Romero-Flores v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A206 688 042/043

17-2263
Romero-Flores v. Barr
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A206 688 042/043
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 2
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3
New York, on the 23
rd
day of January, two thousand twenty. 4
5
PRESENT: 6
JON O. NEWMAN, 7
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 8
Circuit Judges.
1
9
_____________________________________ 10
11
GLENDA XIOMARA ROMERO-FLORES, 12
DIEGO SAUL SANTOS-ROMERO, 13
Petitioners, 14
15
v. 17-2263 16
NAC 17
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 18
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19
Respondent. 20
_____________________________________ 21
22
FOR PETITIONERS: Peter E. Torres, New York, NY. 23
24
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 25
Attorney General, Civil Division; 26
Claire L. Workman, Senior 27
Litigation Counsel; Maarja T. 28

1
Judge Christopher F. Droney, who was originally assigned to the panel, retired
from the Court, effective January 1, 2020, prior to the resolution of this case.
The remaining two members of the panel, who are in agreement, have determined
the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone,
140 F.3d 457, 458–59 (2d Cir. 1998).

2

Luhtaru, Trial Attorney, Office of 1
Immigration Litigation, United 2
States Department of Justice, 3
Washington, DC. 4
5
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 8
is DENIED. 9
Petitioners Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores and her son 10
Diego Saul Santos-Romero, natives and citizens of Honduras, 11
seek review of a June 30, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming 12
a January 9, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 13
denying Romero-Flores’s application for asylum, withholding 14
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 15
(“CAT”). In re Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores, Diego Saul 16
Santos-Romero, Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (B.I.A. June 30, 2017), 17
aff’g Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 9, 18
2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 19
underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 20
Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered 21
both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 22
completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 23
524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review 24

3

are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Y.C. v. 1
Holder, 741 F.3d 325, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). 2
Because Romero-Flores expressly waives her CAT claim, we 3
address only asylum and withholding of removal. To establish 4
eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, “the 5
applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, 6
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion 7
was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting 8
the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); id. 9
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 10
341, 348 (BIA 2010). Asylum or withholding of removal “may 11
be granted where there is more than one motive for 12
mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the 13
mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya 14
v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal 15
quotation marks omitted). An applicant “must provide some 16
evidence of [a persecutor’s motives], direct or 17
circumstantial.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 18
(1992); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 19
F.3d 281, 291 (2d Cir. 2007). 20
Romero-Flores has waived her claim that she was harmed 21
on account of her political opinion or membership in a social 22
group based on her gender; she presses only her family-based 23

4

social group claim. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1
540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005). 2
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 3
that Romero-Flores failed to demonstrate that the harm she 4
suffered or fears would be on account of her membership in a 5
family-based social group. Romero-Flores’s testimony 6
regarding a connection between the robbery of her store in 7
2014, and her father, who had previously owned the store and 8
had been robbed and killed by gang members in 1989, was 9
speculative given the length of time between those events and 10
the fact that the only connection she could make is that the 11
gang members may have known that the store was robbed in the 12
past and thus thought it would be a good target. However, 13
she also testified that the people who robbed her were not 14
the people who killed her father, and she did not have any 15
reason to think that they were connected to her father’s 16
killers. Her attempt to identify a nexus between her harm 17
and a social group of her family members was further 18
undermined by her concession that, other than her father, no 19
family members had been threatened by gang members. See 20
Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) 21
(finding claimed fear of future persecution weakened when 22
similarly situated family members remain unharmed in 23

5

petitioner’s native country). Finally, Romero-Flores also 1
acknowledged that the men who robbed her would not have been 2
interested in her if she did not have money. This record 3
provides substantial evidence for the agency’s conclusion 4
that Romero-Flores was targeted because she was thought to 5
have money. This harm as a result of “general crime 6
conditions” does not constitute persecution on account of a 7
protected ground. Id. at 314; see Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 8
509 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (“harm motivated purely by 9
wealth is not persecution”). This nexus determination is 10
dispositive of both asylum and withholding of removal. See 11
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A) 12
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 13
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 14
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 15
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 16
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 17
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 18
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 19
34.1(b). 20
FOR THE COURT: 21
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 22
Clerk of Court 23