Joseph Sponheimer v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Appeal from the United States District Court for…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 16-4042
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JOSEPH SPONHEIMER,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 1:15-cv-04180)
District Judge: Hon. Robert B. Kugler
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 11, 2017
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Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: June 7, 2018)
_______________________
OPINION*
______________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Joseph Sponheimer appeals the District Court’s order affirming the final
decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security finding that Sponheimer was not
entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433. For the reasons below, we will affirm.
I.1
Our review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
finding of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that Sponheimer was not disabled on or
before his date last insured.2 Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere
scintilla[,]” and “[i]t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate.”3 To prove a disability existed, Sponheimer had to demonstrate that he had an
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”4
We will not disturb a decision that is “supported by substantial evidence” in the record.5
II.
1 We write only for the parties in this non-precedential opinion, so our factual recitation is
brief.
2 Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014); 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (c); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.101.
3 Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
4 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A).
5 Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).

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Sponheimer first challenges the ALJ’s explanation of his reliance on certain
medical testimony. We have stated that, “in most cases, a sentence or [a] short
paragraph” will “probably suffice” to support an ALJ’s decision.6 Here, the ALJ
provided sufficient reasons for the weight given to the evidence from each of the treating
physicians in this case.7 Therefore, we find that the ALJ adequately explained the basis
for his conclusions.
Moreover, the ALJ could properly discount the opinions of physicians whose
opinions were “inconsistent with . . . other substantial evidence in [Sponheimer’s] case
record.”8 Here, the ALJ ultimately found, among other things, that Sponheimer could
perform sedentary work with “occasional pushing and pulling with the lower extremities,
climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, [and] crawling;”
but “can never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds.”9 The record is replete with evidence
that demonstrates that Sponheimer’s physical ailments did not require him to be
considered disabled under the Social Security Act.
6 Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981).
7 See e.g., App. 240 (“Dr. Mariani’s opinions [are] given some weight regarding the
claimant being able to perform sedentary work with limited standing and walking, no
climbing or heavy lifting; but his opinion of no squatting, and complete inability to work
noted on several occasions are not supported by the record as discussed above and are
given little weight . . . . Dr. O’Shea’s opinions. . . are given great weight as they are
consistent with the evidence of record indicating a limited sedentary residual functional
capacity . . . . Dr. Khona’s opinion is given some weight, but not greater weight because
it is not quantified and too vague”).
8 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). See Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“[I]n the absence of contradictory medical evidence, an ALJ in a social security
disability case must accept the medical judgment of a treating physician.”).
9 App. 240.

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Sponheimer also contends that the ALJ did not properly evaluate all of his
symptoms when determining his Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) and that the
“ALJ’s RFC assessment was contrary to the weight of the evidence.”10 We do not agree.
The ALJ properly relied on substantial evidence to support his finding that
Sponheimer was not eligible for DIB.11 When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, an ALJ
should evaluate the intensity and persistence of the symptoms, such as pain, and
determine the extent to which the claimant’s symptoms limit his or her capacity for
work.12 To do this, an ALJ should rely on “objective medical evidence” and “other
relevant evidence” to evaluate the extent that the alleged symptoms limit the claimant’s
ability to do basic work activities.13 Other relevant evidence includes precipitating or
aggravating factors, symptoms, medication and treatment, and daily activities.14 The ALJ
could quite properly discount subjective complaints that were not otherwise supported by
the record.15 Accordingly, we “defer to [his] credibility determination.”16
10 Appellant Br. 12–13.
11 App. 240.
12 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
13 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)–(3).
14 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)(iii)(v).
15 See Schaudeck v. Comm'r of SSA, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) (“An ALJ must
give great weight to a claimant's subjective testimony of the inability to perform even
light or sedentary work when this testimony is supported by competent medical
evidence[;]” . . . [however,] the ALJ can reject such claims if he does not find them
credible.”) (citations omitted).
16 Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003).

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Here, the ALJ fully discussed Sponheimer’s functional limitations—including his
limitations on climbing, sitting, standing, lying down, and leg elevation.17 He found that
Sponheimer’s “activities [were] more extensive and his capabilities [were] greater than
would be expected of one who is alleging totally disabling impairments and
limitations.”18 The ALJ discussed substantial clinical evidence to support his ultimate
finding that Sponheimer “had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work
. . . [and] he can perform pushing and pulling with lower extremities.”19 This evidence
included: 5/5 motor strength, mostly normal gait, good range of motion, no right leg or
knee instability, negative straight leg raise, and no focal motor deficits.20 Furthermore,
the ALJ’s decision was supported by Sponheimer’s own testimony detailing his daily
activities.21 Accordingly, we do not find error in the ALJ’s determination of
Sponheimer’s RFC.
Finally, Sponheimer alleges that “the final decision [was] not supported by
substantial evidence, [because] the ALJ did not give sufficient considerations to
Appellant’s testimony about his restrictions, nor did he sufficiently explain his reasons
for concluding that it was not entirely credible.”22 We do not agree. An ALJ must
consider subjective evidence about pain and other symptoms if the evidence can
17 App. 238.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 236.
20 Id. at 30, 65–66, 69, 77, 80, 82–85, 86–87, 92, 98, 155, 157, 160, 162, 164, 171, 173,
175, 181, 183, 203–04, 211, 219–20.
21 App. 238.
22 Appellant Br. at 16.

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“reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other
evidence.”23
Here, the medical evidence in the record did not support Sponheimer’s testimony
that he cannot perform sedentary work. The ALJ discussed the medical evidence that
contradicted Sponheimer’s alleged physical restrictions and also discussed how that
evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that portions of Sponheimer’s testimony were
not credible.24 Thus, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence and gave sufficient consideration to Sponheimer’s testimony.
III.
For the aforementioned reasons and in light of our overall examination of the
record, we hold that the Commissioner’s determination is supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
23 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).
24 App. 237–41.

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