No: 03-2465 PAMELA L. RICE v. Joanne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No: 03-2465
___________
PAMELA L. RICE
Appellant
v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Civil Action No. 02-cv-00051E)
District Judge: Hon. Sean J. McLaughlin
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 13, 2004
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROTH, and McKEE, Circuit Judges,
(Opinion filed March 25, 2004)
___________
OPINION
___________
McKee, Circuit Judge.

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1 We exercise plenary review over decisions to grant and deny motions for summary
judgment. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003). Where the ALJ's findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we
would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 38
(3d Cir. 2001).
2 For brevity’s sake, this evidence will be referred to as “the earlier evidence” in the
rest of this opinion.
2
We are asked to review the denial of Pamela Rice’s application for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401-434. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts of this
case in detail. Rice makes three arguments on appeal. She claims that the ALJ erred by
ignoring relevant evidence that she submitted to support her previous failed claim for
DIB, and that the district court erred by invoking the doctrine of res judicata in affirming
the final order of the ALJ. She also argues that the ALJ had a duty to secure additional
consultative examinations, and that the hypothetical question that the ALJ asked the
vocational expert at the hearing improperly omitted some of her impairments. We
address each claim separately.1
A. Res Judicata and the Relevance of the Earlier Medical Evidence
Rice argues that the ALJ erred because he did not consider medical evidence from
before her alleged onset date of July 31, 1996.2 She also argues that the district court

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erred in affirming the ALJ’s decision despite this error, and in incorrectly applying the
doctrine of res judicata.
1. The District Court’s Application of Res Judicata
The district court correctly concluded that res judicata barred the ALJ from
considering the portion of Rice’s claim for benefits up to August 16, 1996, but incorrectly
implied that it automatically made the earlier evidence irrelevant. Res judicata applies
when there has been “a prior determination or decision . . . about [the claimant’s] rights
on the same facts and on the same issue or issues, and this previous determination has
become final by either administrative or judicial action.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.957©)(1); see
also Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 1985). In the Social Security benefits
context, we have said that an ALJ may apply res judicata where the “same injuries, the
same dates, and the same issues” are involved in a subsequent disability claim. Tobak v.
Apfel, 195 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 1999).
The prior ALJ considered whether Rice had a disabling emotional or psychological
impairment pursuant to her 1993 application for DIB and rejected this claim in his 1996
decision. R. at 373-83. He ruled that “at the time of application the claimant did not
allege disability due to any emotional impairment[,]” but noted that Dr. Singh questioned
how much of Rice’s reported symptoms were related to a psychological condition. Dr.
Singh had diagnosed her with “adjustment disorder with depressed mood.” He also noted
that Rice was being treated for “emotional complaints” by Dr. Woods, and that Dr.

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4
Woods stated that “the claimant appears obsessed with physical problems” but that she
“was not consistent with attending therapy sessions.” R. at 376. He concluded that any
psychological impairments Rice may have had did not render her disabled. Id.
The ALJ considered the same issue presented here, whether Rice’s “disability”
was merely a psychosomatic illness. The ALJ’s decision resolves that issue for the period
up to and including August 16, 1996. Res judicata thus prevented a subsequent ALJ from
reconsidering whether Rice was disabled through August 16. Tobak v. Apfel, 195 F.3d
183, 186, 188 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that res judicata applied because both of petitioner’s
DIB applications alleged disability due to the same injuries beginning on the same date).
The district court correctly ruled that res judicata would not bar a subsequent ALJ
from considering whether Rice had the impairments she alleges after August 16, 1996.
However, this does not mean that res judicata barred Rice from relying on earlier
evidence offered in support of her 1993 DIB application when she reapplied in 2000. As
Rice correctly points out, res judicata bars the same claim from being relitigated but does
not bar using the old evidence to prove a new claim.
2. Relevance of the Earlier Evidence to the Current Claim
However, there was no need for the second ALJ to review the earlier evidence
unless Rice could illustrate its relevance to her second claim. Rice seems to argue that
the ALJ should have considered the earlier evidence because res judicata did not bar
doing so. However, the fact that the earlier evidence was available for consideration does

