United States of America v. Electro Glass Products

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 07-3191
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ELECTRO GLASS PRODUCTS,
Appellant.
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On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal No. 06-cr-00117)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
Argued September 29, 2008
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 16, 2008)
David M. Laigaie (Argued)
Mariana Rossman
DIL WORTH PAXSON, LLP
3200 Mellon Bank Center
1735 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant

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Mary Beth Buchanan
Robert L. Eberhardt (Argued)
700 Grant Street, Suite 400
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Electro-Glass Products (“Electro-Glass”) appeals its conviction for violating the
Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), arguing that the Government presented insufficient
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Electro-Glass acted willfully. Because
the jury verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, we will affirm.
I.
We write solely for the benefit of the parties, who are familiar with the factual
context and legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts
necessary to our analysis.
Electro-Glass manufactures “glass preforms,” including “solder glass preforms.”
Solder glass preforms are used, inter alia, by manufacturers of night vision equipment.
The AECA requires manufacturers to obtain licenses before exporting military products
that are on the United States Munitions List (“Munitions List”).
In October 1993, a United States customs agent visited Electro-Glass to inquire
about an order Electro-Glass received from a Dutch entity called B.V. Delft. Pursuant to

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On January 22, 2004, B.E. Delft began to operate as Bel-Optronic Devices Ltd.1
For consistency, we refer to this entity as B.E. Delft throughout the opinion.
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the agent’s instructions, Electro-Glass sought a commodity jurisdiction determination
from the Department of State (“DOS”) regarding whether a license was necessary to
export the preforms. The customs agent also made a presentation to Electro-Glass during
this time period to educate the company’s representatives about the AECA licensing
requirements. In January 1994, DOS issued a commodity jurisdiction determination that
the specific preform B.V. Delft ordered was on the Munitions List, and therefore Electro-
Glass could not ship it without a license. Electro-Glass chose not to ship to B.V. Delft.
Eight years later, in June 2002, Electro-Glass received an order for solder glass
preforms from an Indian company called B.E. Delft . Electro-Glass was aware that these1
preforms were originally developed for military application in night vision devices.
Electro-Glass also acknowledged that it was uncomfortable with continued dealings with
B.E. Delft and that it recognized the similarity in this entity’s name to B.V. Delft.
Electro-Glass sought guidance from several government agencies regarding its
ability to ship to B.E. Delft. Electro-Glass contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and Congressman John Murtha, who referred Electro-Glass’s inquiry to United States
Customs. Although none of these governmental agencies told Electro-Glass not to make
shipments to B.E. Delft, Electro-Glass never received actual authorization for the
shipments. Moreover, a United States customs agent told Electro-Glass that he would

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have to make inquiries with three federal agencies, including DOS, to determine whether
Electro-Glass could legally export the preforms. Without waiting for definitive
authorization from the government, Electro-Glass made four shipments to B.E. Delft
without obtaining a license.
On December 6, 2004, two United States customs agents visited Electro-Glass and
told the company that it would need a license to ship preforms to B.E. Delft. Only then
did Electro-Glass stop making shipments. On April 5, 2006, a grand jury indicted
Electro-Glass on four counts of violating the AECA, one for each shipment that Electro-
Glass made to B.E. Delft. After a four-day trial, a jury found Electro-Glass guilty on all
four counts. Electro-Glass filed a timely appeal.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Because Electro-Glass is appealing from a final judgment of conviction, we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259,
263 (1984); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
Defendant bears a heavy burden on appeal. When considering the sufficiency of
the evidence to uphold a criminal conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see
also United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that this Court
applies a “particularly deferential standard of review when deciding whether a jury

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verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence”). Seen in that light, we affirm if “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[T]he evidence need not
unequivocally point to the defendant’s guilt as long as it permits a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 1999); see also
United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Only when the record
contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may an appellate court overturn the verdict.” (quoting
Brandom v. United States, 431 F.2d 1391, 1400 (7th Cir. 1970))).
III.
To establish a violation of the AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c), the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant exported an article from the
United States, (2) that article is listed on the Munitions List, (3) the defendant exported
the article without a license, and (4) the defendant did so willfully. See United States v.
Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 160 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992). We have noted that the “willfulness”
element of the AECA is established only “[i]f the defendant knew that the export was in
violation of the law.” Id. at 162. The Government does not need to prove the basis of
that knowledge, or that the defendant was aware of the licensing requirement. Id.
Electro-Glass asserts that the Government failed to prove the “willfulness” element
of the offense. To differentiate its case from those where AECA violations have been

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established, Electro-Glass points to cases involving defendants who either admit knowing
that their conduct was illegal or who act in a manner that demonstrates such knowledge
by misrepresenting information to the Government. Electro-Glass also argues that most
AECA cases involve shipments of military items to war-torn or hostile countries. See,
e.g., Tsai, 954 F.2d at 158-59 (affirming a guilty verdict where the defendant falsified
documents to smuggle items through Customs, had been informed that a license was
required to export his product, and told an undercover agent to “act dumb” about the
licensing requirement).
Pointing to more extreme AECA violations, however, does not automatically
imply that Electro-Glass’s conduct did not rise to the level of willfulness, and it certainly
does not allow Electro-Glass to meet its heavy burden on appeal. The fact remains that
Electro-Glass had a four-day jury trial, during which it had a full and fair opportunity to
present a defense to the Government’s charges. After weighing the evidence and
evaluating the credibility of witnesses, the jury determined that the Government proved,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Electro-Glass violated the AECA willfully. In reviewing
the jury verdict, we exercise great deference and affirm if any rational trier of fact could
have found willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the record contains
evidence which could have supported a contrary conclusion does not warrant reversal as
long as there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict. Here, we
conclude that there is.

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Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, with all of
the credibility inferences viewed in favor of the Government, we find that a rational trier
of fact could infer that Electro-Glass knew about the AECA licensing requirements dating
back to the 1993-1994 time period and, therefore, that the company knew that at least
some of its solder glass preforms were military products that could not be shipped without
a license at the time Electro-Glass made shipments to B.E. Delft. Specifically, a rational
trier of fact could have concluded that: (1) a United States customs agent made a
presentation to Electro-Glass representatives in 1993 about the AECA licensing
requirements; (2) this presentation and the 1994 DOS commodity jurisdiction
determination put Electro-Glass on notice that certain military products cannot be
exported without a license; (3) Electro-Glass knew that the preform at issue in this case
was “originally developed for military application,” (Appendix 00753), and was therefore
subject to DOS licensing; and (4) when Electro-Glass made the four shipments to B.E.
Delft without obtaining a license or even requesting a commodity jurisdiction
determination, it knew that doing so was illegal. Thus, a rational trier of fact could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Electro-Glass violated the AECA willfully.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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