Latchmie Toolasprashad v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4239
________________
LATCHMIE TOOLASPRASHAD,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; JERRY GRABER, Chief Internal Affairs;
HARRELL WATTS, Internal Affairs; MIKE NELSON, Internal Affairs;
ART BEELER, Warden, FCI Fort Dix, NJ; E. L. TATUM, Assistant Case
Manager, Coordinator; HENRY J. SADOWSKY, Reginal Counsel; WENDY J.
ROAL, National Inmate Appeals; JOSEPH GILBERT REED, Lt., Allenwood,
FCI; JOHN ADAMI, Case Manager, Allenwood, FCI; CARL STEVENS,
Unit Manager, Allenwood, FCI; D. RICHARDS, Captain,
Allenwood, FCI; DOUG MOYER, Case Manager, Coordinator; PETE
ACKLEY, Associate Warden, Allenwood, FCI; LESA COWAN
_____________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00168)
District Judge: Honorable Judge Malcolm Muir
_____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 6, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed October 26, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Latchmie Toolasprashad, appeals from an order entered by the United

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States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment
to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on Toolasprashad’s Privacy Act damages
claim, the only claim that remained of Toolasprashad’s complaint after it was transferred
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. We will affirm the
District Court’s entry of judgment in favor of the BOP.
The facts and extensive procedural history of this case are well known to the
parties; thus, it is not necessary for us to restate them in great detail here. It suffices to
note that Toolasprashad, a federal prisoner, alleges that the BOP violated the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552a, when it transferred him to a correctional institution far from his parents’
home and classified him as a “special offender” based upon false information contained
in a BOP memorandum written on September 8, 1997. Specifically, the challenged BOP
memorandum contained statements noting that: 1) Toolasprashad had a “significant
documented history of harassing and demeaning staff members” at FCI-Allenwood; 2)
since his arrival at FCI-Allenwood, there were four separate investigations conducted by
a Special Investigative Supervisor (“SIS”) relating to his “manipulative behavior;” 3)
despite staff encouragement for proper programming, Toolasprashad “continued to
demonstrate a personal vendetta;” and 4) Toolasprashad “has clearly disrupted the orderly
running of [FCI-Allenwood]” and “is considered to be a management problem based on
his blatant disrespect for authority.”
The District Court considered Toolasprashad to have fulfilled the first element of a
Privacy Act claim, i.e., that his transfer and redesignation were adverse determinations.

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See, e.g., Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(citing
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C), and Deters v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 85 F.3d 655, 657 (D.C. Cir.
1996)). With respect to the second element concerning the accuracy of the transfer
memorandum, the District Court noted that insofar as the memorandum contains a
combination of subjective judgments and objective factual assertions, differing review
standards applied to each challenged aspect of the memo. Additionally, the District Court
concluded that Toolasprashad was precluded from challenging the actual documents
which supported the transfer memorandum because as he had not demonstrated that
administrative remedies had been exhausted with respect to the documents referenced by
the BOP in the transfer memo. See D.Ct. Memorandum Opinion at 14 citing (5 U.S.C. §§
552a(d)(2) and (d)(3)).
According to the District Court, the first comment noting that Toolasprashad has a
“significant documented history of harassing and demeaning staff members” at FCI-
Allenwood is, in part, a factual conclusion supported by documents in the record. The
question of whether the behavior at issue in those documents (i.e., incident reports based
on, inter alia, “insolence towards staff” and “conduct which disrupts or interferes with the
orderly running of the institution which most resembles lying or providing false
information to a staff member,” etc.) was appropriately characterized by the memo writer
as “harassing and demeaning” toward staff members is one of opinion or judgment, and is
not subject to review under the Privacy Act. See id. at 16. Likewise, the statement
asserting that four separate SIS investigations were conducted regarding Toolasprashad’s

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“manipulative behavior” was based, in part, on a factual statement regarding the number
of investigations actually conducted – a contention capable of simple verification in the
summary judgment record – and on an assessment of Toolasprashad’s behavior as
“manipulative,” a subjective judgment not within the ambit of judicial review.
Toolasprashad’s challenge to the next two statements in the September 8 memoth
fared no better. The comment regarding Toolasprashad’s “continued personal vendetta”
despite staff encouragement for proper programming was found by the District Court to
relate more to his behavior and attitude as opposed to any other objectively verifiable
facts such as completed courses, work assignments, etc. As such, the statement was
viewed to constitute an opinion that was, in any event, “sufficiently accurate” given the
evidentiary record presented. Finally, the statement that Toolasprashad disrupted the
orderly running of FCI-Allenwood was found by the District Court to be supported by the
four SIS investigations, and the characterization of Toolasprashad as a “management
problem” was found to reflect an opinion sufficiently accurate to withstand a Privacy Act
claim. Accordingly, given the foregoing, the District Court determined that no reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that any material statement in the September 8 memo isth
sufficiently inaccurate to entitle Toolasprashad to monetary relief under the Privacy Act.
Summary judgment was thus entered in favor of the BOP and this timely appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
exercise plenary review over a District Court’s order granting a motion for summary
judgment. See Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006). After

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It appears that portions of the summary judgment record were misplaced or lost.1
Accordingly, the parties were requested to provide assistance in recompiling those
documents and have done so as best they can. Importantly, the documents provided,
which we have reviewed, include those offered as support for the BOP’s transfer memo
of September 8, 1997: 1) the Incident Report of 1/27/94 (exhibit 4 of Motion for
Summary Judgment); 2) Incident Report of 3/10/95 (exhibit 5); 3) Disciplinary Hearing
Officer’s report of 3/13/95 re: incident of 3/10/95 (exhibit 6); 4) Marguis’ memo of
12/22/95 (exhibit 7); 5) Transfer Request of 6/12/96 (exhibit 8); 6) Administrative
Detention Order of 11/1/96 (exhibit 9); and 7) Transfer Request of 8/25/97 (exhibit 10).
By separate order filed simultaneously with this opinion, those documents will be
transferred to the District Court and will constitute the official record for the relevant
entries noted.
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careful review of the record, we find that summary judgment in favor of appellee BOP1
was proper for essentially the reasons given by the District Court. We have considered
the contentions raised by Toolasprashad on appeal and reject them as meritless with little
discussion. His reliance on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit as dispositive of the current appeal is misplaced, as the Court
in that case was reviewing a decision granting a motion to dismiss and viewed the facts
“through that lens.” See Toolasprashad, 286 F.3d at 580. Additionally, the Court there
noted that “[g]iven the posture of [the] case – a motion to dismiss – [it] neither should nor
need decide the typicality issue,” the very issue upon which the underlying District Court
decision is based. Id. at 583. Finding no reversible error with the District Court’s
analysis in that regard, we affirm its decision. Likewise, finding no reason to appoint
counsel in this case, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993), or to hold oral
argument, we deny these requests.

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