Frances E. Garrett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118 3d Cir. 2000

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 07-1548
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FRANCES E. GARRETT,
Appellant,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
__________
On Appeal of an Order of the United States
District Court, District of New Jersey
No. 07-1548
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 10, 2008
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Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and ALDISERT Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: April 17, 2008)
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OPINION
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Frances Garrett (“Garrett”) appeals the order of the District Court affirming the

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Commissioner of Social Security’s (the “Commissioner”) denial of her disability benefits
under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). See 42 U.S.C. § 423. For the following
reasons, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, we note only the essential facts. Garrett
was born in 1956 and was 48 years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision denying her disability benefits. She completed the twelfth grade. Her
past work experience includes employment as a data entry clerk, day care worker,
receptionist, and clerk typist. Garrett filed her application for disability benefits on
September 3, 2002, with an alleged onset date of November 3, 2000. She alleged severe
impairments of the neck and back due to a motor vehicle accident. Her claim was denied
initially and on reconsideration, and she subsequently requested a hearing before an ALJ
which was held on June 7, 2004.
In a detailed opinion, the ALJ found that Garrett had not been under a disability,
as defined by the Act, at any time since her alleged onset date of disability through the
date of decision. Applying the familiar five-step analysis for disability claims, the ALJ
found at step one that Garrett had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since
her alleged onset date. At steps two and three, the ALJ found that, while Garrett’s
chronic cervical and lumbosacral strain are “severe” within the meaning of the
regulations, neither impairment was severe enough to meet or medically equal the listings

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in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “Listing”). After explaining why he
considered Garrett’s testimony about her limitations to be less than credible, the ALJ
found at step four that Garrett retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform work at the “light” exertional level. Finally, the ALJ found that Garrett was not
disabled at step four because she could perform her prior work.
Garrett filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. In a comprehensive opinion, the
District Court affirmed the Commissioner’s finding that Garrett was not disabled.
Garrett timely appealed the District Court’s ruling, which we have jurisdiction to review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
This Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision under the same standard as the District
Court to determine whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support the
ALJ’s decision.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[W]e are bound by the ALJ’s findings of fact if they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d
Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-
65 (1988). Our review of legal issues is plenary. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).

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Listing 1.04 provides:1
Disorders of the spine (e.g., herniated nucleus pulposus,
spinal arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis,
degenerative disc disease, facet arthritis, vertebral fracture),
resulting in compromise of a nerve root (including the cauda
equina) or the spinal cord. With:
A. Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by
neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of
the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle
weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or
reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower back,
positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine); or
B. Spinal arachnoiditis, confirmed by an operative note or
pathology report of tissue biopsy, or by appropriate medically
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III.
On appeal, Garrett raises many of the same arguments that she raised before the
District Court. She argues that: (A) the ALJ erred at step three in finding that her
impairments, when taken together, did not meet or equal in severity a Listing of
Impairment, particularly Listing 1.04; and (B) the ALJ erred in determining that she
retained the RFC to perform her past relevant work. We will address these arguments
below.
A.
Garrett first argues that the ALJ erred at step three by: (1) stating summarily that
her impairments did not meet a Listing; and (2) failing to find that her impairments,
together, meet or equal Listing 1.04. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that1

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acceptable imaging, manifested by severe burning or painful
dysesthesia, resulting in the need for changes in position or
posture more than once every 2 hours; or
C. Lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication,
established by findings on appropriate medically acceptable
imaging, manifested by chronic nonradicular pain and
weakness, and resulting in inability to ambulate effectively,
as defined in 1.00B2b.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
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the ALJ provided sufficient explanation for his finding, along with substantial evidence
in the record, that Garrett’s impairments failed to meet or equal a Listing.
Contrary to Garrett’s assertion, the ALJ provided sufficient explanation for his
conclusion that her impairments did not meet or equal in severity a Listing. As we stated
in Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004), we do not require an ALJ to
adhere to any set format for explaining his analysis so long as there is “sufficient
development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful judicial
review.” The ALJ’s analysis at step three was more than sufficient to permit us to
meaningfully review his decision.
In particular, the ALJ performed an exhaustive review of the medical record
(Administrative Record [“A.R.”] 13-17) and then set forth the Listings he considered
(A.R. 17). The ALJ then stated that, while the evidence indicated that Garrett suffered
from chronic cervical and lumbosacral sprain, her impairments were not severe enough
to meet or equal a Listing. The ALJ specifically noted that her impairments did not meet

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Listing 1.04 because, as stated in a treating orthopedist’s report, there was no evidence of
motor or sensory deficiencies. (A.R. 17.) Furthermore, the ALJ specifically noted that
there was no evidence of motor or sensory deficiencies, and no evidence of spinal
stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication, spinal arachnoiditis, or other manifestations, as
required under Listing 1.04. The ALJ’s analysis clearly “set forth the reasons for his
decision,” allowing us to meaningfully review his conclusions. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at
119.
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
conclusion that Garrett’s impairments do not meet or equal the criteria in Listing 1.04.
First and foremost, Garrett provides us with no citations to any record evidence
demonstrating that her impairments are of Listing-level severity. See id. at 120 n.2
(noting that “[t]he claimant must provide sufficient medical evidence at step three to
show that her impairment is equal in severity to a listed impairment. . . .”). Furthermore,
“‘[f]or a claimant to show his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the
specified medical criteria.’” Jones, 364 F.3d at 504 (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S.
521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original)). While Garrett’s impairments met some of the
criteria under Listing 1.04, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion
that her impairments failed to meet all the criteria of Listing 1.04. For instance, the
record indicated that Garrett could ambulate effectively (A.R. 167, 204-05) and that she
retained hand and finger dexterity (A.R. 167). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §

