Singh v. Barr BIA McCarthy, IJ A206 895 563

18-2219
Singh v. Barr
BIA
McCarthy, IJ
A206 895 563
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 2
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3
New York, on the 3
rd
day of March, two thousand twenty. 4
5
PRESENT: 6
PETER W. HALL, 7
SUSAN L. CARNEY, 8
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 9
Circuit Judges. 10
_____________________________________ 11
12
GURPREET SINGH, AKA GOPI THAP, 13
Petitioner, 14
15
v. 18-2219 16
NAC 17
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 18
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19
Respondent. 20
_____________________________________ 21
22
FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY. 23
24
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 25
General; Mary Jane Candaux, 26
Assistant Director; Stephen Finn, 27
Trial Attorney, Office of 28
Immigration Litigation, United 29

2

States Department of Justice, 1
Washington, DC. 2
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 3
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 4
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 5
is DENIED. 6
Petitioner Gurpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, 7
seeks review of a July 10, 2018 decision of the BIA affirming 8
an October 24, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 9
denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of 10
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 11
(“CAT”). In re Gurpreet Singh, No. A 206 895 563 (B.I.A. 12
July 10, 2018), aff’g No. A 206 895 563 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 13
Oct. 24, 2107). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 14
underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 15
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and 16
supplemented by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of 17
Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. 18
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The standards 19
of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); 20
Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018); 21
Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). 22

3

Credibility
1
1
The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 2
circumstances . . . base a credibility determination on the 3
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant,” the 4
plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his 5
statements or between his statements and other evidence, 6
without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the 7
applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 8
The IJ found that Singh testified credibly, except as to 9
his allegation that he was attacked by members of the 10
religious group Dera Sacha Sauda (“DSS”) because of his Sikh 11
religion in September 2014. Substantial evidence supported 12
the partial adverse credibility determination because Singh’s 13
testimony was internally inconsistent as to whether he was 14
unconscious or half-conscious following the beating, and his 15
written statement did not mention that he was rendered 16
unconscious or half-conscious when describing his injuries. 17
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 18
357 F.3d 169, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that “materially 19
different accounts” of past persecution “may render the 20

1
Contrary to the BIA’s conclusion, Singh challenged the IJ’s
partial adverse credibility determination before the BIA.
See Certified Administrative Record at 10, 17 (Brief to BIA).

4

alien’s testimony incredible”). 1
Past Persecution
2
The agency did not err in determining that the remaining 3
credible claims did not establish harm rising to the level of 4
persecution. “Persecution is an extreme concept that does 5
not include every sort of treatment our society regards as 6
offensive.” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 7
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A valid claim of 8
past persecution may “encompass[] a variety of forms of 9
adverse treatment, including non-life-threatening violence 10
and physical abuse,” but the harm must be more severe than 11
“mere harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 12
F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 13
brackets omitted). The difference between harassment and 14
persecution is “necessarily one of degree that must be decided 15
on a case-by-case basis.” Id. We review de novo whether the 16
harm rises to the level of persecution. See Edimo-Doualla 17
v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2006). 18
The agency credited Singh’s allegations that DSS 19
followers threatened him on two occasions and that a group of 20
older classmates beat and taunted him in July 2013. Singh 21
did not present evidence regarding the extent of his injuries 22

5

following the July 2013 beating. Taken together, these 1
events do not rise to the level of persecution. See Jian Qiu 2
Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding 3
beating and subsequent detention did not constitute 4
persecution where beating occurred prior to detention and 5
applicant “suffered only minor bruising . . . , which required 6
no formal medical attention and had no lasting physical 7
effect”). 8
Future Persecution
9
Absent past persecution, an applicant may prevail on an 10
asylum claim by demonstrating that he subjectively fears 11
future persecution and that his fear is objectively 12
reasonable. Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178. An applicant 13
may make this showing by establishing either a “reasonable 14
possibility he . . . would be singled out individually for 15
persecution,” or a “pattern or practice” of persecution of 16
“persons similarly situated” to him. 8 C.F.R. 17
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see also Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332; In re 18
A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005) (defining pattern 19
or practice of persecution as “systemic or pervasive” 20
persecution of a group). A fear is objectively reasonable 21
“even if there is only a slight, though discernible, chance 22

