No: 01-4460 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. William Allen

*Honorable Richard Cudahy, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 01-4460
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM ALLEN,
Appellant
___________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. 01-cr-00178)
District Judge: Harvey Bartle, III
____________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 3, 2002
Before: ROTH, SMITH and CUDAHY*, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 16, 2002)
Joseph T. Labrum, III
Suite 1250
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
Del Atwell

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Specifically, Allen pled guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; interference with interstate commerce by robbery, in
violation of the same statute; use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A); and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (2).
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P. O. Box 2516
Montauk, NY 11954
Counsel for Appellant
____________________________
____________________________
OPINION
_____________________________
_____________________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge:
I.
Appellant William Allen appeals his sentence of thirty-two years imprisonment and
five years supervised release. Allen pled guilty to participating in three armed robberies of
retail establishments.1 He faced a minimum sentence of fifty-seven years, but the
government filed a motion for downward departure at sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (e), which the District Court granted. The District Court then
imposed sentences below the guideline range and below the mandatory minimum terms
stated in Section 924(c). Allen now argues that the District Court erred under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter “the Guidelines”) when it denied his motion for
downward departure due to an extraordinary medical condition pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

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This section provides that “[p]hysical condition or appearance, including physique, is not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
guideline range. However, an extraordinary impairment may be a reason to impose a
sentence below the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4.
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5H1.4.2 Because the record makes clear that the District Court was aware of its authority
under the Guidelines to depart downward, but exercised its discretion not to do so, we will
dismiss Allen’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
We find that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Allen’s appeal because the
District Court properly exercised its discretion to deny Allen’s motion for downward
departure. Our jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s argument that he is entitled to a
downward departure based on an extraordinary medical condition depends on the basis for
the District Court’s ruling. United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2000);
United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1989). Where the District Court’s
ruling is based on the Court’s belief that a departure on the grounds proffered by the
appellant is legally impermissible, we have jurisdiction “to determine whether the district
court’s understanding of the law was correct.” Stevens, 223 F.3d at 247 (citing United
States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994)). We lack jurisdiction to review a
refusal to depart downward when the District Court, knowing it may do so, nonetheless
determines that departure is not warranted. Stevens, 223 F.3d at 247; Denardi, 892 F.2d at
272. “If the district court’s stated reasons are ambiguous, so that the record does not

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reflect whether the court’s denial is based on legal or discretionary grounds – then the
proper remedy is to ‘vacate the sentence and remand for the district court to clarify the
basis for its ruling.’” Stevens, 223 F.3d at 247 (quoting Mummert, 34 F.3d at 205).
We find that the District Court’s comments constituted a proper exercise of
discretion and were not sufficiently ambiguous as to require vacatur and remand. The
District Court clearly recognized it had the authority to grant downward departures, having
granted the government’s motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The District Court then specifically referred to the downward
departure available for “Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or
Abuse.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. In denying the motion for downward departure, the Court stated:
Your counsel has filed a motion for a further downward departure as a result
of your medical condition, and while I agree that you do have a medical
condition, it’s not of an extraordinary nature, as set forth in the guidelines, in
my view, and I believe, also, that the Bureau of Prisons will be able to deal
effectively with that condition.
This language demonstrates that the District Court recognized that it had the legal authority
to grant a further downward departure for an extraordinary medical condition pursuant to
the guidelines, but determined that the appellant’s condition was not sufficiently
extraordinary to warrant such a departure. This was a proper exercise of discretion and is
therefore unreviewable.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
/s/ D. Brooks Smith
Circuit Judge

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