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3 Moreover, since the first ALJ obviously concluded that Rice’s problems were mostly
in her mind, it is obvious that consideration of her earlier evidence would have greatly
undermined her current claim absent an argument that she has a disabling mental
disability.
4 Munchausen syndrome is a factitious disorder in which a person acts as if he or she
has a physical illness when he or she is not really sick. WebMD: Health: Factitious
Disorders, at http://my.webmd.com/content/article/60/67132.htm (visited M ar. 11, 2004).
Factitious disorders are considered mental illnesses because they are associated with
severe emotional difficulties. Id. These disorders are similar to somatoform disorders, in
5
not establish its relevance, and Rice does not explain its relevance to her current claim.
She might have done so by arguing that her mental disorders establish a basis for her
current disability, but she has not made that argument. Thus, the ALJ did not err in
ignoring the earlier evidence.3
3. Equitable Argument for Admitting This Earlier Evidence
The mere fact that the ALJ requested a consultative evaluation that may have
considered the earlier evidence and included that in the record does not mean that the ALJ
reconsidered evidence from before August 1996, or that he should have done so.
Moreover, Dr. Cynthia Hoffmeir’s evaluation did not significantly rely on evidence from
before August 1996. She stated that she began treating Rice in the early 1990s, and that
Rice has made various complaints “over the years” which have led other doctors to say
that Rice had “somatization syndrome.” R. at 192. Most of Dr. Hoffmeir’s evaluation
detailed Rice’s current condition as of the date of her last examination on June 14, 2000.
Dr. Hoffmeir concluded by stating: “I believe that [Rice] has somatatization (sic)
syndrome as well as what I would consider Munchausen syndrome.4 . . .” R. at 196.

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which a person “experiences symptoms of an illness even though a doctor can find no
medical cause for the symptoms.” WebM D: Health: Types of Mental Disorders, at
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/60/67134.htm?lastselectedguid={5FE84E90-
BC77 -4056-A91C-9531713CA348}. “The main difference between the two groups of
disorders is that people with somatoform disorders do not fake symptoms or mislead
others about their symptoms on purpose.” WebM D: Health: Factitious Disorders, at
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/60/67132.htm (visited M ar. 11, 2004).
6
Nor does the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Hoffmeir’s evaluation establish that the ALJ
relied on evidence from before August 1996. The ALJ notes that Dr. Hoffmeir had
difficulty determining which of Rice’s physical complaints were real and which were
exaggerated. R. at 12. The ALJ’s second reference states simply that Dr. Hoffmeir’s
records “do not reflect objective signs or findings of abnormality to corroborate the
existence of a musculoskeletal impairment of disabling severity[.]” Id. The third time, the
ALJ states that Dr. Hoffmeir “speculated that Ms. Rice might have ‘Munchausen’s
Syndrome,’” but goes on to say that there is no significant mental health treatment during
the period at issue and that the state psychologist evaluating Rice found that she did not
have a mental impairment that significantly affected her ability to work. R. at 13 (internal
citation omitted). The ALJ also lists Dr. Hoffmeir’s report, together with the other
doctors’ reports, in detailing the evidence he considered in ruling on Rice’s claim. R. at
14. This does not suggest that the ALJ reconsidered the earlier evidence. See Coup v.
Heckler, 834 F.2d 313, 317 (3d Cir. 1987).
B. Duty to Secure Further Consultative Examinations
Rice argues that the ALJ had a duty to secure additional consultative examinations

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under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 404.1517, and 404.1519a.
Section 404.1512 states:
(a) General. In general, you have to prove to us that you are
blind or disabled. Therefore, you must bring to our attention
everything that shows that you are blind or disabled. This
means that you must furnish medical and other evidence that
we can use to reach conclusions about your medical
impairment(s) and, if material to the determination of whether
you are blind or disabled, its effect on your ability to work on
a sustained basis.
. . .
(c) Your responsibility. You must provide medical evidence
showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it is
during the time you say that you are disabled. You must
provide evidence showing how your impairment(s) affects
your functioning during the time you say that you are
disabled, and any other information that we need to decide
your case.
. . .
(d) Our responsibility. Before we make a determination that
you are not disabled, we will develop your complete medical
history for at least the 12 months preceding the month in
which you file your application unless there is a reason to
believe that development of an earlier period is necessary or
unless you say that your disability began less than 12 months
before you filed your application.
It is thus clearly the claimant’s burden to produce sufficient medical evidence to
support his or her claim, and the government is obligated to fill in the gaps only if it does
not have a complete medical history for the preceding year.
The ALJ apparently thought he needed more information from Dr. Hoffmeir
before he could render a decision, and he therefore asked for a consultive examination.
He made his decision on Rice’s claim after considering Dr. Hoffmeir’s consultative

