Ronald Camp v. Edward Brennan, Superintendent

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-2003
RONALD CAMP,
Appellant
v.
EDWARD BRENNAN, SUPERINTENDENT;
BROOKS, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT;
MARQUART, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT;
JOHN THOMPSON, SR.; CLARK, GUARD;
WALMSLEY, GUARD; BURTON, GUARD;
BYERLEY, GUARD; JONES, GUARD;
JOHN DOES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 98-cv-00180E)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 20, 2002
Before: BARRY and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
ACKERMAN*, District Judge
*Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey,
sitting by designation.

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(Opinion filed December 5, 2002)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Ronald Camp filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit against guards and officials of the State
Correctional Institute at Albion. Camp alleges that while an inmate there, he was subjected to
excessive force during a cell extraction and then restrained in an observation cell while videotaped and
without clothing, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District
Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Camp appeals the dismissal of his claims
on grounds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to both. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
I.
On October 6, 1996, a team of five to six guards forcibly extracted Camp from his cell, where
he had been exhibiting erratic and threatening behavior. Camp was handcuffed and led by the guards
toward an observation cell. As they were proceeding down a hallway and through an exit, Camp
placed his foot against the door and pushed off. His doing so caused the group to stumble off balance,
and Camp either fell or was pushed to the floor. While Camp was on the ground, one of the officers
applied an EBID (Electronic Barring Immobilization Device), or stun gun, to Camp at least once. The
disturbance in the doorway lasted less than twenty seconds, and was videotaped in its entirety.

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1The record is unclear as to the precise duration and circumstances of Camp’s restraint.
Camp’s handwritten complaint alleges that he “was left in this cell nude for approximately
two (2) days and was not given any food while in restraints.” However, the Magistrate
Judge’s report noted that:
[t]he videotape clearly shows that Plaintiff was covered with a blanket after the
four-way restraints were applied. He himself removed the blanket after the
guards left the cell. The videotape further shows that Plaintiff was fed
approximately four hours after being placed in the isolation cell and that the
blanket was again placed over him. Additionally, the medical records submitted
by Plaintiff specifically state that Plaintiff received a “dry sack lunch” at 1515
hours on the day of the transfer.
3
Once the guards regained control of Camp, they carried him to an observation cell where he
was strip searched and, while still naked, placed on a bed and put into a four points restraint, i.e., each
limb was strapped down. A blanket was draped over him, but at some point it either was removed or
fell off. Camp says that he was left in this state – tied down, without clothing or food – for two days.1
These events also were videotaped. The prison officials responsible for observing Camp included a
female.
II.
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc.,
186 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether the actions of correctional officers
constituted excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, we look to the following factors:
(1) the need for the application of the force; (2) the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat
to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the
basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response.
Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321

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2The Magistrate Judge’s report that was adopted by the District Court correctly noted
that, although Camp’s complaint did not allege a Fourth Amendment violation, he now
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(1986)). The central question in such a claim is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
Examining the circumstances of this case under the Whitley factors, we conclude that the force
applied was not so excessive as to present a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. Camp’s refusal to
walk through the doorway created the confrontation; force was applied for approximately twenty
seconds, a reasonably short period necessary to subdue a struggling prisoner; and Camp’s injuries
involved four dime-sized burns, indicating that the dual-pronged EBID was applied twice. Contrary to
Camp’s assertions, the use of the stun gun does not prove that the amount of force was excessive. Cf.
Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The use of mace, tear gas or other chemical
agent of the like nature when reasonably necessary . . . to subdue recalcitrant prisoners does not
constitute cruel and inhuman punishment,” even if the inmate is handcuffed). The brief application of the
EBID was reasonably necessary to regain control of Camp.
III.
Camp next challenges the circumstances of his detention in the observation cell following the
hallway incident. More specifically, Camp contends that restraining him on a table for an extended
period of time, while naked, violated the Eighth Amendment. Neither the relevant law nor the facts
support such a claim in this case.
Camp’s argument is properly understood as a conditions of confinement claim.2 The District

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questions the legality of the strip search. Like the District Court, we follow the rule that a
motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated by alleging claims not raised in the
pleading. See, e.g., Landano v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 873 F. Supp. 884, 891
(D.N.J. 1994).
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Court relied on Johnson v. Boreoni, 946 F.2d 67, 71 (8th Cir. 1991), for its ruling that Camp had not
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that being held in the observation cell for two days without
clothing (although with a blanket) violated the Eighth Amendment. In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to prison officials after placing an inmate in a
small “quiet cell” for up to 36 hours without clothing, bedding, or personal materials, in response to that
inmate’s causing a disturbance. Id. at 69-72. But, as the Eighth Circuit recognized in Williams v. Delo,
49 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995), Johnson was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s seminal decision
in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), which marked a new understanding of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Post-Farmer, “[p]rison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment by placing a
prisoner in a strip cell unless they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’
and knowingly disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety created by such a
deprivation.” 49 F.3d at 446 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837).
In Williams, an inmate violently assaulted his wife while she was visiting him in prison. Officials
confined him to a “strip cell” for four days without any clothes, bedding, or running water. The inmate
was provided with a light, toilet, sink, and regular meals. Id. at 444. The Eighth Circuit concluded that
these conditions did not deny the prisoner the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Id. at 445.
His behavior was threatening, and under the circumstances, these deprivations served legitimate
penological goals of preventing injury to himself and others and damage to the facility. Id. at 446.

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Here, Camp had provoked a violent disturbance. The evidence shows that he was fed. His
clothing was not removed, as Camp contends, for the purposes of humiliation without legitimate penal
concerns. He was stripped to be certain he did not possess a weapon or other contraband. He was
shackled to ensure his safety, as well as that of the guards and medical personnel examining him. Most
significantly, the Magistrate Judge, who viewed the videotape, found that Camp himself removed the
blanket that prison officials had used to cover him. Camp’s prolonged nakedness was the result of his
own actions. His arguments about exposure while videotaped and in the presence of female prison
personnel cannot overcome the factual record, which demonstrates that the indignities he complains of
were not inflicted by the defendants.
Finally, because Camp has not proven misconduct by subordinate prison officials, he
necessarily cannot establish supervisory liability on the part of those responsible for the policies under
which he was detained in the observation cell. Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir.
1986).
* * * * *
For the reasons stated, we conclude that Camp presents no genuine issues of material fact on
his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District
Court.

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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
/s/ Thomas L. Ambro
Circuit Judge

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