US v. Jason Rhule

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4403

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JASON ALLEN RHULE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, District Judge. (2:24-cr-00157-1)

Submitted: May 20, 2026 Decided: August 10, 2026

Before GREGORY, RUSHING, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, David R. Bungard, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Moore
Capito, United States Attorney, Lesley Shamblin, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Jason Allen Rhule pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon in in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and he was sentenced to 77 months’ imprisonment. He appeals his
sentence, arguing that the district court erred by denying him a reduction in his offense
level for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.
After Rhule pled guilty, but before sentencing, a search of his jail cell revealed pills
and a folded piece of paper containing a powdery substance that tested positive for cocaine
in two field tests. The items were found close together under Rhule’s sleeping mat. Rhule
admitted that some of the pills belonged to him and were given to him by medical staff.
He denied that the remainder of the pills and the substance in the paper belonged to him.
During sentencing, the Government presented evidence about Rhule’s alleged possession
of contraband. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Rhule
possessed cocaine while detained at the jail and denied him a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility for clear error. United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007).
“‘A finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948)). “We must give ‘great deference’ to the district court’s decision because
‘[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5).

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The United States Sentencing Guidelines “allow a district court to reduce the
defendant’s offense level by two if ‘the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)). “To earn the reduction,
a defendant must prove to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that he has clearly
recognized and affirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“To determine whether a defendant has accepted responsibility, the sentencing
judge must weigh the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480,
488 (4th Cir. 2018). “A guilty plea may be evidence of acceptance, but it does not, standing
alone, entitle a defendant to a reduction as a matter of right.” Dugger, 485 F.3d at 239
(internal quotation marks omitted). The acceptance-of-responsibility decision “often
depends on the actions of the defendant following his . . . arrest or plea.” Id. at 240.
Commentary in the Sentencing Guidelines provides district courts with a nonexclusive list
of factors to consider when evaluating whether a defendant has clearly demonstrated
acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1 (2024). Pertinent here,
“appropriate considerations include” the defendant’s “voluntary termination or withdrawal
from criminal conduct.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(B).
The district court did not clearly err by denying Rhule a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. The court heard testimony that while Rhule was detained at the jail, a
powdery substance that twice field tested positive for cocaine was found under his mat near
pills that he admitted belonged to him. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Rhule possessed cocaine while detained at the jail, and it concluded that he “should

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not receive acceptance of responsibility” because he “engaged in further criminal conduct.”
J.A. 168.
“We have upheld denials of reductions for acceptance of responsibility where, as
here, the defendant continues criminal activity after apprehension, indictment, or [a] guilty
plea.” United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 915 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming the district
court’s denial of the reduction where defendant “resumed distributing drugs” “after his first
arrest” and distributed cocaine and marijuana “while under indictment and on bond”); see,
e.g., Dugger, 485 F.3d at 240 (holding that the district court did not clearly err by denying
defendant the reduction where defendant “chose to deal drugs while incarcerated”); United
States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 34 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s denial of the
reduction where defendant continued to use and distribute cocaine after his indictment and
plea agreement); United States v. Bowe, No. 22-4549, 2023 WL 4075161, at *2 (4th Cir.
June 20, 2023) (holding that “the district court did not commit procedural sentencing error
in determining that [defendant] did not deserve [the] reduction” where “after his guilty
plea, [defendant] participated in a violent fight while incarcerated in a jail”); United States
v. Longus, No. 24-4309, 2026 WL 1362449, at *5 (4th Cir. May 15, 2026) (holding that
because defendant “conspired to smuggle a controlled substance into the jail while he was
awaiting sentence, it was well within the district court’s discretion to conclude that
[defendant] had not accepted responsibility and was not entitled to [the reduction]”).
Rhule argues that the district court erred by applying a bright-line rule that he should
not get a reduction for acceptance of responsibility because he engaged in criminal conduct
while in the jail. We disagree. During sentencing, the court stated that it considered the

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factor listed in Application Note 1(B) of Guidelines Section 3E1.1—“voluntary
termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations”—“probably most
pertinent to [the] proceedings today.” J.A. 102 (emphasis added). Rhule does not identify
any relevant “appropriate consideration,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1, that the district court
failed to consider. Similarly, although he notes that the court was required to base its
decision “on all the facts and circumstances of Rhule’s case,” Opening Br. 23, he does not
identify any pertinent fact or circumstance that the court failed to consider.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying Rhule a reduction
for acceptance of responsibility and so affirm the sentence imposed by the court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before us and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED