Kanciper v. Suffolk County SPCA, Inc. et al 1

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13-1000-cv
Kanciper v. Suffolk County SPCA, Inc. et al
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3
4
August Term, 2012 5
6
(Argued: June 18, 2013 Decided: July 8, 2013) 7
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Docket No. 13-1000-cv 9
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MONA T. KANCIPER, 12
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Plaintiff- Appellant, 14
15
– v. – 16
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SUFFOLK COUNTY SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO 18
ANIMALS, INCORPORATED; ROY GROSS; GERALD LAUBER; SHAWN A. 19
DUNN; MICHAEL NORKELUN; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10, 20
21
Defendants-Appellees, 22
23
24
Before: CALABRESI, CABRANES and B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges. 25
26
Mona Kanciper appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint, in 27
which she sought both a declaratory judgment that N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 2.10(7) is 28
unconstitutional and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from a search of her 29
property by agents of the Suffolk County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 30
Inc. (“SPCA”). We conclude that the District Court’s decision to dismiss her § 1983 claims 31
under claim splitting principles was erroneous, and its decision to apply Wilton/Brillhart 32
abstention to dismiss her claim for declaratory relief was error. We therefore VACATE the 33
judgment and REMAND the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent 34
with this decision. 35
ALAN E. SASH (Steven J. Hyman, on the brief), 36
McLaughlin & Stern, LLP, New York, N.Y., for 37
Plaintiff-Appellant. 38
39
JOSEPH SALVO (Ryan Sestack, on the brief), Gordon & 40
Rees, LLP, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees. 41
42
43

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CALABRESI, Circuit Judge: 1
Mona Kanciper appeals from the District Court’s February 23, 2013 Memorandum 2
of Decision and Order, dismissing her complaint, which sought: (1) a declaration that N.Y. 3
Crim. Proc. Law § 2.10(7)—allowing Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to 4
grant their employees “peace officer status,” and thereby empowering them with various 5
governmental investigatory and enforcement functions—is unconstitutional under the 6
United States Constitution;1 and (2) damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from 7
a search of her property and her arrest by agents of the Suffolk County Society for the 8
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. (“SPCA”). 9
Because Kanciper filed a suit for tort damages based on the same facts in state court, 10
the District Court (Spatt, J.) applied claim splitting principles2 to dismiss Kanciper’s § 1983 11
action. Although district courts have some authority to manage their dockets by declining to 12
entertain claims that a plaintiff could have brought in another pending federal case, we 13
conclude that the District Court’s decision to dismiss a federal claim because of a similar 14
pending state court litigation was in error. In these situations, the Supreme Court’s Colorado 15
River abstention standard applies to ensure that federal courts do not abdicate “the virtually 16
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River Water 17
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 18
1 Kanciper’s complaint also asserted that N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 2.10(7) violates N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 30 and
31. She does not raise that claim to us. She also asserted that the statute is unconstitutional under the New
York State Constitution, but she does not appeal the dismissal of that claim.
2 Wright & Miller describe claim splitting as follows:
In dealing with simultaneous actions on related theories, courts at times express principles of
“claim splitting” that are similar to claim preclusion . . . . A dismissal on this ground has
been viewed as a matter of docket management . . . even in decisions that with some
exaggeration describe the theory “as an aspect of res judicata.”
18A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4406.

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The District Court relied on Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and 1
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995), in deciding to abstain from hearing Kanciper’s 2
claim for declaratory relief. Because Brillhart/Wilton abstention cannot apply when, as in 3
this case, a plaintiff seeks damages in addition to declaratory relief, we hold that the District 4
Court erred (or, in the awkward locution traditionally adopted by this Court, “abused its 5
discretion”) in dismissing Kanciper’s declaratory judgment claim. 6
We therefore VACATE the judgment and REMAND the case to the District Court 7
for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 8
9
I. BACKGROUND 10
A. Facts 11
Kanciper owns and lives on a horse farm in Manorville, New York. She is the 12
President of The New York Horse Rescue Corporation, a non-profit organization located at 13
her horse farm that rescues unwanted and abandoned horses. Kanciper asserts that, since 14
1998, her horse farm has rescued more than 1,500 horses. 15
In August 2009, the SPCA received a complaint about “equine abuse” at the 16
Kanciper horse farm. In response, the SPCA sent a person it refers to as a detective, Shawn 17
Dunn, to investigate the situation. After Dunn had visited the horse farm twice, and 18
allegedly threatened Kanciper and her ailing husband with prosecution and the loss of her 19
husband’s veterinary license, the case against Kanciper was closed for lack of probable 20
cause. 21

