but confirms that this colloquial usage was intended. If the comment
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was not intended in the colloquial sense, then it could just as easily
have been intended to refer to the fact that the juror had never patron-
ized the store after the crime, not that she had never been on or near
the premises of the crime scene. In fact, the juror reported, during the
same voir dire, that she saw the store boarded up after the crime and
inquired about it, establishing both that she did at least go into the
vicinity of the crime scene and that she was not trying to conceal this
fact. Id. Given these eminently reasonable explanations of the sup-
posed discrepancies between the juror's voir dire answers and the
statements to the investigator, there is simply no basis upon which to
conclude that the juror lied with respect to either her patronization of
the Fast Fare or her visit to the crime scene.
Appellant also contends that the juror lied on voir dire when she
said that she only had a vague prehearing knowledge of the case.
However, the only relevant voir dire question that appears in the
record was the following: "Q: . . . I think that the evidence will show
that this crime took place with a robbery and murder occurring at a
convenience store on N. Person Street and in about the 800 block of
North Person Street on March 7, 1987. Do you have any knowledge
about that particular incident?" Id. (emphasis added). This question
asked whether the juror had any knowledge of the robbery and mur-
der, not whether the juror knew of any previous trial or of the death
sentence that had been imposed on appellant. No other question on
voir dire or in the jury questionnaire asked about any prehearing
knowledge of appellant's death sentence. Furthermore, while the affi-
davit does states that "[t]his juror knew that Mr. Jones had previously
received a death sentence," J.A. 351, the affidavit does not specify
when the juror knew this. Given the affidavit's language, it could be
that the juror had such knowledge at the time that the investigator
interviewed her.2
____________________________________________________________
2 In the affidavit, in a separate paragraph from the discussion of the
allegedly biased juror in question, the investigator reports that "[t]wo of
the jurors we interviewed admitted that they knew at the time of Mr.
Jones' 1991 sentencing hearing that he had previously received the death
penalty." J.A. at 351. But it does not indicate that one of those two jurors
is the one challenged in the petition and in this appeal.
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Finally, the investigator's affidavit recounts the juror's belief "that
the Bible mandates imposition of the death penalty in every case of
first degree murder," and represents that, "when [the investigator]
asked her whether she could imagine any first degree murder case in
which the death penalty would not be appropriate, she could not,
other than if the defendant grew up in a jungle with no contact with
humanity." J.A. 351. This statement is fully consistent with the juror's
voir dire responses, wherein she declared her support for the death
penalty "when appropriate," J.A. 203, and offered as examples of cir-
cumstances where the death penalty "might be in order," instances
where "people were tortured or [for] certain brutal crimes," J.A. 204,
and where she stated that she could fairly balance aggravating and
mitigating factors, J.A. 205. It cannot be inferred from any statement
in the affidavit that the juror could not disregard her personal feelings
about the death penalty or apply the law as written, or that the juror
lied when she stated that she could be a fair juror.
In sum, appellant has proffered evidence only that the juror
responded inaccurately when she stated that she had no relatives who
had been arrested or subjected to jury trials. It is far from clear that
we look to state law to determine whether a challenge for cause would
have been granted, but regardless, appellant cites no North Carolina
statute or case allowing a challenge for cause based merely on the fact
that the juror had relatives who had been arrested or subject to jury
trials. Indeed, none of the jurors who answered "yes" to either of these
questions was dismissed for cause on that fact alone.
To the extent that the federal standards governing challenges for
cause are implicated, "[t]he category of challenges for cause is lim-
ited," and traditionally, a challenge for cause is granted only in the
case of actual bias or implied bias (although a third category, inferred
bias, might also be available). See United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d
38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997). The mere fact that the juror's relatives had a
history of arrests and jury trials certainly does not reach the high stan-
dard needed for the implication of bias. See Person v. Miller, 854
F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 1988) (implied bias "is limited in application
to those extreme situations where the relationship between a prospec-
tive juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is highly
unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliber-
ations under the circumstances"). And, the fact that the juror had rela-
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tives who were subject to arrest and jury trials does not give rise to
an inference that the juror was biased against the appellant; indeed,
arguably, the more common-sense assumption is that a juror with this
background would be biased in favor of the accused. Cf. United States
v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that, where juror
lied about being accused of felonies and convicted of misdemeanors
on her questionnaire and during voir dire, "the juror's previous
brushes with the law would create a stronger opposite inference —
one that she might well be biased in favor of defendants in general").