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1.00(B)(2)(b)(2) (requiring proof of inability to ambulate effectively and inability to
perform fine and gross manipulation to meet or equal any relevant impairment under
Listing 1.00). Morever, as the District Court correctly noted, there is no evidence in the
record of nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis, or lumbar spinal stenosis, as
required under Listing 1.04. See id. § 1.04. Garrett points us to no such evidence in the
record. Therefore, the District Court correctly held that the ALJ’s finding at step three
was supported by substantial evidence.
B.
Garrett also argues that the ALJ’s determination that she retained the RFC to
perform her past relevant work was not based on substantial evidence. According to
Garrett, the ALJ failed to perform a function-by-function analysis of her previous work,
failed to determine whether her previous work allowed for a sit/stand option, and
improperly discredited her testimony. We disagree.
At step four, the Commissioner determines whether, despite her severe
impairments, the claimant retains the RFC to perform her past relevant work. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (f). In making this determination, “the ALJ must consider all
evidence before him.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted). Thus, the
Commissioner must “consider the combined effect of all of [the claimant’s] impairments
without regard to whether such impairment, if considered separately, would be of
sufficient severity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; see also Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d

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546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). The determination of the claimant’s RFC is the exclusive
responsibility of the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1546.
Importantly, the ALJ need only include in the RFC those limitations which he
finds credible. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. Accordingly, to the extent the ALJ found
Garrett’s alleged limitations less than credible, they were properly omitted from the RFC
analysis. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002). At step four, Garrett
bears the burden of demonstrating that she lacks the RFC to perform her past relevant
work. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
At step four, the ALJ found that Garrett maintained the RFC to perform light
work involving “lifting and carrying objects weighing 20 pounds occasionally;
frequently lifting and carrying objects weighing up to 10 pounds; standing, walking and
sitting up to six hours in an 8-hour workday with the option to sit and stand to alleviate
pain and stiffness; pushing and pulling arm and leg controls.” (A.R. 19.) The ALJ then
stated that Garrett’s previous work as a receptionist, data entry clerk, and typist, involved
“having to sit at a desk for up to six hours a day and perform data entry with no
appreciable lifting or carrying requirements.” (A.R. 19.) Because of this, the ALJ
determined that Garrett retained the RFC to perform her previous work.
We agree with the District Court that this finding was based on substantial
evidence. The medical evidence submitted by Garrett only indicated that, while she
suffered from certain impairments, her impairments were not so severe as to prevent her

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from returning to her previous work. For example, the ALJ noted the physical
examinations by various doctors were “relatively benign” (A.R. 18), and this conclusion
was supported by the record. For instance, Garrett’s treating physician, Dr. Donald,
remarked that Garrett had a good range of function, her strength was full, her reflexes
were intact, and she had negative straight leg testing. (A.R. 18, 177-82.) Furthermore,
Dr. Nkwonta, who performed a consultative examination, reported that Garrett was in no
acute distress, she had a normal gait, and she had a full range of motion in her shoulders,
elbows, forearms, wrists, hips, knees and ankles. (A.R. 18, 166-68.) The ALJ also
discounted the limitations in Dr. Donald’s report, finding that Dr. Donald did not
indicate that Garrett was totally unable to work. The ALJ further noted the absence of
clinical findings supporting the limitations noted by Dr. Donald. Furthermore, as
discussed below, the ALJ found that Garrett’s testimony was not entirely credible. Based
on the foregoing, we agree with the District Court that the ALJ based his RFC findings
on substantial evidence.
Although Garrett argues that the ALJ failed to perform a function-by-function
analysis of her prior work, the record indicates that the ALJ specifically questioned
Garrett as to the work she performed in her prior jobs. The ALJ also asked her whether
she could sit and stand during those jobs, and she responded that her work involved
changing positions and alternating between sitting and standing. It is apparent that the
ALJ took these answers into account in determining that Garrett retained the RFC to

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perform her past relevant work. We will require no more from the ALJ.
Garrett also argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that her testimony was less
then fully credible. When making credibility findings, the ALJ must indicate which
evidence he rejects and which he relies upon as the basis for his findings. See
Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433. Inconsistencies in a claimant’s testimony or daily activities
permit an ALJ to conclude that some or all of the claimant’s testimony about her
limitations or symptoms is less than fully credible. See Burns, 312 F.3d at 129-30.
Additionally, allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported by
objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).
The ALJ noted that the conservative treatment Garrett received for her
impairments indicated that they were not as debilitating as she claimed. The ALJ also
discounted Garrett’s claims of disability by noting that she was never hospitalized for her
conditions, and could perform household chores and activities of daily living. The ALJ
also remarked that, while Garrett claims constant excruciating head, neck, and back pain,
she only takes Advil or Excedrin. Furthermore, as noted above, the record evidence
corroborated these findings that her impairments were not as debilitating as claimed.
Accordingly, the ALJ properly discounted Garrett’s testimony.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

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