-1- 12-2493-cv Kwan v. The Andalex Group LLC 1 2 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 3 4 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT…

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12-2493-cv
Kwan v. The Andalex Group LLC
1
2
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 3
4
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 5
____________________________________ 6
7
August Term, 2012 8
9
Argued: March 7, 2013 Decided: December 16, 2013 10
Docket No. 12-2493-cv 11
____________________________________ 12
13
ZANN KWAN, 14
15
Plaintiff-Appellant, 16
17
—v.— 18
19
THE ANDALEX GROUP LLC, 20
21
Defendant-Appellee. 22
___________________________________ 23
24
Before: B.D. PARKER AND LOHIER, Circuit Judges, and KOELTL, 25
District Judge.*
26
27
The plaintiff, Zann Kwan, appeals from the judgment of 28
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 29
New York dismissing her complaint. The District Court 30
(Katherine B. Forrest, Judge) granted summary judgment 31
dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, 32
retaliation, and hostile work environment, in violation of 33
federal and state discrimination laws, and failure to notify 34
* The Honorable John G. Koeltl, of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.

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the plaintiff of her rights under the Consolidated Omnibus 1
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, in violation of the 2
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 3
We affirm the judgment of the District Court in all 4
respects, except we vacate the judgment dismissing the 5
retaliation claims and remand as to those claims for further 6
proceedings. 7
Judge Parker concurs in part and dissents in part in a 8
separate opinion. 9
______________ 10
EDWARD F. WESTFIELD, Edward F. Westfield, P.C., for Plaintiff- 11
Appellant Zann Kwann. 12
13
A. MICHAEL WEBER AND JOSEPH E. FIELD, Littler Mendelson, P.C., 14
for Defendant-Appellee The Andalex Group LLC. 15
16
______________ 17
John G. Koeltl, District Judge: 18
19
The plaintiff, Zann Kwan, is a former employee of The 20
Andalex Group LLC (“Andalex”). She appeals from a judgment of 21
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 22
New York dismissing her complaint. The District Court 23
(Forrest, J.), granted summary judgment dismissing the 24
plaintiff’s claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile 25
work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 26
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); the New York 27
State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; and 28

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the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. 1
Code § 8-107.1 The District Court also dismissed the 2
plaintiff’s claim that Andalex violated the Employee 3
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. 4
§ 1001 et seq. by failing to notify her of her right to 5
continuing health care coverage pursuant to the Consolidated 6
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. 7
§ 1166 et seq. 8
On appeal, Kwan contends that she proffered sufficient 9
evidence that she was subjected to a hostile work environment 10
because of her gender and was retaliated against for 11
complaining about gender discrimination. Kwan also alleges 12
that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her 13
statutory penalties under COBRA. For the reasons that follow, 14
we affirm the judgment of the District Court except with 15
respect to Kwan’s retaliation claims, as to which there are 16
genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary 17
judgment. 18
19
20
1 Although the plaintiff alleged claims of
discrimination on the basis of gender and national origin
under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, those claims have
not been pursued on appeal, and will therefore not be
discussed in this opinion.

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1
BACKGROUND 2
In reviewing the District Court’s grant of summary 3
judgment in favor of Andalex, “we construe the evidence in the 4
light most favorable to the [plaintiff], drawing all 5
reasonable inferences and resolving all ambiguities in [her] 6
favor.” CILP Assocs., L.P. v. PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP, 7
735 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal 8
quotation marks omitted). 9
10
I. 11
Andalex is a small family-owned real estate management 12
company specializing in large gaming and commercial 13
properties. Allen Silverman is the founder and Chief 14
Executive Officer. Allen’s sons, Andrew and Alex, are the 15
Chief Investment Officer and Chief Operations Officer 16
respectively. Steven Marks is the Chief Financial Officer. 17
During the relevant time period, April 2007 to September 2008, 18
Andalex had approximately twenty to twenty-five employees. 19
20
A. 21
On April 9, 2007, Andalex hired the plaintiff to be Vice 22
President of Acquisitions. Kwan was an at-will employee and 23
was provided a six-figure salary, two weeks paid vacation, 24

