Kevin Razzoli v. U.s. Navy

BLD-365 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-2708
________________
KEVIN RAZZOLI,
Appellant
v.
U.S. NAVY; U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION; U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL
GONZALEZ; WARDEN LACKAWANNA COUNTY PRISON;
SCRANTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-01834)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 7, 2007
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed October 2, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
In 1987, Kevin Razzoli was convicted of attempted murder and other offenses by a

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In that case, we determined that Razzoli had committed the attempted murder1
offense that he was court-martialed for on October 15, 1986. As a result, we determined
that his case was governed by the old parole law.
2
Navy Court Martial and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
§ 858, he was transferred to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to serve his
sentence. Razzoli has previously been paroled on multiple occasions. On three
occasions, Razzoli’s parole was revoked because he violated the terms of the parole. Just
prior to another parole, his parole date was delayed after an altercation with his case
manager. In November 2004, Razzoli filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
regarding the revocation of his parole in 2004. That petition was dismissed and this Court
affirmed. See Razzoli v. FCI Allenwood, 200 Fed. Appx.166 (2006).1
Razzoli was most recently paroled on July 27, 2006, from USP-Beaumont, Texas.
Razzoli again violated parole conditions and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On
August 9, 2006, Razzoli pled guilty to disorderly conduct in Lackawanna County Central
Court. After serving his state sentence, Razzoli remained in the custody of the
Lackawanna County prison as a detainee for his parole violation. On August 28, 2006,
the United States Parole Commission provided Razzoli with notice that there would be a
hearing to determine whether his parole should be revoked because of the disorderly
conduct charge (among other things). Razzoli was transferred to a federal institution in
Philadelphia for the hearing, which was conducted in December 2006. At the hearing,

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Razzoli waived counsel and admitted to the disorderly conduct conviction. The
Commission ordered Razzoli’s parole revoked due to the conviction on the disorderly
conduct charge and sentenced Razzoli to fourteen months of imprisonment with a
presumptive parole date of October 3, 2007.
Razzoli thereafter filed the instant pro se § 2241 petition in September 2006.
Although not a model of clarity, Razzoli’s petition appears to allege that he should be
released from confinement because: (1) he has not had a naval clemency hearing since the
1990s; (2) he was arrested in 2006 pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute that does not exist;
and (3) the 2006 parole revocation proceedings violated his Due Process rights. The
District Court dismissed Razzoli’s petition, concluding that each of Razzoli’s claims was
without merit. The District Court also denied Razzoli’s pending motions for declaratory
judgment, issuance of subpoenas, suspension of time, expedited evidentiary hearing, and
the recusal of the Honorable Edwin M. Kosik.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district
court’s denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Because we find that Razzoli’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P.
10.6.
With respect to Razzoli’s claim that his rights have been violated because he has
not had a naval clemency hearing since the 1990s, Razzoli raised a similar claim in his

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prior § 2241 petition. We previously determined that Razzoli is not entitled to annual
clemency hearings because he is under the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the Bureau of
Prisons and is not entitled to different treatment because he was convicted by a Navy
court martial. See Razzoli, 200 Fed. Appx. at 168-69 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 858(a)).
Moreover, Razzoli fails to cite any authority in his current petition that supports his
position.
We also agree with the District Court that Razzoli’s claim that he was illegally
arrested pursuant to a statute that does not exist is without merit. Razzoli was arrested for
a violation of 18 Pa. C. S. § 3926(a)(4), a statutory section which has been in effect since
1973 and was amended in 1995. Further, Razzoli’s assertions in his habeas petition that
his arrest pursuant to this state statute constituted illegal retaliation for his filing of
unidentified civil rights actions or that defendants maintained false and inaccurate records
are not supported by the record.
In addition, Razzoli appears to allege that his Due Process rights were violated
when the Commission failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(1)(A) and various
federal regulations. In support of this claim, he alleges that he was entitled to a “fast
hearing” within the area of his violation and “access to records [and the ability to]
subpoena witnesses who [were] involved with his parole violation.” The District Court
properly dismissed this claim. Revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution
and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to

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As noted above, the order appealed from also disposed of a number of other2
motions. We are satisfied that the District Court properly resolved these motions.
parole revocations. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). Razzoli appears to
have received all the process that he was due under Morrissey. Further, as the District
Court explained, Razzoli was not entitled to the issuance of subpoenas. A revocation
hearing is not a forum where a parolee may “relitigate issues determined against him in
other forums, as in the situation presented when the revocation is based on the conviction
of another crime.” Id. at 490. Even assuming arguendo that the United States Parole
Commission failed to comply with certain procedures, Razzoli fails to explain what
prejudice, if any, he has suffered because of the Commission’s putative actions. At his
hearing before the Commission, Razzoli admitted to a disorderly conduct conviction, and
the Commission ordered Razzoli’s parole revoked based on this conviction.
Finally, the District Court properly denied Razzoli’s motion for the recusal of the
Honorable Edwin M. Kosik. A reasonable person knowing all of the circumstances2
would not harbor doubts about Judge Kosik’s impartiality. See Selkridge v. United of
Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. To the
extent Razzoli attempts to raise any issues for the first time on appeal, we decline to
address them.

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