Inez T. Hubbard v. JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice On Appeal from the…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 01-3019
___________
INEZ T. HUBBARD,
Appellant
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice
_______________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-02389
(Honorable Jerome B. Simandle)
___________________
Argued April 25, 2002
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 1, 2002)
F. MICHAEL DAILY, JR., ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
Quinlan, Dunne & Daily
16 North Centre Street
Merchantville, New Jersey 08109-2519
Attorney for Appellant
JOHN A. RUYMANN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
Office of United States Attorney
402 East State Street, Suite 430
Trenton, New Jersey 08608
Attorney for Appellee
__________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Inez Hubbard, M.D., an African-American female over the age of forty,
appeals from a grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the Attorney General on
her claims of employment discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) (for gender and race discrimination) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 633a(a). The District Court

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entered summary judgment after concluding that Hubbard had failed to present a prima
facie case of discrimination or sufficient evidence to "cast doubt" on defendant’s
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged adverse employment action at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey.
We will affirm.
I.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
II.
We exercise de novo review over a grant of summary judgment. Goosby v.
Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.
Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in gender or race-based
discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a). The ADEA prohibits
employment discrimination based on age. 29 U.S.C. 633a(a). In order to prevail on a
pretext theory of age, sex, or race discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Goosby, 228 F.3d at 318 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101,
1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying a "slightly" modified McDonnell Douglas framework to
an ADEA claim). Once a prima facie case has been established, the employer "must
come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
decision." Goosby, 228 F.3d at 318. If the employer can proffer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered
reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.; Starceski v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095-96 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) ("At all times the burden of
proof or risk of non-persuasion, including the burden of proving ’but for’ causation or
causation in fact, remains on the employee."). In order to show pretext, plaintiff must
submit evidence which: "1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons
proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each
reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action."
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining plaintiff must
"demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions . . . that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ’unworthy of
credence’") (internal citation omitted).
In this case, Hubbard resigned prior to finishing a probationary period of
employment with FCI Fort Dix. Defendants contend Hubbard was asked to resign
because of allegations of clinical mismanagement and unprofessional behavior. Warden
Doug Lansing gave multiple reasons for his decision to terminate Hubbard’s
employment, including: (1) the Mortality Review Committee’s conclusion Hubbard
mismanaged an inmate’s care; (2) Hubbard demonstrated frequent communication
problems with other staff members; and (3) Hubbard’s refusal to grant certain privileges
to physician assistants that was inhibiting the provision of adequate health care at the
Health Services Unit. Hubbard concedes that defendant has met its burden of
articulating nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions, but she contends that
she has presented ample proof of the weaknesses and implausibilities of these reasons to
demonstrate pretext. We disagree. During her tenure at Fort Dix, Hubbard apparently
brought certain alleged problems with alleged uncooperative physician assistants to the
attention of her supervisors but never suggested she was being discriminated against
because of race, gender, or age. Furthermore, Hubbard stated that Warden Lansing, the
chief official and decision-maker at FCI, did not treat her differently because of her
membership in a protected class. In fact, when Hubbard alerted Warden Lansing to her
"problems," he accommodated her and even arranged for her to shadow a more
experienced physician for a time. But when Hubbard was unable to develop satisfactory
working relationships, Warden Lansing decided not to retain her. In these circumstances,
Hubbard has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact whether
discrimination was "more likely than not" a cause of the alleged adverse employment
action. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. This is fatal to her claim.
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Anthony J. Scirica
Circuit Judge

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