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health insurance, and was eligible for a year-end 1
discretionary bonus. The plaintiff’s primary duties at 2
Andalex involved analyzing cash flows, preparing financial 3
models and projections, and performing due diligence on 4
investment properties. From April to August 2007, the 5
plaintiff worked with Andrew Feder, the Managing Director of 6
Acquisitions. Feder testified that Kwan’s work product was 7
“very good” and that he never had reason to criticize her 8
competence or diligence. After Feder left Andalex in August 9
2007, Kwan reported directly to Steven Marks until she was 10
terminated in September 2008. In November 2007, Andrew 11
Silverman complimented Kwan’s work and told her to “[k]eep up 12
the good work.” In December 2007, she received a bonus of 13
$5,000. 14
On September 24, 2008, Andalex terminated Burton Garber, 15
a male Andalex executive who had been with the company for 16
several years. On September 25, 2008, Kwan left the office at 17
5:15 p.m., earlier than the standard departure time of 6:00 18
p.m. Andalex alleges that when Marks asked Kwan where she was 19
going, she replied that she was leaving to play squash. Marks 20
asked Kwan’s status on a project and she said that she would 21
work on it the following day and left the office. The 22
plaintiff alleges that she received permission from Marks to 23
leave early, that her leaving had no effect on her work, and 24

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that September 25 was the first time she had ever left the 1
office before 6:00 p.m. 2
The next morning, September 26, 2008, Marks met with Kwan 3
and reprimanded her for leaving work early without permission. 4
Amy Piecoro, the Director of Human Resources at Andalex, was 5
present at the meeting. Although Marks testified that he had 6
previously told the plaintiff not to leave early without 7
permission and not to take long lunch breaks, Kwan testified 8
that the September 26 meeting was the first time she had 9
learned that there were set working hours at Andalex. Amy 10
Piecoro testified that prior to September 26, 2008, she had 11
never been told that Kwan was arriving late, leaving early, or 12
taking long lunches. Later that day, Andrew Silverman fired 13
Kwan. 14
15
B. 16
According to Kwan, she was terminated about three weeks 17
after she had complained to Alex Silverman that she was being 18
discriminated against because of her gender. She alleges that 19
she was fired because of her recent complaint about 20
discrimination. Kwan testified that on September 3, 2008, she 21
asked Alex Silverman why she was being discriminated against 22
and treated differently from the men in the office with 23
respect to salary increases and bonuses. Alex allegedly told 24

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her that he and Andrew Silverman each speak with Allen 1
Silverman about their “own men” and Allen then decides the 2
increases and bonuses. About three weeks later, on September 3
26, 2008, Kwan was fired. Andalex claims that Andrew 4
Silverman made the decision to terminate Kwan.2 Alex 5
Silverman denies that the September 3 conversation ever 6
occurred. 7
Andalex has denied that it retaliated against the 8
plaintiff. Indeed it has denied that the alleged complaint of 9
gender discrimination ever occurred. Its explanations for the 10
plaintiff’s firing have, however, evolved over time. Andalex 11
initially contended that its change in business focus to 12
international investments made the plaintiff’s skill set 13
obsolete. Subsequently, it shifted to an explanation that the 14
plaintiff’s poor performance and bad behavior were the reasons 15
for the termination. 16
2 Andalex has not been consistent in its explanation of
whether Andrew Silverman acted alone in deciding to terminate
the plaintiff. Andalex’s statement to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) indicates that Andrew
Silverman and Steven Marks made the decision to terminate Kwan
together. At another point, the EEOC statement says that “it
was Mr. Marks[’s] decision, approved by Andrew Silverman” to
terminate Kwan. Alex Silverman testified that Andrew
Silverman made the decision to terminate the plaintiff. Amy
Piecoro testified that the decision to terminate Kwan was made
by Andrew Silverman, Steven Marks, and William Kogan,
Andalex’s General Counsel.