Because even truthful answers to the questions on the questionnaire
could not have formed the basis for a challenge for cause, appellant
is not entitled to relief under the second part of the McDonough test.
C.
Even apart from the McDonough test, appellant has not made a
substantial showing that the juror in question was actually or
impliedly biased. That the juror strongly supported the death penalty
does not raise an inference that she could not follow the court's
instructions properly. Nor does the fact that several members of the
juror's family had abused drugs, which inspired in the juror a vehe-
ment opposition to illegal drug use, indicate that the juror was or
would be biased against appellant. And the same is true with respect
to the juror's limited contacts with law enforcement.
Misstatements on a jury questionnaire such as those here are trou-
bling, but do not, standing alone, indicate juror bias. As the Supreme
Court has instructed, "[t]he motives for concealing information may
vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly
be said to affect the fairness of a trial." McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556.
Here, there is no evidence of motive, much less evidence of motive
tending to raise questions as to the juror's impartiality.
Appellant's allegations are distinguishable from those made in such
cases as Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), Fullwood
v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Colombo,
869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989). In Williams, the juror lied about her rela-
tionship with a prosecution witness (the father of her children) and the
fact that one of the prosecutors once represented her in a legal matter;
her explanation for her misrepresentation was questionable; and the
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prosecutor also remained silent. 529 U.S. at 441-42. In Fullwood, the
affidavit offered by the petitioner alleged that a juror was pressured
by her husband to vote in favor of a death sentence, and that the pres-
sure appeared to be effective. 290 F.3d at 676, 681. In Colombo, the
juror had "claim[ed] to know that a locale at which the evidence will
place the defendant is a `hang out for gangsters,' and . . . had deliber-
ately responded falsely to a material question on voir dire precisely
because she wanted to sit on the case," a circumstance in which, the
Second Circuit stated, the juror "should be presumed not to be impar-
tial." United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1993)
(explaining the facts and holding of Colombo). The troubling allega-
tions presented in these cases are not present here.3
D.
In conclusion, appellant has not made a substantial showing of the
denial of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. Issuance of a
certificate of appealability on this ground, therefore, is unwarranted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
III.
Appellant also argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to turn over material, exculpatory
information (in particular, the jail log and the jailor's identity), and in
____________________________________________________________
3 Appellant also cites United States v. Bynum, 634 F.2d 768 (4th Cir.
1980), in support of his contention of juror bias. Bynum is distinguish-
able on its facts, however. Circumstances concerning the racial composi-
tion of the jury and the race of the defendants triggered the concern of
the court in that case. Id. at 771. These features simply are not present
in the instant case. It also appears that the court in Bynum concluded that
the juror's concealment impaired the rights of the defendants to "exercise
intelligently a peremptory challenge," and that this, standing alone, enti-
tled the defendants to a new trial. Id. Insofar as this reasoning was subse-
quently rejected by the Supreme Court in McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555,
it is no longer good law. See Zerka, 49 F.3d at 1185 ("The Supreme
Court in McDonough explicitly rejected the argument that a plaintiff who
is prevented from intelligently utilizing his peremptory challenges is
entitled to a new trial, and it counseled against exactly this sort of endless
second-guessing.").
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the alternative, that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel,
in violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when
his trial counsel failed to uncover this evidence. In rejecting appel-
lant's second MAR, the state court held that both of these claims were
procedurally defaulted because they "ha[d] previously been raised and
addressed on the direct appeal and in the first motion for appropriate
relief, or . . . could have been raised therein and were not," and the
appellant had "failed to demonstrate good cause for such failure or
shown actual prejudice . . . ." J.A. 477. The state court also considered
the merits of these claims, concluding that "even if these untimely
claims and allegations were proven to be true as asserted, they do not
show that the prosecution failed to disclose any information that
would constitute exculpatory or materially favorable evidence . . . .
The information is also insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the
mind of a reasonable fact finder as to the correctness and appropriate-
ness of the defendant's death sentence." Id. Thus, the state court con-
cluded that the allegedly suppressed evidence was not material and
that the suppression did not prejudice appellant.
