GUILIO MESADIEU, trading as Palmist Trucking LLC v. CITY OF LINDEN, Official Capacity

DLD-073 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________

No. 19-2670
___________

GUILIO MESADIEU, trading as Palmist Trucking LLC
Appellant

v.

CITY OF LINDEN, Official Capacity; LINDEN POLICE OFFICER 20098838,
Individually and Official Capacity; LINDEN POLICE OFFICER 20098664, Individually
and Official Capacity
____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-14561)
District Judge: Honorable John Michael Vazquez
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 19, 2019

Before: RESTREPO, PORTER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 27, 2020)
_________

OPINION
*

_________
PER CURIAM

*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

2

Appellant Guilio Mesadieu, proceeding pro se, filed a civil-rights action naming as
defendants the City of Linden, the Linden Police Department, and two Linden Police
Officers, and alleging that he received three wrongful motor vehicle citations (which
were later dismissed by a state court), that his trailer was towed and impounded, and that
he could not afford the fees to have it released, all in violation of several of his rights
under the United States Constitution and New Jersey state law. For the reasons stated
below, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the action.
Mesadieu’s initial complaint purported to be brought on behalf of Palmist
Trucking, LLC. The District Court issued an opinion explaining that an LLC cannot
proceed without counsel, and granting Mesadieu’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Because Mesadieu was proceeding pro se, the Court screened the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as though it had been brought by Mesadieu, and concluded
that it failed to state a claim on the merits. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice to his filing one that remedied the flaws in his first
complaint.
Mesadieu filed an amended complaint, in which he listed himself as the named
plaintiff, trading as Palmist Trucking LLC. The District Court again screened the
amended complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), and again found that it failed to state a claim.
Specifically, the District Court concluded that Mesadieu failed to allege facts
demonstrating that a city custom or policy resulted in the alleged wrongs, failed to allege
facts demonstrating that the towing and impoundment of his ostensibly abandoned trailer
was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and failed to allege facts giving rise to

3

a substantive or procedural due process claim. The District Court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, and dismissed the action,
with prejudice, concluding that an opportunity to amend again would be futile. Mesadieu
timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review is
plenary, Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000), and we construe
Mesadieu’s pro se complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial
question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
For substantially the reasons given in the District Court’s opinion, we will affirm.
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. As explained by the District Court,
Mesadieu’s amended complaint, liberally construed, contained insufficient factual
allegations to support his claims of Constitutional violations. Furthermore, given that
Mesadieu failed to state a claim regarding his federal causes of action, the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his
state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188
F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).