Craig R. Espigh v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAMERON LINDSAY, Warden, USP Canaan

ALD-8 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3107
___________
CRAIG R. ESPIGH,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAMERON LINDSAY,
Warden, USP Canaan
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-02436)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 12, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER AND HARDIMAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Opinion filed: October 24, 2007)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Craig R. Espigh appeals the order from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed

-- 1 of 3 --

1 The District Court’s order also denied Espigh’s motion to amend his § 2241 petition
to include an allegation that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). A federal prisoner’s challenge to the legality of his
sentence and conviction must be raised in a § 2255 motion, except where the remedy
under § 2255 would be inadequate or ineffective. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Okereke v.
United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). Espigh has not shown that § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective to consider the Booker claim raised in his motion to amend. We
also note that the rule announced in Booker does not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review. See Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 615-16 (3d Cir. 2005).
Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend. See
Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000).
2
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 In the petition, Espigh challenged the method that the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) uses to calculate Good Conduct Time (“GCT”). The BOP
calculates GCT based upon the amount of time an inmate actually serves, not the amount
of time to which the prisoner has been sentenced. Espigh maintains that this method is
contrary to what Congress intended when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order denying Espigh’s petition.
See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Summary action is appropriate where there
is no substantial question presented in the appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. In this
appeal, there is no substantial question presented. The District Court was correct that our
Court has squarely rejected Espigh’s argument before. See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d
172, 174 (3d Cir. 2005). In O’Donald, the petitioner argued that he was entitled to earn
up to 54 days of GCT per year of the term of sentence imposed, rather than just on the
amount of time actually served. We held that the BOP’s interpretation of the statute,
whereby it permits GCT to be earned only on time actually served, is reasonable. See id.

-- 2 of 3 --

at 174. Accordingly, we find that there is no substantial question presented in this appeal.
We will affirm the District Court’s order.
3

-- 3 of 3 --