Karen C. Gavura v. Pennsylvania State House of Representatives, the Republican House Caucus

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 00-1279
KAREN C. GAVURA,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE REPUBLICAN HOUSE CAUCUS AND
JULIE HARHART, STATE REPRESENTATIVE,
Appellees
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-686)
District Judge: Honorable Bruce W. Kaufman
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 29, 1999
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, Circuit Judges
and DIAMOND, * District Judge
(Filed: December 13, 2002)
* Honorable Gustave Diamond, Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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1The District Court construed Gavura’s pro se complaint as asserting claims for
employment discrimination under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§621 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §1983. As acknowledged in her
2
OPINION OF THE COURT
DIAMOND, District Judge:
Appellant Karen Gavura appeals to this court contending that the District
Court erroneously dismissed her pro se amended complaint asserting claims under title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. Because we conclude that the
District Court erred in dismissing Gavura’s amended complaint, we will reverse and remand
for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
On March 4, 1999, Gavura, a former legislative aide to Republican State
Representative Julie Harhart, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania a pro se complaint alleging sex and age discrimination. Gavura’s
request for appointment of counsel was denied and her complaint was dismissed without
prejudice based in part on Gavura’s failure to allege that she had satisfied the administrative
prerequisites for filing suit in federal court. On November 30, 1999, Gavura filed an
amended complaint, pro se, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and
retaliation1 and explicitly averring administrative exhaustion.2

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brief, Gavura is not appealing the dismissal of her ADEA or §1983 claims but is appealing
only the dismissal of her Title VII claims for sex discrimination and retaliation.
2Specifically, Gavura pled her timely filing of suit in federal court following her receipt
of a right-to-sue letter from the U.S. Department of Justice relating to a timely 1995
complaint that Gavura had filed with the EEOC and the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission alleging discrimination based on sex.
3
We read Gavura’s pro se amended complaint to assert the following pertinent
factual allegations which we must assume to be true in light of the procedural posture of
this case. See Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 288 F.3d 548, 559 (3d
Cir. 2002) (In evaluating whether dismissal is proper, a court must accept all of the “factual
allegations of the complaint ... as true,” and must draw all “reasonable inferences to aid the
pleader.”).
In November 1994, Gavura interviewed with State Representative Julie
Harhart for the position of legislative aide. During her second interview with Harhart,
Gavura was offered a job but with no health insurance benefits. Harhart’s explanation was
that it would be “double dipping” if Gavura were granted benefits because she was married
and her husband had health benefits. Nevertheless, Gavura accepted Harhart’s offer of
employment.
The complaint further alleges that Harhart hired a male, Patrick Loquasto, as
a legislative aide around the same time as Gavura was hired. Loquasto was assigned to
Harhart’s main office in Whitehall, PA, while Gavura was placed in charge of Harhart’s
satellite office in Slatington, PA. However, in April 1995, Harhart contemplated closing
the Slatington office and asked Gavura to train Loquasto in the Whitehall office because

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Loquasto was incapable of handling constituent problems and Harhart wanted Gavura to
“teach [Loquasto] how to overcome his repeated errors and obvious lack of knowledge
regarding office procedures.” As a result, Gavura was required to do extra work for the
same salary as Loquasto. Gavura also complained to Harhart about Loquasto addressing her
as “woman” but Harhart merely brushed aside her complaints.
Gavura subsequently discovered that Loquasto and two female secretaries
who worked for Harhart were receiving the benefits that Gavura had been denied. In
addition, Harhart required Gavura to become a notary but refused to pay for her notary
certificate, and further required Gavura to pay office expenses as well as travel and lodging
expenses out of her own pocket often without reimbursement.
Around May 1995, Gavura engaged in a conversation with Darwin Moyer, a
Republican Party Official in Harrisburg, regarding Gavura’s “unfair treatment and working
environment.” This conversation between Gavura and Moyer resulted in an individual
identified as Ted Kovall “wanting to know why [Gavura] was unhappy.” Kovall’s position is
not identified in the complaint. Gavura also spoke at length with Jerry Knowles, a
“troubleshooter” for the Republican Party, primarily regarding the work of Loquasto.
Over Memorial Day weekend in 1995, Gavura decided that she would begin
looking for another job. However, before Gavura gave notice, Harhart terminated her on
June 2, 1995, “just days after [Gavura] went over [Harhart’s] head to complain about my
working environment.”
After Gavura’s termination, Knowles was hired as Gavura’s temporary

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replacement in Slatington until Harhart hired a married female, Lynn Adamchick-
Yandrisovitz, with benefits. Adamchick-Yandrisovitz was placed in the Whitehall office
and Loquasto was moved to the Slatington office. About a month later, Harhart terminated
Loquasto and he was replaced by a male, Gary Birks, who received a higher salary than
Gavura had made and with full benefits. Gavura also alleges that Birks was not asked to pay
office expenses out of his own pocket “as he was the head of the household.”
On March 13, 2000, the District Court entered a memorandum and order
granting appellees’ motion to dismiss Gavura’s amended complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), finding that
Gavura did not sufficiently allege that the treatment that she received from Harhart was
different from that of male employees, nor that she participated in any protected activity
under Title VII that served as the impetus for her dismissal. This appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. We
review the District Court’s decision granting a party’s motion to dismiss de novo. See
Pryor, 288 F.3d at 559.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only if,
accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. Doug Grant, Inc. v. Great