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In a letter dated November 19, 2008, Andalex’s counsel 1
explained that both Kwan and Garber were terminated because 2
the business focus at Andalex had changed from domestic real 3
estate to international gaming and hospitality: 4
[Kwan’s] skill set no longer matche[d] what Andalex 5
need[ed] from her position. . . . As Andalex’s 6
business shifted from U.S.-based office properties 7
to Latin American hospitality and gaming interests, 8
Ms. Kwan’s skill set became increasingly 9
obsolete. . . . Ms. Kwan has no experience in the 10
hospitality or gaming industry . . . which Andalex 11
deems necessary for the direction its business is 12
headed. Notably, only weeks ago, Andalex terminated 13
a senior portfolio manager who is male, [Burton 14
Garber,] because it similarly concluded that his 15
skill set was not a good match for the company going 16
forward. 17
18
The letter also claimed that Kwan was terminated because “she 19
repeatedly took long lunches, arrived to the office late, left 20
early, and generally made little effort to make herself 21
valuable to the company as its business focus changed.” 22
After Kwan filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 23
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Andalex filed its Position 24
Statement (the “Position Statement”) on April 7, 2009. The 25
introduction to the Position Statement explained that over the 26
course of Kwan’s employment, Andalex’s “business changed 27
dramatically.” Andalex switched its focus from “the 28
acquisition, development and management of commercial, retail 29
and residential properties in the United States,” at the time 30
Kwan was hired, to “investments in Latin America and the 31

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Caribbean” and a “business plan abroad.” The Position 1
Statement argued that “the termination of Ms. Kwan’s 2
employment [was] for reasons having nothing to do with her 3
gender or national origin. Rather, her skill set no longer 4
matched the needs of either Andalex or its foreign hospitality 5
and gaming division.” The introduction did not allege that 6
Kwan’s poor performance or behavioral problems contributed to 7
the decision to terminate her. 8
The body of the Position Statement also focused almost 9
exclusively on Andalex’s change in business focus. Andalex 10
represented that although it had attempted to “integrate Ms. 11
Kwan into its foreign hospitality and gaming division, as 12
domestic acquisitions came to a complete halt,” Kwan was not 13
suited to working on such transactions because she did not 14
speak Spanish and lacked experience in this new area of 15
business focus. Andalex represented that Kwan was unable to 16
adapt to the change in business focus and that both she and 17
Burton Garber had been terminated because of the change in 18
business focus: 19
While Ms. Kwan’s performance in the context of the 20
domestic real estate aspect of the operation was 21
acceptable, she had failed and had been unable to 22
make the transition to the foreign hospitality and 23
gaming aspect of the business operation. In this 24
context, . . . her employment was terminated . . . . 25
During the same time frame, Burton Garber, a male, 26
who is not of Asian nationality, was also notified 27
of his termination based upon the disposition of 28

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Andalex’s domestic real estate portfolio and the 1
growing focus on foreign business. 2
3
Andalex reiterated that “both Ms. Kwan’s and Mr. Garber’s 4
employments were severed as a consequence of the company’s 5
shift from domestic real estate ownership and management to 6
the foreign hospitality and gaming business.” Andalex 7
repeated this position: 8
As noted above, the company’s emphasis shifted from 9
real estate in the United States to hospitality and 10
gaming in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ms. Kwan 11
did not have experience in hospitality or gaming 12
acquisitions. She also did not speak Spanish. Her 13
skills simply no longer fit in with the business of 14
the company. . . . Ms. Kwan was never singled out 15
for disparate treatment. Ms. Kwan conveniently 16
fails to note that Mr. Garber’s employment had been 17
terminated around the same time that her employment 18
had been terminated. His termination was for the 19
same basic reasons as was Ms. Kwan. 20
21
In the argument section of its Position Statement, 22
Andalex framed the dispute between the parties as “begin[ning] 23
with whether Ms. Kwan was qualified to perform in the 24
aftermath of the corporate changes in operations.” The 25
argument proceeded to tie Kwan and Garber together and claim 26
that the change in business focus was the reason for their 27
terminations: 28
Andalex asserts that Ms. Kwan did not have the 29
needed qualifications and abilities to transition 30
with the changes in corporate focus. Ms. Kwan and 31
Mr. Garber were both laid off at around the same 32
time for the same business reasons. Andalex has 33
presented a facially valid, independent and non- 34
discriminatory basis for the actions taken. 35

