Greg W. Earnest v. JUDGE THOMAS S. LING, Court of Common Pleas On Appeal From the United States…

APS-330 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-4745
GREG W. EARNEST,
Appellant
v.
JUDGE THOMAS S. LING,
Court of Common Pleas
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00243J)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
_______________________________________
Submitted Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
August 4, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: August 17, 2005 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Greg Earnest appeals from the grant of the Defendant’s motion to
dismiss the complaint against Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas Judge Thomas Ling.
The appeal is frivolous, and we will dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
On October 10, 2004, Earnest filed a complaint with the District Court. The

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review1
over the grant of a motion to dismiss. See Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 (3d
Cir. 1993).
2
complaint consists of one document listing several causes of action and three separate
documents entitled “complaint,” each listing numerous individuals and government
entities. The District Court docketed the complaint against only Judge Ling. Earnest
claims Judge Ling violated numerous constitutional rights with respect to his case in the
Bedford County Court of Common Pleas. The District Court granted the Defendant’s
motion to dismiss with prejudice. Earnest appeals and filed a motion to compel
discovery.1
Earnest’s complaint is unintelligible and fails to provide any details regarding what
injuries he allegedly sustained or what unconstitutional actions are alleged to have
occurred. To the extent he seeks federal review over the judgment of a state court,
Earnest is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
To the extent Earnest attempts to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are
not inextricably intertwined with state court judgments, his claims are barred by judicial
immunity. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). Although
Earnest argues that Judge Ling was without jurisdiction to act, which excepts the
protection of judicial immunity, see id., Earnest provides no coherent argument or any

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3
statement of facts from which we can assess the argument.
Finally, Earnest filed a document in this Court entitled “Petition for Motion to
Compel Discovery.” He requests that this Court docket his appeal with respect to the
other named Defendants. Upon closer inspection it appears Earnest seeks to appeal the
District Court’s failure to address the claims relating to the United States and the
Commonwealth, not actually obtain discovery. We construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings
liberally, see Dluhos v. Stasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003), and construe his
motion as a letter in support of his notice of appeal. The District Court did not err in
failing to consider these parties. First, it does not appear that Earnest requested a
summons or served process on any of the other potential defendants. See generally Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4. Second, his complaint fails to clearly identify which parties he seeks to sue.
Finally, he alleges no coherent claim against any other potential defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we will dismiss.

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