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On December 23, 2009, the SPCA received another complaint about horse abuse at 1
the Kanciper horse farm. Kanciper alleges that another SPCA detective, Michael Norkelun, 2
walked around the horse farm with her and reported to the SPCA that she “show[ed] [him] 3
several horses inside a large barn that appeared healthy.” 4
Despite this report, Norkelun visited the complainant’s home a few days later to 5
collect written statements. Then, on March 18, 2010, based only on the complainant’s 6
statements (and no additional corroboration), Norkelun allegedly applied for a warrant to 7
search Kanciper’s horse farm. Norkelun and other members of the SPCA executed the 8
search warrant on March 20, 2010. Kanciper asserts that during the search (1) large 9
machinery was used to dig up portions of her property without her consent, (2) she was 10
restrained despite the absence of an arrest warrant, (3) she was interrogated despite her 11
request to speak with counsel, and (4) she was not read her Miranda rights until late in the 12
day. 13
Kanciper was indicted in July 2010 on three counts of animal cruelty—solely with 14
regard to the treatment of dogs (not horses)—and two counts of endangering a minor. On 15
October 13, 2011, Kanciper was found guilty on one count of endangering a minor; all the 16
other counts were dismissed. Her one conviction was based on the fact that she had injected 17
a dog with a tranquilizer in front of a ten-year-old child. On November 14, 2012, the New 18
York Appellate Division reversed Kanciper’s conviction, concluding that the evidence 19
presented did not establish that witnessing a dog being injected with a tranquilizer was likely 20
to harm the physical, mental, or moral welfare of a child. 21
22
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B. Procedural History 1
On February 4, 2011, during the pendency of her criminal case, Kanciper filed a civil 2
suit in New York state court against the SPCA and other individuals, seeking damages 3
based on various tort theories, including: abuse of process, fraud and misrepresentation, 4
tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. See App’x 5
66-96. Almost a year later, Kanciper also initiated an Article 78 Petition, in which she 6
sought a declaratory judgment that the SPCA was a “public entity” and therefore subject to 7
New York’s Freedom of Information Law. See App’x 169-211. Kanciper’s state court 8
action and Article 78 Petition apparently are still pending. 9
On April 30, 2012, Kanciper filed this action against the SPCA and other individuals 10
(jointly, “Defendants”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 11
York. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit on Pullman, Burford, and Younger 12
abstention grounds, as well as on a theory of claim splitting. Although the District Court 13
concluded that it was not appropriate to abstain pursuant to Pullman, Burford, or Younger, it 14
dismissed Kanciper’s § 1983 claims on the claim splitting theory. Relying on the Tenth 15
Circuit’s decision in Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2011), the District Court 16
disregarded the fact that both cases remained pending. Instead, the District Court focused 17
on whether – assuming (hypothetically) that Kanciper’s state court action had been 18
adjudicated – the state court judgment would be preclusive in the federal action. The 19
District Court concluded that it would, and that dismissing Kanciper’s § 1983 claim was 20
appropriate; the court noted that (1) her § 1983 claim and her state court claims arose from a 21
common set of facts, and (2) she could have (and should have) brought her § 1983 claims in 22
state court together with her state law claims. 23