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Andalex’s Position Statement also made brief reference to 1
Kwan’s performance in response to her claims that her 2
performance was excellent, that she had always carried out her 3
responsibilities, and that she had never received written or 4
oral performance warnings. Andalex alleged there were 5
“several instances in which Ms. Kwan’s work product contained 6
significant errors,” including “at least one case [where her 7
performance] adversely affected a transaction being negotiated 8
with a global financial institution.” 9
Andalex also alleged that Kwan’s behavior contributed to 10
its decision to terminate her. Andalex alleged that on at 11
least two occasions Kwan had behaved inappropriately by taking 12
photographs of Steven Marks despite his repeated requests that 13
she stop. Andalex also claimed that “[t]oward the end of her 14
employment, Ms. Kwan was taking long lunches and leaving the 15
office early,” and referred to her alleged early departure for 16
a squash game. 17
Any fair reading of Andalex’s Position Statement to the 18
EEOC indicates that Andalex claimed that Kwan was fired 19
primarily because its business focus had changed. Kwan was 20
therefore terminated at about the same time as Garber, a male 21
non-Asian, and Andalex could argue that the reason for both 22
terminations was the same. This rationale undercut any 23

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argument that Kwan was terminated because of discrimination 1
based on her gender or national origin. 2
Andalex’s explanation that Kwan was terminated because of 3
a change in Andalex’s business focus was undermined by Marks’s 4
testimony at his deposition. Marks testified that Andalex’s 5
business focus had already shifted from domestic real estate 6
to international hospitality and gaming by the time the 7
plaintiff began to work at Andalex. Marks testified that “at 8
the time [Kwan] came in, [Andalex was] looking to acquire 9
Curacao. . . . [and] some properties in Mexico. And [Andalex 10
was] in the process of trying to raise equity with . . . JP 11
Morgan to expand the hospitality and gaming business plan.” 12
Marks testified that although Burton Garber had been 13
terminated because of the shift in business focus, Kwan was 14
not terminated for that reason “[b]ecause she had been working 15
on casino-related projects soon after she started.” On the 16
other hand, Andrew Silverman testified that the plaintiff’s 17
termination was the “[c]ulmination of her poor performance and 18
the fact that . . . our business model had begun to 19
change . . . .” 20
Andalex now alleges that Kwan’s poor performance, 21
illustrated by three discrete incidents, was the chief reason 22
for her termination. Of the three incidents, only one was 23
mentioned in Andalex’s Position Statement before the EEOC. 24

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The first instance, referred to briefly in Andalex’s EEOC 1
Position Statement, involved Kwan’s error in preparing a 2
financial model for possible equity funding. The project was 3
reassigned. Andalex also alleges that Kwan was late in 4
preparing a financial model for a casino acquisition in 5
Argentina. Additionally, Andalex claims that Kwan was late in 6
preparing a financial projection for a Mexican acquisition and 7
that the projection contained significant errors. Neither the 8
Argentina project, nor the Mexico project, was mentioned in 9
the EEOC Position Statement. 10
Andalex also alleges that Kwan’s behavior contributed to 11
the decision to terminate her. Alex Silverman testified that 12
Kwan had conducted herself unprofessionally at several 13
business meetings. Marks also testified that Kwan did not 14
abide by the standard work hours, getting into work late, 15
leaving early, and taking long lunches. 16
17
C. 18
The evidence with respect to Kwan’s COBRA claim is as 19
follows. After her termination, Kwan was entitled to receive 20
notification under COBRA regarding her right to continue to 21
receive health insurance benefits. As Director of Human 22
Resources, Amy Piecoro was responsible for notifying Andalex’s 23
health insurance claims administrator, Paychex, Inc. 24

