Yun Lin v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES On Review of a Decision of the Board of…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 07-2158
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YUN LIN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
_____________________
On Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Honorable Daniel A. Meisner
(No. A95-688-008)
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 9, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, STAPLETON and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 15, 2008)
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OPINION
___________________
PER CURIAM
Yun Lin, a forty-eight year old Chinese native and citizen, petitions for review of a
final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), in which the BIA affirmed the
denial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of Lin’s application for asylum, withholding of

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Although the BIA relied on the “heart of the asylum claim” test, under the REAL1
ID Act, credibility determinations may be made “without regard to whether an
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). The REAL ID Act applies to
cases, like Lin’s, where the applicant applied for asylum or other relief after May 11,
2005. Id.
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removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Before the IJ, Lin
claimed that she practiced Falun Gong and that, on account of her practice, her father was
detained by Public Security officials and she was dismissed from her job at a home for the
elderly. The IJ denied Lin’s applications because he did not find her testimony to be
credible. We will deny Lin’s petition for review because substantial evidence supports
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d
Cir. 2004).
To establish eligibility for asylum, Lin must show a reasonable likelihood that she
experienced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(A) (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). The IJ found that Lin’s
testimony regarding past persecution was incredible. This determination rests on
substantial evidence. See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (in order to
support an adverse credibility determination, inconsistencies in testimony must involve
the “heart of the asylum claim”). Specifically, Lin was inconsistent in her assertions1
regarding when she was dismissed from her job at the home for the elderly. Lin’s asylum
application states that she was dismissed in July 2000; however, during her hearing before

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Because Lin failed to make out an asylum claim, she necessarily failed to satisfy2
the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).
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the IJ, she pinpointed the exact date of her dismissal as October 25, 1998. Lin attempts to
explain the discrepancy by claiming that she was censured at work in October 1998 but
her dismissal was not announced until July 2000. However, as the BIA decision noted,
Lin’s explanation fails to account for other inconsistencies in her testimony. For
example, Lin testified that her father was detained two days after the October 25, 1998
incident; but Lin also testified that she heard about the detention from her mother because
she had already moved to a different city to find new employment.
Failing to establish past persecution, an applicant may still establish eligibility for
asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution. Lin relies only on
evidence of past persecution to establish her fear of future persecution. Id. at 174
(applicant who demonstrates that s/he has suffered past persecution triggers a rebuttable
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution as long as that fear is related to
the past persecution). Lin’s fears of future persecution, therefore, suffer from the same
credibility defects as her allegations of past persecution.2
Similarly, because Lin did not show a likelihood of torture, her application for
protection under CAT was also justifiably denied. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
For the above-stated reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

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