Although it did not do so clearly, the state court appeared to apply
the prejudice prong of both the Brady and Strickland tests in rejecting
appellant's claims on the merits.4 Therefore, appellant is not entitled
to relief unless he can show that this determination was an unreason-
able application of clearly established federal law, as determined by
the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). If the
state court's determination of the claim on the merits is so clearly rea-
sonable that no "reasonable jurist[ ] could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a differ-
ent manner," Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, then appellant is not entitled to
a certificate of appealability.
The information from the jailor, who claimed to be experienced at
dealing with individuals under the influence of drugs, J.A. 463, was
____________________________________________________________
4 In order to show prejudice under either Brady or Strickland, appellant
must show that had there been no suppression of evidence or dereliction
of counsel, there would be "a reasonable probability that . . . the proceed-
ing's results would have been different." Bell v. Cone, 122 S. Ct. 1843,
1850 (2002) (Strickland); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280
(1999) (Brady).
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as follows. First, based on observations that appellant moved slowly,
looked tired, somewhat slurred his speech, and responded slowly to
questions, the jailor formed the opinion that appellant looked to be
"coming down from having been real high." J.A. 462. Second, having
overheard appellant speaking to his grandfather on the telephone, the
jailor believed that appellant was remorseful. J.A. 462-63.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that had this evidence been avail-
able to appellant, there was no reasonable probability of a different
outcome in any of the proceedings to which the appellant was subject.5
First, it was only the jailor's belief that appellant appeared to be on
drugs. The physical factors and characteristics cited by the jailor in
support of her belief are equally consistent with appellant having
committed a murder and robbery late in the evening; having been
chased and apprehended by police officers; having spent all night and
the morning under interrogation by police officers; having been
awake for an extended period of time; and having been seen by the
jailor early in the morning. See Appellant's Brief at 5-6 (setting forth
facts); J.A. 462 (noting time that the jailor observed appellant).
Also, the evidence presented by the government that appellant was
not suffering from a mental or emotional disturbance was significant
and extensive. Not only did the officers who apprehended appellant
testify that appellant showed no signs of impairment or drug use. But,
during his taped confession on March 9, 1987, appellant made no
mention of having been high on drugs, disoriented, or subject to any
other significant mental or emotional disturbances while he planned
and carried out the murder and robbery, which he admitted doing in
order to pay off a debt. This was strong evidence that appellant was
not suffering from any mental or emotional disturbance, as was other
evidence presented by the prosecution and apparently believed by the
jury. This combination of facts suggests, if anything, that the state
court was correct, not simply reasonable, in concluding that appellant
suffered no prejudice.
____________________________________________________________
5 To the extent that appellant contends that he would not have pled
guilty had he been provided the information held by the jailor, this claim
is foreclosed by United States v. Ruiz, 122 S. Ct. 2450 (2002).
12

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Second, the evidence the jailor presents regarding remorse is
equally unconvincing. Appellant had recently been captured and
interrogated throughout the morning. An individual might very well
sound as if he were remorseful at this time due to a newfound appre-
ciation for the consequences of his action, and the exhaustion caused
by being awake and subject to interrogation for an extended period.
Given that the appellant's own statement of remorse at the re-
sentencing hearing was not sufficient for any juror to believe that he
satisfied the statutory mitigating factors of remorse or sorrow, the jail-
or's recollections of the appellant's demeanor right after his capture
and extensive interrogation could not have been considered more
informative.
For the reasons stated, it clearly was not unreasonable for the state
court to determine that there was no prejudice from the failure to dis-
close or uncover the evidence in question. Hence, federal habeas
relief is unquestionably barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).6
CONCLUSION
Appellant, having failed to make a substantial showing of the vio-
lation of a constitutional right, is denied a certificate of appealability,
and the appeal is dismissed.
DISMISSED
____________________________________________________________
6 Appellant also alleges that he was indicted by an unconstitutional
"short form" indictment which, in violation of Supreme Court precedent,
failed to allege each element of the crime of first degree murder and
failed to allege any aggravating factors. Appellant recognizes that this
claim is barred by our decision in Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190 (4th Cir.
2002), and we reject the claim on the basis of this authority.
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