in Re: Peter Secivanovic v. PETER SECIVANOVIC AND ZORA SECIVANOVIC Zora Secivanovic

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NOS. 04-2381 & 04-2466
________________
IN RE: PETER SECIVANOVIC,
Debtor
GARY S. JACOBSON, CHAPTER 7
TRUSTEE FOR PETER SECIVANOVIC
v.
PETER SECIVANOVIC AND
ZORA SECIVANOVIC
Zora Secivanovic,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00797)
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 6, 2005
Before: NYGAARD, VAN ANTWERPEN AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed July 7, 2005 )

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Any reference hereafter to “Secivanovic” is to Zora Secivanovic.1
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OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Zora Secivanovic appeals from the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy
Court’s order that denied her motion to vacate a default judgment. For the reasons set
forth below, we will affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will only briefly revisit them here. In
1998, Peter Secivanovic filed a voluntary petition for personal bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey. After the case was converted to a Chapter 7 case, Gary S.
Jacobson was appointed as the trustee. Jacobson filed a complaint against Peter
Secivanovic and Zora Secivanovic, his mother, and alleged that Peter transferred a
property to Zora for less than reasonably equivalent value. Jacobson filed a request for
entry of default judgment and a judgment was entered against both defendants in the
amount of $32,000.00. Zora Secivanovic filed a motion to vacate the default judgment; a
consent order was entered vacating the default judgment as to Zora only.1
Approximately a year later, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order to compel
discovery. Jacobson filed a motion to strike Secivanovic’s answer for failure to comply
with the discovery order. The motion was granted and a second default judgment was

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Rule 60(b) is made applicable here by Rule 9024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy2
Procedure.
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entered. Secivanovic filed another motion to vacate the default judgment, which was
granted. As a condition of vacating the default judgment, the order required Secivanovic
to pay Jacobson’s counsel fees, in the amount of $5,000.00, within 30 days. When
payment was not remitted, Jacobson filed a third motion for entry of default judgment,
which was granted. Secivanovic filed another motion to vacate the default judgment; the
Bankruptcy Court denied the motion. Secivanovic then filed a notice of appeal to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court affirmed
the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying the motion to vacate the default judgment.
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s orders
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have appellate jurisdiction over the District
Court’s order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. The entry of default and default
judgment will only be set aside if we determine that the trial court abused its discretion.
See United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192,195 (3d Cir. 1984); see
also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7055, 9024; Argentaria v. Family Rests., Inc. (In re Home Rests.,
Inc.), 285 F.3d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 2002).
In exercising its discretion, the Bankruptcy Court addressed the necessary factors
for reviewing a motion to vacate a default judgment; the Bankruptcy Court properly
denied Secivanovic’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion after concluding that (1) Jacobson2
would be prejudiced if the motion was granted; (2) Secivanovic did not present a

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meritorious defense; and (3) her conduct, which led to the default, was culpable. See
U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 195. We discern no abuse of discretion here. To the extent
Secivanovic attempted to raise new arguments on appeal to the District Court or is
attempting to present new arguments in this appeal, she is precluded from doing so. See
Srein v. Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214, 224 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003).
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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