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The District Court then dismissed Kanciper’s declaratory judgment claims sua sponte 1
under the Brillhart/Wilton abstention doctrine. See Dittmer v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113, 2
118 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To avoid wasteful and duplicative litigation, district courts may often 3
dismiss declaratory judgment actions ‘where another suit is pending in a state court 4
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties.’” 5
(quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282)). 6
II. DISCUSSION 7
This appeal requires us to determine whether the District Court erred (1) by 8
dismissing Kanciper’s § 1983 claim on a claim splitting theory, and (2) by dismissing 9
Kanciper’s declaratory judgment claims under the Brillhart/Wilton abstention doctrine. We 10
consider each issue in turn. 11
A. Standards of Review 12
The parties disagree about the correct standard of review which we should apply to the 13
District Court’s dismissal of Kanciper’s § 1983 claim. Kanciper argues that we should 14
review the District Court’s decision de novo because claim splitting was not a theory of 15
dismissal available to the District Court in these circumstances; she argues that the District 16
Court should have instead considered Defendant’s arguments regarding her allegedly 17
duplicative state and federal actions under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. Reply Br. 18
2-3; see Colo. River, 424 U.S. 800; see also Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black 19
River Regulating Dist., 673 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2012); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 702 (2d Cir. 20
2001) (“Colorado River . . . and its progeny . . . set forth the standards governing abstention 21
when ‘state and federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction simultaneously.’” (quoting 22
Vill. of Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1999))). Defendants disagree and 23

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contend that we should only review the District Court’s claim splitting decision for abuse of 1
discretion because the decision related to the District Court’s management of its own 2
docket. See SPCA Br. 2 (citing, inter alia, Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 3
296 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2002)). 4
As the question presented in this appeal is whether or not claim splitting is even 5
applicable in these circumstances, we agree with Kanciper that the question presents an 6
issue of law that we review de novo. See Hatch v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 699 F.3d 38, 44 (1st 7
Cir. 2012) (“In our view, the first issue of whether claim preclusion is available at all in this 8
context presents an issue of law subject to de novo review.”); see also Am. Int’l Grp. v. Bank of 9
Am. Corp., 712 F.3d 775, 778 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As this appeal turns on a pure question of law, 10
our review is de novo.”). 11
Whether the District Court properly abstained under the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine is 12
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 673 F.3d at 99 (“We 13
review a district court’s abstention decision for abuse of discretion.”). Although abuse of 14
discretion is normally a deferential standard, it is “somewhat rigorous” in the abstention 15
context “because we are considering an exception to a court’s normal duty to adjudicate a 16
controversy properly before it.” Dittmer, 146 F.3d, at 116 (internal quotation marks and 17
brackets omitted). 18
B. Claim splitting 19
In dismissing Kanciper’s § 1983 claim on a claim splitting theory, the District Court 20
relied principally on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 21
2011). Katz upheld a district court’s claim splitting theory dismissal when the plaintiff had 22
previously filed related claims that were pending in the same federal court against the same 23

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defendants. Id. at 1217-19. The Tenth Circuit noted that “[t]he test for claim splitting is not 1
whether there is finality of judgment, but whether the first suit, assuming it were final, 2
would preclude the second suit,” and it justified this standard by referring to the fact “that 3
the claim splitting rule exists to allow district courts to manage their docket and dispense 4
with duplicative litigation.” Id. at 1218-19.3
5
The District Court’s reliance on Katz (and, indeed, on claim splitting generally) was 6
erroneous, however, because the previously filed case in this litigation was not filed “in the 7
same [federal] district court” but in a different state court. Id. at 1219 (pointing out that the 8
plaintiff in Katz “ha[d] filed two cases in the same district court, involving the same subject 9
matter, seeking the same claims for relief against the same defendants.”). Indeed, while 10
plaintiffs “generally have no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same 11
subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant,” Adams v. 12
Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007), “as between state and federal courts, 13
the rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings 14
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,” Colo. River., 424 U.S. 15
at 817 (emphasis supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16
These different approaches, “involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent 17
jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts,” are well established. Id. 18
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]his difference in general approach between state- 19
federal concurrent jurisdiction and wholly federal concurrent jurisdiction stems from the 20
3 The Tenth Circuit also stated its view regarding the differences between claim splitting and res judicata: “To
be sure, claim splitting and res judicata both serve the same interests of promoting judicial economy and
shielding parties from vexatious concurrent or duplicative litigation. But claim splitting is more concerned with
the district court’s comprehensive management of its docket, whereas res judicata focuses on protecting the
finality of judgments.” Katz, 655 F.3d at 1218.

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virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them. 1
Given this obligation . . . the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to 2
the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are 3
considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention.” Id. at 817-18 4
(emphasis supplied). 5
Although we have not specifically referred to “claim splitting” in applying these 6
principles, we stated in Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), that a district 7
court’s authority to stay or dismiss a suit “as part of its general power to administer its 8
docket” arises in situations where the second suit “is duplicative of another federal court suit.” 9
Id. at 138 (emphasis supplied). We also noted: 10
Because of the obvious difficulties of anticipating the claim or issue-preclusion 11
effects of a case that is still pending, a court faced with a duplicative suit will 12
commonly stay the second suit, dismiss it without prejudice, enjoin the parties 13
from proceeding with it, or consolidate the two actions. Of course, simple 14
dismissal of the second suit is another common disposition because plaintiffs 15
have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same court, 16
against the same defendant at the same time. 17
18
Id. at 138-39 (citations omitted). District courts in this Circuit have stated this principle 19
more specifically in the claim splitting context. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 20
418 F. Supp. 2d 215, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[C]laim-splitting does not apply to parallel 21
state and federal actions.”); Coleman v. B.G. Sulzle, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 403, 421 (N.D.N.Y. 22
2005) (“[I]f claim splitting is involved, simple dismissal is . . . appropriate because plaintiffs 23
have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same court, against the 24
same defendant at the same time.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 25
In sum, because the “contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions” in this 26
case was between a state court and a federal court, Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817, claim 27

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splitting was not a theory under which the District Court could dismiss Kanciper’s § 1983 1
claim.4 Moreover, in light of “[t]his difference in general approach between state-federal 2
concurrent jurisdiction and wholly federal concurrent jurisdiction,” id., we agree with 3
Kanciper that Colorado River sets out the appropriate standard under which to examine 4
whether or not to dismiss (or stay) her allegedly duplicative federal claims. See Niagra 5
Mohawk Power Corp., 673 F.3d at 100 (“In Colorado River, the Supreme Court held that, in 6
addition to the earlier-established categories of abstention, in certain other exceptional 7
circumstances, a federal court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction when parallel state- 8
court litigation could result in [the] comprehensive disposition of litigation and abstention 9
would conserve judicial resources.” (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)). We 10
do not consider, however, whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate in this case under 11
the six-factor test used in this Circuit. See id. at 100-01. If Defendants pursue that issue on 12
remand, the District Court will be able to consider it at that time. 13
C. Brillhart/Wilton Abstention 14
Because the District Court erred in dismissing Kanciper’s § 1983 claim, it necessarily 15
erred or “abused its discretion” in dismissing her declaratory judgment claims under the 16
Brillhart/Wilton abstention doctrine. We have stated before, and we now hold, that “Wilton 17
does not apply where, as here, a plaintiff does not seek purely declaratory relief, but also . . . 18
seeks damages caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks and 19
4 Since we conclude that the District Court erroneously dismissed Kanciper’s § 1983 claim on the ground that
claim splitting does not apply to parallel state and federal court actions, we need not consider Kanciper’s
argument that claim splitting was unavailable here because the parallel state court action remains pending.

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brackets omitted).5 Accordingly, as with the § 1983 claim, we vacate the District Court’s 1
order dismissing Kanciper’s declaratory judgment claim and remand the case to the District 2
Court. 3
III. CONCLUSION 4
We VACATE the District Court’s February 23, 2013 order, which dismissed 5
Kanciper’s § 1983 and declaratory judgment claims, and we REMAND the case to the 6
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 7
5 Kanciper also argues that Brillhart/Wilton abstention was improper because her suit raises important issues of
federal, rather than state, law. There is support for that position, see Youell v. Exxon Corp., 74 F.3d 373, 374 (2d
Cir. 1996), but because we resolve the case on other grounds, we need not reach that contention.

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