United States of America v. Jarrod A. Ross

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-4148
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JARROD A. ROSS,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 06-cr-00003-2E)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 9, 2008
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 23, 2008)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Jarrod Ross pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States
under 18 U.S.C. § 371. He received a sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment plus a three-

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year term of supervised release. On appeal, he raises the sole claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. His counsel asserts that this and all other potential grounds for
appeal are frivolous, seeking to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
“It has long been the practice of this court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel to a collateral attack. Nonetheless, we have held that we may address the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal when the record is sufficient to
allow determination of the issue.” United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir.
2003) (citations omitted). In our case, Ross has provided no specifics as to how his trial
counsel was ineffective. We have no record “developed precisely for the object of
litigating or preserving the claim.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003).
Thus, the exception mentioned in Thornton does not apply here.
The Government contends that Ross knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
appeal as part of his plea agreement. Ross points to no evidence in the record to the
contrary. Yet because he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, which might have
detracted from the knowingness or voluntariness of his waiver, the waiver issue is best
addressed on collateral review as well.
In this context, a habeas corpus petition is a more appropriate procedure for Ross
to challenge his conviction and sentence. We thus affirm the judgment of the District
Court. In this regard, we also grant Ross’s counsel leave to withdraw.

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