US v. Celeste Pardue

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4671

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CELESTE ALLEN PARDUE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock
Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (0:20-cr-00719-CMC-5)

Submitted: July 28, 2026 Decided: July 30, 2026

Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Adam Sinclair Ruffin, RUFFIN LAW FIRM, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, Elliott B. Daniels, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Celeste Allen Pardue appeals the 10-month sentence, followed by two years’
supervised release, imposed by the district court following the revocation of her supervised
release. Pardue challenges the district court’s sentencing explanation, and she claims that
her sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
“A district court . . . has broad discretion to impose a particular sentence upon
revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. Celedon, 165
F.4th 873, 879 (4th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). We will affirm a revocation sentence
“unless it is above the statutory maximum or plainly unreasonable.” Id. Where, as here,
the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, “we first examine whether the
sentence was unreasonable at all, procedurally or substantively.” United States v. Amin,
85 F.4th 727, 739 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only if we find the
sentence unreasonable must we decide whether it is plainly so.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “Although the court need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation modified).

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At a minimum, the district court must explain the sentence sufficiently to permit
meaningful appellate review with the “assurance that [it] considered the applicable
sentencing factors with regard to the particular defendant before it.” United States v. Gibbs,
897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court adequately
explained its imposition of the sentence, including the additional term of supervised
release. The court engaged with Pardue’s arguments about her struggle with addiction, but
it declined her request to delay sentencing in favor of in-patient treatment because it did
not believe it would be a “worthwhile endeavor” in Pardue’s case. The court explained
that although it frequently granted similar requests, it did not believe Pardue was in the
proper mindset based on her “multiple different kinds of violations” and her failure to
acknowledge the seriousness of her violations or take accountability for them. Although
Pardue is correct that the district court did not explicitly “tick through the § 3553(a)
factors,” it was not required to. See United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir.
2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the court’s explanation demonstrates that
it considered the nature and circumstances of Pardue’s offense, her history and
characteristics, and the need to afford an adequate deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(2)(B). We discern no procedural error in the imposition of Pardue’s revocation sentence.
Finally, Pardue argues that her sentence is substantively unreasonable. “A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks

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omitted). “A revocation sentence that is within the recommended Guidelines range is
presumed reasonable.” Gibbs, 897 F.3d at 204 (citation modified). Based on the district
court’s engagement with Pardue’s arguments and its explanation of the sentence, Pardue
has failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded her within-policy-range
sentence.
Accordingly, we conclude that Pardue’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable, and
we affirm the district court’s revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED