United States of America v. Martin Williams, a/k/a Lewis Johnson, a/k/a Peter Ejoh, a/k/a Peter Anderson

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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 03-2434
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MARTIN WILLIAMS,
a/k/a Lewis Johnson,
a/k/a Peter Ejoh,
a/k/a Peter Anderson,
Appellant
_______________
Appeal from the United States District
Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 96-cr-00587 )
District Judge: Honorable William H.
Walls
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR
34.1(a)
on February 13, 2004
Before: SCIRICA,Chief Judge, ROTH
and MCKEE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 21, 2004 )
Esther Salas, Esquire
Louise Arkel, Esquire
Federal Public Defender
972 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant
George S. Leone
Ricardo Solano, Jr.
Office of the United States Attorney
920 Broad Street
Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee
O P I N I O N
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Martin Williams, is a
Nigerian national who filed pro se motions
in the District Court of New Jersey seeking
dismissal of the detainer lodged against
him in May 2002 for violating the terms of
his supervised release. He argued, inter
alia, that the period of supervised release
included as part of his 1997 sentence
should have been deemed extinguished
upon his subsequent deportation. After the
District Court denied his motion, Williams
pleaded guilty. On appeal, Williams raises
this same issue, one of first impression in
this Circuit. After careful consideration,
we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.

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I. Factual and Procedural History
On September 27, 1996, Williams
pleaded guilty to bank fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1344 and obstruction of
correspondence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1702. Pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey sentenced
Williams to 16 months imprisonment and
five years of supervised release. The terms
and conditions of Williams’ supervised
release included that (1) “the defendant
shall not commit another federal, state, or
local crime,” and (2) “[i]f deported, the
defendant shall not re-enter the United
States without the written permission of
the Attorney General.”
After Williams completed his term
of imprisonment on July 18, 1997, he was
released into the custody of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
On July 23, 1997, he was deported to
Nigeria.
Sometime after his deportation, but
before his term of supervised release was
to end, Williams re-entered the United
States. On September 6, 2001, he was
arrested under an alias in the Northern
District of Illinois. Charged with credit
card fraud, Williams pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment
and three years of supervised release.
On April 30, 2002, Williams was
indicted for illegally re-entering the United
States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
and (b)(2). After pleading guilty, on
October 3, 2002, Williams was sentenced
to seven months imprisonment and two
years of supervised release.
On May 31, 2002, the District Court
for the District of New Jersey issued an
order to show cause why Williams should
not be found in violation of the conditions
of the supervised release imposed on him
in connection with his 1996 bank fraud
conviction. After a detainer was lodged
against him, Williams moved to dismiss
the detainer arguing, among other things,
that his period of supervised release had
ended upon his deportation.
The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey denied
Williams’ motion to dismiss the detainer.
Subsequently, on April 29, 2003, Williams
pleaded guilty to violating the condition of
his supervised release which prohibited
him from committing another federal,
state, or local crime. That same day, the
District Court revoked Williams’
previously imposed term of supervised
release and sentenced him to seven months
imprisonment.
On appeal, Williams contends that
his term of supervised release terminated
upon deportation in 1997, thereby
depriving the District Court of jurisdiction
to revoke the term of supervised release.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of
Review
The District Court had jurisdiction
in this criminal matter pursuant to 18

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U.S.C. § 3231, which confers original
jurisdiction over all offenses against the
laws of the United States, and, more
specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which
governs the authority of a court to revoke
a term of supervised release. We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Our review of issues of jurisdiction
is plenar y. S ee G rand Un ion
Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v.
H.E. Lockhart Mgmt, Inc., 316 F.3d 408,
410 (3d Cir. 2003).
III. Discussion
Williams contends that his term of
supervised release terminated on the date
he was deported from the United States.
He bases this argument on our decision in
United States v. Porat, 17 F.3d 660 (3rd
Cir. 1994), where we held that a defendant
whose period of supervised release was
conditioned on home detention in Israel
must serve that period of supervised
release in the United States. Id. at 671.
The decision in Porat was based on the
fact that home detention is perhaps the
most serious and constraining condition of
supervised release and therefore proper
supervision is required. Id. at 670. We
reasoned that, because there was no
ongoing contact with a probation officer
and the defendant could decide to end
cooperation with the District Court,
making it difficult or even impossible to
bring the defendant before it to impose
remedial measures, the defendant had to
serve his complete sentence in the United
States. Id. at 670-71. Williams alleges that
the reasoning underlying Porat is equally
applicable in the instant case and that
probation cannot supervise a defendant
who has been deported.
We disagree. Williams’ reliance on
United States v. Porat is misplaced. Porat
dealt with a defendant whose supervised
release included home detention and
therefore required active supervision. See
17 F.3d at 670-71. In contrast, a condition
of supervised release requiring that a
defendant not commit any federal, state, or
local crime can be easily enforced against
a defendant who after deportation illegally
re-enters the United States and commits
another federal, state, or local crime during
the term of his supervised release
(including the offense of illegal reentry).
Enforcement of the condition in this case
does not require supervision in a foreign
country.
Moreover, the language of § 3583
does not provide for automatic termination
of supervised release upon deportation. To
the contrary, the statute provides that in
such cases “the court may provide, as a
condition of supervised release, that [the
defendant] be deported and remain outside
the United States, and may order that he be
delivered to a duly authorized immigration
official for such deportation.” Id. § 3583
(d) (3). We see from the language of §
3583 that Congress was aware that some
defendants sentenced to supervised release
would be deported yet chose not to provide
for automatic termination of supervised
release when the defendant was deported.

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The omission of such language defeats
William’s contention. See United States v.
Ramirez-Sanchez, 338 F.3d 977, 981 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“Had Congress intended for
deportation to terminate a term of
supervised release, it could have provided
so”); United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If Congress intended
for deportation to terminate this sentence,
it could have specifically provided for
such to occur. However, Congress has not
done so . . . ”). Indeed, it would be
inconsistent for Congress to authorize a
district court to order a defendant to
“remain outside the United States”
following deportation as a condition of
supervised release but concurrently intend
that condition to extinguish upon
deportation. See Brown, 54 F.3d at 239
(“This is a clear indication that a term of
supervised release remains in effect after
the defendant is deported.”).
We will follow the other courts of
appeals that have held that supervised
release is not automatically extinguished
by deportation. See Ramirez-Sanchez, 338
F.3d at 980; United States v. Cuero-Flores,
276 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Akinyemi, 108 F.3d 777, 779 (7th
Cir. 1997); Brown, 54 F.3d at 238-39.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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