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5 We assume here that Dr. Hoffmeir’s report renders more than a speculation regarding
Rice’s possible mental disorders. The ALJ’s statement that Dr. Hoffmeir’s conclusion
was speculative is supported by Dr. Hoffmeir’s conditional language when rendering her
opinion. See Op. at 14. It is also supported by her report’s content: because her opinion
states that Rice has both somatization syndrome and Munchausen syndrome, the reader is
left to figure out whether Rice knew that her medical complaints were false or if the
complaints were psychosomatic in origin. See supra note 4 (regarding the differences
between somatoform disorders and factitious disorders such as Munchausen syndrome).
8
examination. However, Rice argues that he either had to use Hoffmeir’s consultative
evaluation to conclude that Rice was disabled or, having rejected her opinion, had to
gather more information regarding Rice’s potential disability based on psychiatric
disorders. That argument rests on the false assumption that accepting Hoffmeir’s opinion
equates to finding Rice disabled due to Munchausen syndrome or a somatoform disorder.
Hoffmeir’s report states only that she believed Rice “has somatatization (sic) syndrome as
well as what I would consider Munchausen syndrome. . . .”5 R. at 196. She does not
comment on whether these psychiatric disorders rose to the level of being a “disability”
under the Social Security Act.
The ALJ could therefore rely totally upon Dr. Hoffmeir’s opinion and still find that
Rice’s impairments did not result in disability for purposes of DIB. He was free to reach
that conclusion based on his assessment of Rice’s lack of credibility and Dr. Hoffmeir’s
professional opinion that Rice exaggerated her symptoms. R. at 11-12. The ALJ’s
conclusion is thereby supported by substantial evidence on the record, and there was no
need for him to secure additional evidence.

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6 See “keen, a. (adv.)” in the Oxford English Dictionary on-line, at
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00125769?query_type=word&queryword=keen&editi
on=2e&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=2&search_id=FPyu-H
IKb7V-122&hilite=00125769.
9
C. Failure to Include Every Impairment in Hypothetical to the Vocational Expert
Rice’s final argument is that the ALJ erred in posing his hypothetical to the
vocational expert because the question did not include Rice’s visual impairment. It is
undisputed that Rice had “only one functional eye” due to “the significant retinal damages
resulting in the loss of central and some peripheral vision” in her left eye. R. at 293. It is
also undisputed that the ALJ incorporated this impairment by requiring the vocational
expert to come up with jobs that did not require “keen or acute bilateral vision.” R. at 71.
Rice argues that the ALJ erred when he used the word “keen” in relation to “vision”
because “keen vision” is not a concept that “has any functional definition in the record on
in the ALJ’s decision.” She also argues that the ALJ erred because he failed to restrict
her ability to perform manual coordination requiring depth perception in the hypothetical.
Appellant’s Br. at 41-42.
Her argument regarding the ALJ’s use of the word “keen” is meritless. First,
Rice’s counsel did not object or request clarification of the term “keen.” Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the meaning of the ALJ’s phrase “keen vision” can be taken
from the ordinary meaning of “keen.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines “keen” with
regard to “the eyes or eyesight” as: “[s]harp, penetrating” and “[a]cute, highly sensitive.”6

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Rice’s argument regarding the ALJ’s failure to incorporate the manual coordination
limitation is also meritless. The ALJ could properly assume that any secondary
impairment of her motor skills resulting from her visual impairment would be taken into
account simply by accounting for the visual impairment itself.
III.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court’s judgment.

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