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Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, a federal court may
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Doe v.
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2001).
Moreover, pro se complaints, however inartfully pleaded, are held to even
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Becker v. C.I.R., 751
F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1984). Thus, “[a] pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to
state a claim only if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d
371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
Under the notice pleading standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), a complaint requires
only a short and plain statement showing a right to relief, “not a detailed recitation of the
proof that will in the end establish such a right.” Pryor, 288 F.3d at 564. As the United
States Supreme Court recently has confirmed, complaints in employment discrimination
cases must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002); see also Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 429 (3d
Cir. 2001). Thus, “an employment discrimination complaint need not include [specific
facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)] and instead must contain only ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Swierkiewicz,
539 U.S. at 508; Weston, 251 F.3d at 429 (a complaint need not plead law or match facts to

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every element of a legal theory to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)).
Applying the appropriate liberal pleading standard to Gavura’s pro se
amended complaint, we must conclude that the District Court erred by dismissing the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as it does not appear
“beyond doubt” that plaintiff can prove no facts in support of her allegations that would
entitle her to relief.
First, Gavura’s pro se complaint may be read to state a claim for sex
discrimination. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s ... sex, ....” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).
Here, Gavura’s complaint alleges that she was discriminated against in
respect to “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges” of employment in that she
received a lower salary than a male replacement, that she received no benefits while a less-
qualified male replacement did, and that she was required to pay office expenses out of her
own pocket while a male replacement was not. While these allegations admittedly are not
strong, particularly in light of other allegations in the complaint indicating that other
female employees, including one who presumably was married, did receive the benefits
denied to Gavura, they at least are sufficient to give appellees fair notice of what her claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests. As Gavura’s allegations meet our lenient standards
of notice pleading, the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss Gavura’s

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sex discrimination claim. See, e.g., Weston, 251 F.3d at 430.
Likewise, Gavura’s allegations that Harhart adhered to a “head of household”
policy that was applied differently to her than to a married male employee are sufficient to
allege a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII. Gavura alleged in her amended
complaint that a married male employee of Harhart received certain benefits because he
was “head of the household” whereas Gavura was denied those same benefits and instead
was required to rely upon those provided through her husband’s employer.
“Employment practices which vary in their applicability to married females
and married males constitute discrimination on the basis of sex, the only distinguishing
characteristic being the sex of the married persons.” Jurinko v. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d
1038, 1044 (3d Cir. 1973), judgment vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); see
also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (Title VII does not allow for
one hiring policy for women with preschool age children and another for men with
preschool age children). Here, Gavura’s allegations are sufficient to have placed appellees
on notice that Gavura is alleging sex discrimination arising from a “head of household”
policy that is applied differently to married males and married females, and that is all that is
required under the notice pleading standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
Finally, this Court must conclude that Gavura has stated a claim for
retaliation under Title VII. Section 704(a) of Title VII forbids an employer from
discriminating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
practice by this subchapter ....” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a).

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3Under the McDonnell Douglas standard a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
retaliation by showing that (1) she was engaged in protected activity; (2) she was discharged
subsequent to or contemporaneously with such activity; and (3) there is a causal link
between the protected activity and the discharge. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d
913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997).
9
Here, Gavura alleges in her amended complaint that she was discharged “just
days” after she “went over [Harhart’s] head” with complaints about her “unfair treatment and
working environment.” These allegations are sufficient to constitute “a short and plain
statement” of a retaliation claim which, accepted as true, would entitle Gavura to relief
under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.
Appellees’ argument that the District Court’s dismissal of Gavura’s
retaliation claim should be affirmed because she failed to allege facts sufficient to prove a
prima facie case of retaliation again misses the mark.3 As with a discrimination claim, the
allocation of the burden of proof for a retaliation claim follows the familiar Title VII
standards as articulated in McDonnell Douglas. See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d
913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997).
However, as the Supreme Court made clear in Swierkiewicz, the McDonnell
Douglas standard is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. 534 U.S. at 510.
Accordingly, plaintiff was not required to plead facts establishing that she engaged in
protected activity or that she complained to anyone who was in a position to act upon her
complaints in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Rather, Gavura was only required to
plead facts sufficient to give appellees fair notice of the basis for her retaliation claim.

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Gavura’s assertions that she was discharged shortly after going over Harhart’s head to
complain about her unfair working environment were sufficient to place appellees on
notice that she is pursuing a retaliation claim under Title VII for which she could be entitled
to relief. Accordingly, Gavura has done all that is required at the pleading stage, and
therefore, it was error for the District Court to grant appellees’ motion to dismiss Gavura’s
retaliation claim.
“Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to whether a claim
will succeed on the merits.” Swierkiewicz, 514 U.S. at 515; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (“Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely, but that is not the test.”). Instead, the simplified
notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a) “relies on liberal discovery rules and summary
judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious
claims.” Swierkiewicz, 514 U.S. at 512.
Thus, the issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not
whether a plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer
evidence to support her claims. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir.
2000); In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir.
1997). Accordingly, although on the face of her complaint Gavura’s chances of prevailing
on the merits of her claims may appear “remote and unlikely” at this stage of the process,
her allegations nevertheless are sufficient, at a minimum, to state claims for sex
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and she is entitled to an opportunity to attempt

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to strengthen her case through discovery. Should she fail in that endeavor, her
unmeritorious claims properly should be dealt with through a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514.
III.
The District Court failed to adhere to the liberal standard applicable to a
review of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and improperly dismissed Gavura’s pro
se complaint. For the reasons set forth herein, we will reverse and remand for additional
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.
/s/ Gustave Diamond
District Judge

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