Sharon Harris-Dubose v. Delta Family-Care Disability

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 02-1267
SHARON HARRIS-DUBOSE
Appellant
v.
DELTA FAMILY-CARE DISABILITY AND SURVIVORSHIP PLAN;
ABC PARTNERSHIP (NAMES FICTICIOUS);
XYZ CORPORATION (NAMES FICTICIOUS)
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-01187)
District Judge: Honorable John C. Lifland
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 13, 2002
BEFORE: FUENTES and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
and O’KELLEY,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: December 19, 2002)
_____________________________
*Honorable William C. O’Kelley, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.

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___________
OPINION
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff/Appellant, Sharon Harris-Dubose, was diagnosed in March of 1989
with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. She received short-term disability benefits from the
Defendant/Appellee Plan from March 12, 1989, to July 5, 1989. Having exhausted her 26
week entitlement to such benefits, she applied for and received long-term disability
benefits from July 6, 1989, to January 1, 1995.
Once an employee beneficiary of the Plan exhausts short-term benefits, she
may be entitled to long-term disability benefits if she:
is disabled at that time as a result of demonstrable injury or
disease (including mental or nervous disorders) which will
continuously and totally prevent [her] from engaging in any
occupation whatsoever for compensation or profit, including
part-time work, but not including work performed in
connection with the rehabilitation program approved by the
Administrative Committee.
On February 6, 1995, Harris-Dubose was notified that her long-term benefits
were being terminated because the Plan had determined (a) that she could perform some
gainful employment, and (b) that she had failed to cooperate with the Plan’s request for
additional medical testing as required by the terms of the Plan. This suit followed. We will
affirm.
(1.) The terms of the Plan give its Administrator, the Administrative

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Committee, the discretion to interpret the Plan and to make decisions regarding claims for
benefits. This is sufficient to limit judicial review of the decision to terminate Harris-
Dubose’s long-term benefits to the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Abnathaya v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 2
F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 1993). Nor does the record disclose any conflict of interest on the part
of the Plan that would render this standard inapplicable. Id.
(2.) Harris-Dubose has not shown the termination decision to be arbitrary or
capricious. The issue before the committee was not whether she had Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome, but rather whether she was able to do any kind of work, including part-time
work. The decision to terminate Harris-Dubose’s long-term benefits, while based on a
review of all of the medical evidence, was in large part the result of an agreed to
examination by Dr. Leon Smith, a qualified doctor suggested by her, who determined that
she could work as of August 1, 1996. The committee accepted Dr. Smith’s conclusion and
extended her benefits from January 1, 1995, to August 1, 1996, the date Dr. Smith opined
that she could return to work.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing not precedential opinion.
/s/Walter K. Stapleton
Circuit Judge

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