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(“Paychex”), about Kwan’s termination, so that Paychex could 1
send Kwan notification of her right to continue her health 2
insurance benefits. Piecoro alleges that she completed and 3
sent the COBRA employee data sheet to Paychex on September 30, 4
2008, but Paychex claims that it never received the form and 5
therefore did not send the COBRA notification to Kwan. 6
Andalex claims that it discovered that Kwan had not 7
received her COBRA notification form only after her attorney 8
raised the issue in 2009. On October 12, 2009, more than a 9
year after her termination, the plaintiff received 10
notification of her COBRA rights from Paychex. Kwan then 11
allegedly called Paychex several times in October and November 12
2009 to determine the amount she owed for her first premium 13
check. The premium for the policy, stated in the notification 14
form from Paychex, was $1,942.81 per month. On December 1, 15
2009, Paychex sent a second COBRA notice to the plaintiff 16
offering Kwan participation in a different health plan, 17
Healthnet, for a monthly premium of $990.24. Kwan testified 18
that she could not afford the premium for coverage under the 19
Healthnet plan. When the plaintiff sought clarification about 20
the differences between the original and Healthnet plans, 21
Andalex’s broker allegedly told her that all further 22
communications would “have to go through the attorneys.” Kwan 23
did not enroll in the Healthnet plan. 24

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The plaintiff remained unemployed and without health 1
insurance until she began new employment in Singapore in April 2
2010. Kwan testified that from the time her Andalex coverage 3
lapsed in October 2008 to when she secured new insurance in 4
2010, she and her husband incurred unreimbursed medical 5
expenses of “a few hundred dollars.” Kwan alleges that she 6
and her husband avoided and delayed seeking medical attention 7
during the period they were without health insurance, 8
including psychological counseling for the emotional distress 9
associated with Andalex’s alleged discriminatory treatment and 10
her termination. Kwan was unable to locate any documents 11
evidencing her medical expenses or demonstrating that she had 12
delayed seeking medical attention for any ailments. 13
14
II. 15
The District Court granted Andalex’s motion for summary 16
judgment and dismissed all of Kwan’s claims. 17
The District Court dismissed the claims of discrimination 18
and retaliation under Title VII for failure to establish a 19
prima facie case under the framework set forth in McDonnell 20
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The District 21
Court went on to determine that even assuming the plaintiff 22
had met her prima facie burden, Andalex had offered legitimate 23
non-discriminatory reasons for her termination and the 24

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plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to 1
demonstrate that the reasons were a pretext for discrimination 2
or retaliation. 3
The District Court dismissed Kwan’s claims under the 4
NYSHRL and NYCHRL for the same reasons it dismissed the Title 5
VII claims and dismissed Kwan’s COBRA claim because the 6
plaintiff made no showing that she had been harmed by her lack 7
of COBRA coverage. In response to Andalex’s motion for 8
summary judgment, Kwan also argued that her complaint stated a 9
claim for hostile work environment. The District Court 10
refused to consider Kwan’s hostile work environment claim 11
because it was first raised in response to the motion for 12
summary judgment. 13
This appeal followed. 14
15
DISCUSSION 16
I. Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation Claims 17
We review de novo an award of summary judgment for the 18
claims under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. See 19
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 20
2010); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216-17 (2d 21
Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is 22
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 23
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24

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56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 1
A genuine dispute of material fact “exists for summary 2
judgment purposes where the evidence, viewed in the light most 3
favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable 4
jury could decide in that party’s favor.” Guilbert v. 5
Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 6
The substantive law governing the case will identify those 7
facts that are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that 8
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 9
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” 10
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 11
Although summary judgment is proper where there is 12
“nothing in the record to support plaintiff’s allegations 13
other than plaintiff’s own contradictory and incomplete 14
testimony,” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 555 15
(2d Cir. 2005), there is a “need for caution about granting 16
summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case where 17
. . . the merits turn on a dispute as to the employer’s 18
intent,” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 19
2008). 20
21
A. Hostile Work Environment Claims 22
Kwan’s complaint does not assert a claim for hostile work 23
environment and Kwan did not raise the prospect of such a 24