6

of persecution.” Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 1
2000) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 2
(1987)). But a fear is not objectively reasonable if it 3
lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative 4
at best.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d 5
Cir. 2005). 6
Singh did not meet his burden to establish a reasonable 7
possibility that he would be singled out for persecution. He 8
asserted that he would be persecuted because he was an active 9
member of the Sikh community and a preacher.
2
The agency did 10
not err in concluding that Singh failed to present reasonably 11
available corroboration of these claims. “Where the trier 12
of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence 13
that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence 14
must be provided unless the applicant does not have the 15
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 16
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Contrary to Singh’s argument on 17

2
Singh argues here that he never claimed a prominent role or
a role as a preacher. This argument is contrary to Singh’s
testimony. See, e.g., Certified Administrative Record at 143
(“I was very active preaching my Sikh religion.”), 144 (“I
will be very apparent in front row, and I will preach for
Sikh religion . . . . I would approach people, go home and
tell people that accept Sikh religion, follow Sikh
religion.”), 146 (“Q: Why the DSS people were just picking at
you? A: Because I was very active preaching of my religion.”).

7

appeal, the agency did not err in concluding that such 1
evidence was reasonably available: Singh conceded that he 2
could have provided evidence of his past activities preaching 3
at Sikh events and of his continued religious practice. Nor 4
did the agency err in requiring corroborating evidence 5
without first providing Singh additional time to present it. 6
See Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 2018) 7
(deferring to the BIA’s determination that IJ is not required 8
“to identify the specific evidence necessary to meet the 9
applicant’s burden of proof and to provide an automatic 10
continuance for the applicant to obtain that evidence prior 11
to rendering a decision on the application”). Further, the 12
agency did not err in affording diminished weight to the 13
affidavits in the record because none of them corroborated 14
Singh’s testimony about his religious activities, they were 15
“very similar,” and some of the authors were interested 16
parties unavailable for cross-examination. See Y.C., 741 17
F.3d at 332, 334 (holding that “[w]e generally defer to the 18
agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an 19
applicant’s documentary evidence” and deferring to agency’s 20
decision to afford little weight to relative’s letter from 21
China because it was unsworn and from an interested witness); 22

8

Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d 1
Cir. 2007) (“our case law on intra-proceeding similarities 2
has firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that striking 3
similarities between affidavits are an indication that the 4
statements are ‘canned’”). Absent evidence corroborating his 5
testimony regarding his role in the Sikh community, Singh did 6
not meet his burden to show that he had a well-founded fear 7
of persecution on that basis. See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d 8
at 129. 9
Singh also failed to establish a pattern or practice of 10
persecution of Sikhs in India. The agency took 11
administrative notice of State Department reports for 2016 12
and 2017, which document some violence against Sikhs, but do 13
not discuss any abuse of Sikhs by DSS members. See, e.g., 14
India 2016 Int’l Religious Freedom Rep. at 8, available at 15
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/India-16
3.pdf.
3
The news articles in the record show tensions between 17
Sikhs and the DSS, as well as some police violence against 18
Sikhs engaged in anti-DSS protests. It also shows that the 19
head of the DSS was convicted on rape charges and sentenced 20

3
Singh does not challenge the documents of which the agency
took administrative notice.

9

to 20 years’ incarceration in 2017. This evidence fails to 1
establish that the DSS engages in “systemic and pervasive” 2
persecution of Sikhs sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or 3
practice of persecution in India. See 8 C.F.R. 4
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741. In 5
addition, contrary to Singh’s argument, the agency did not 6
err in considering that his sisters have not suffered 7
significant harm in India, where they remain, in finding that 8
he did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 9
See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) 10
(finding fear of future persecution diminished where 11
applicant’s mother and daughters continued to live unharmed 12
in applicant’s native country). 13
In sum, Singh did not meet his burden for asylum because 14
he did not present credible evidence of past harm rising to 15
the level of persecution, he did not adequately corroborate 16
his claim that he would be singled out for future persecution 17
based on his active role in the Sikh community, and he did 18
not establish a pattern or practice of persecution of Sikhs 19
in India. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. 20
§ 1208.13(b)(1), (2). Because Singh failed to meet his 21
burden for asylum, he “necessarily” failed to meet the higher 22

10

standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See 1
Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). 2
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 3
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 4
stays VACATED. 5
FOR THE COURT: 6
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 7
Clerk of Court 8