Michael Sniscak v. BOROUGH OF RARITAN On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District…

03-1997Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit11.12.2003

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
03-1997
__________
MICHAEL SNISCAK; GARY M. STRAMAGLIA;
GARY R. KAMBECK; ROGER B. ENGLAND;
MARK D. CIESLA; EDW ARD DOBROSKY, JR.;
KENNETH J. MCCORMICK, III; ROBERT MCCARTHY;
MICHAEL C. SCHUTTA; ROBERT LUDWIG;
LAURENCE R. HESS, III; MICKEY B. KIRK;
RAYMOND A. NOLTE; DAVID M. MALINA;
DOUGLAS A. BROWNLIE;
DAVID DELESKY; DALE JOHNSON,
Appellants
v.
BOROUGH OF RARITAN
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-05326)
District Judge: Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise
__________
Argued November 18, 2003
Before: RENDELL, BARRY, and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 11, 2003)

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Stephen E. Klausner [ARGUED]
Klausner & Hunter
63 East High Street
P. O. Box 1012
Somerville, NJ 08876
Counsel for Appellants
Michael Sniscak; Gary M.
Stramaglia; Gary R. Kambeck;
Roger B. England; Mark D. Ciesla;
Edward Dobrosky, Jr.; Kenneth J.
McCormick, III; Robert McCarthy;
Michael C. Schutta; Robert Ludwig;
Laurence R. Hess, III; Mickey B.
Kirk; Raymond A. Nolte; David M.
Malina; Douglas A. Brownlie; David
Delesky; Dale Johnson
Steven S. Glickman [ARGUED]
Ruderman & Glickman
675 Morris Avenue, Suite 100
Springfield, NJ 07081
Counsel for Appellee
Borough of Raritan
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________

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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Michael Sniscak, et al. (“Plaintiffs”), appeal the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment to the Borough of Raritan (“Raritan”) on Plaintiffs’ claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will affirm.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District
Court’s final order.
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our
analysis. Plaintiffs, who are police officers for the Raritan Police Department, alleged
that they each were denied overtime pay at various points between 1990 and 2000 in
violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Plaintiffs further alleged that Raritan failed
to compensate them for 80 hours of regular pay and overtime in 1999, in violation of the
FLSA and a deprivation of property under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, Plaintiffs claimed
that the FLSA’s statute of limitations was equitably tolled because Raritan did not post
the requisite Department of Labor notice used to apprise employees of their FLSA-related
rights. The District Court held that Plaintiffs did not produce evidence sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each of these claims. We review the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324
F.3d 212, 215 (3d Cir. 2003).

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With respect to the FLSA claims, Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that they
performed work for which they were not compensated. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87 (1946). The District Court held that Plaintiffs did not produce
evidence to prove that they were denied remuneration, either overtime pay in various
years or the 80 hours of salaried pay in 1999. While Raritan submitted voluminous
payroll records seeking to show that Plaintiffs were properly compensated, Plaintiffs’
blanket allegation that certain amounts were still owed to them was never connected to a
single payroll record, timesheet, or other documentary evidence. Accordingly, no genuine
issue of material fact was created and summary judgment was entirely proper. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
On appeal, Plaintiffs raise two specific objections. First, the District Court had
observed that in the Final Pretrial Order, Plaintiffs themselves stipulated to receiving all
contractually obligated overtime pay. In their appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the stipulation
was a clerical mistake and the District Court’s reliance on it a reversible error. Even were
we to credit that argument, such that the order should have reflected this issue as
disputed, the record is simply bereft of any evidence that Plaintiffs were denied
compensation. Indeed, Plaintiffs testified in depositions that they actually received their
contractually obligated wages and overtime pay. This objection, therefore, is to no avail.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that the District Court improperly considered the
certifications of Carolyn Gara, Raritan’s current Chief Financial Officer (whose name

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1We also note that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Raritan
with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim of unpaid wages in 1999. It is clear that both
Plaintiffs’§ 1983 and FLSA claims were predicated on lost wages and overtime. Absent
supporting evidence of denied compensation, both claims fail. The District Court
accordingly did not err in granting summary judgment to Raritan on the Plaintiffs’ § 1983
claim as well.
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does not appear in the Final Pretrial Order), and the supporting payroll documentation
attached to Gara’s certifications. Departures from and adherence to pretrial orders are
matters within the discretion of the trial judge and accordingly we review for an abuse of
that discretion. Beissel v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 801 F.2d 143, 150 (3d Cir.
1986). We cannot fault the District Court for considering these submissions since Gara
offered testimony necessary to understand the payroll process at the Police Department,
and absent the accompanying payroll records, there was no way to evaluate Plaintiffs’
claims of lost wages and overtime pay. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in this regard.1
Finally, because we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs did
not present evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment, we need not pass on
Plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to equitable tolling.
Because Plaintiffs’ claims were properly dismissed by the District Court, we will
AFFIRM.

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_________________________
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.
/s/ Marjorie O. Rendell
Circuit Judge

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