Mattheus Andreas Laurens v. Attorney General of the United States

064534np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit23.04.2008

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United States Court of*
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 06-4534
_____________
MATTHEUS ANDREAS LAURENS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
_________________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A96-264-473
(Immigration Judge: Honorable Donald Ferlise)
_________________
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 28, 2008
Before: McKEE, RENDELL and TASHIMA , Circuit Judges*
(Filed: April 23, 2008)
_________________

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Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties, we need not set forth the facts or2
procedural history.
2
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
MCKEE, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Mattheus Andreas Laurens seeks review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s denial of his
applications for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, we
will deny the petition for review.
I.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final orders of removal pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where the Board both affirms the findings of the IJ and discusses some
of the bases for the IJ’s decision, we review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ. Xie
v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). We review constitutional and legal claims
de novo. Debeato v. Attorney Gen., 505 F.3d 231, (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Factual and discretionary findings of the agency are reviewed under the familiar
substantial evidence standard. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2003).
II.2
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), an alien cannot apply for asylum unless
he/she can demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been

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Petitioner asserts in conclusory fashion that the one-year filing requirement “violated the3
equal protection of laws as it denied Petitioner a right which is otherwise available to
persons similarly situated.” He fails to identify the similarly situated group required to
establish that he has received disparate treatment.
3
filed within [one] year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” This
requirement is excused where the alien can demonstrate a change in circumstances
affecting eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances that relate to the delay in
filing. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
The IJ determined that Laurens’ asylum application was untimely and that such
filing was not legally excused, and the BIA affirmed. Although Laurens does not directly
challenge this determination, he argues that the requirement of providing clear and
convincing evidence that the application for asylum is filed within one year violates his
substantive due process right and equal protection rights. The argument is foreclosed by
our decision in Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2006).
To the extent Laurens argues that his right to “equal protection” has been violated,
that argument is also without merit. “The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike,3
are protected by the Due Process Clause does not [mean] that all aliens are entitled to all of
the advantages of citizenship . . . .” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976). Nor does it
establish that “all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification.” Id.
The INA applies the same standard to all applications for asylum, and there is therefore no
disparate treatment.
III.

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The immigration judge found Laurens’ testimony to be credible.4
4
Laurens also challenges the Board’s denial of his application for withholding of
removal. Although the exact nature of his challenge is not clear, Laurens appears to be
challenging the agency’s determination that he has not suffered past persecution. He
claims that he has submitted evidence of past persecution entitling him a rebuttable
presumption of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1).
Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination this claim must
also fail. Laurens testified to being robbed several times, and suffering minor physical
injuries on one occasion. He also reported some disparate treatment at work, which he
believes was on account of his Christian beliefs. We agree with the BIA and the IJ that4
these incidents do not rise to the level of persecution, nor is it clear that the incidents of
street crime bore any connection to his religion or the required governmental nexus. The
BIA properly explained that “[t]he term ‘persecution’ means ‘extreme behavior, including
threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they
constitute a threat to life or freedom. This definition does not include all treatment that
our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.’” App. at 3
(quoting Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003)).
IV.
Finally, Laurens has not demonstrated that the agency was unreasonable in rejecting
his claim that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians in Indonesia. See

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5
Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005). The record simply does not substantiate
Laurens’ alleged fear of future persecution. It contains only his testimony, uncorroborated
by State Department Country Reports. Moreover, because he has not established that the
mistreatment he complains of was the result of government action or acquiescence, he has
not satisfied his evidentiary burden.
V.
Laurens’ brief does not provide any separate analysis of the CAT claim. However,
based on our review of the record, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination
that he has not shown he is more likely than not to be tortured upon his return to Indonesia.
See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2003).
For the foregoing reasons, Laurens’ petition for review is denied.

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