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claim until her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 1
The District Court held that because the plaintiff had never 2
asserted a claim of hostile work environment until her brief 3
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, it would not 4
consider the claim. We agree with the District Court and will 5
not address the merits of that late-asserted claim. See 6
Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir. 7
2006); Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 8
(2d Cir. 1956) (holding that district court was “justified” in 9
“brush[ing] aside” further argument not alleged in complaint 10
but raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment). 11
The dismissal of the hostile work environment claim is 12
therefore affirmed. 13
14
B. Retaliation Claims 15
To prevail on a retaliation claim, “the plaintiff need 16
not prove that her underlying complaint of discrimination had 17
merit,” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 157 (2d Cir. 18
2012), but only that it was motivated by a “good faith, 19
reasonable belief that the underlying employment practice was 20
unlawful,” Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d 21
Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 22
The good faith and reasonableness of Kwan’s belief that she 23

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was subjected to discrimination are not at issue on this 1
appeal. 2
Federal and state law retaliation claims are reviewed 3
under the burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas, 411 4
U.S. at 802-04. See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d 5
Cir. 2010); Dawson, 398 F.3d at 216-17; Reed, 95 F.3d at 6
1177.3
7
1. 8
Under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, 9
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation 10
by showing 1) “participation in a protected activity”; 2) the 11
defendant’s knowledge of the protected activity; 3) “an 12
adverse employment action”; and 4) “a causal connection 13
between the protected activity and the adverse employment 14
action.” Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 15
(2d Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks 16
omitted). The plaintiff’s burden of proof as to this first 17
3 The plaintiff also brought a claim for retaliation
under the NYCHRL. It is unclear whether and to what extent
the McDonnell Douglas framework has been modified for claims
under the NYCHRL. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N.
Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 n.8, 112 (2d Cir. 2013). It is
unnecessary to resolve that issue in this case because to the
extent that the defendant has failed to show it is entitled to
summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas, it would not be
entitled to summary judgment under the more expansive standard
of the NYCHRL. See Williams v. Regus Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 836 F.
Supp. 2d 159, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

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step “has been characterized as ‘minimal’ and ‘de minimis.’” 1
Id. (citations omitted). 2
The District Court erred when it held that the plaintiff 3
failed to satisfy the knowledge and causation prongs of the 4
prima facie case. 5
With respect to the knowledge prong, the District Court 6
held that the plaintiff could not demonstrate Andalex’s 7
knowledge of her protected activity because Kwan had provided 8
no evidence that Andrew Silverman had knowledge of Kwan’s 9
September 3 conversation with Alex Silverman when Andrew made 10
the decision to terminate her. However, for purposes of a 11
prima facie case, a plaintiff may rely on “general corporate 12
knowledge” of her protected activity to establish the 13
knowledge prong of the prima facie case.4 Gordon v. N.Y.C. 14
Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Neither [the 15
4 To the extent Andalex argues that Kwan must
demonstrate communication of Kwan’s complaint from Alex
Silverman to Andrew Silverman, Andalex confuses the
“knowledge” and the causation prongs of the prima facie case
requirement. Kwan does not argue that general corporate
knowledge demonstrates causation, but rather argues that it
demonstrates knowledge. Furthermore, while Andalex is correct
that Kwan cannot satisfy the causation prong through mere
corporate knowledge, as discussed below, Kwan demonstrates
causation indirectly by the temporal proximity between her
complaint and her termination, and does not rely on “general
corporate knowledge” for the causation prong of the prima
facie case. It should, however, be noted that Andrew
Silverman testified that he consulted with his brother before
terminating the plaintiff and Alex Silverman testified that he
and Andrew had discussed terminating the plaintiff.

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Second Circuit] nor any other circuit has ever held that, to 1
satisfy the knowledge requirement, anything more is necessary 2
than general corporate knowledge that the plaintiff has 3
engaged in a protected activity.”) (citations omitted). Here, 4
the plaintiff made her September 3 complaint to Alex 5
Silverman, an officer of the corporation. This complaint was 6
sufficient to impute to Andalex general corporate knowledge of 7
the plaintiff’s protected activity. See Reed, 95 F.3d at 1178 8
(holding that a plaintiff’s complaint to an officer of the 9
company communicated her concerns to the company as a whole 10
for purposes of the knowledge prong of the prima facie case); 11
see also Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125-26 (2d Cir. 12
2013). Therefore, Kwan satisfied the knowledge prong of the 13
prima facie case. 14
This case is a good illustration of why corporate 15
knowledge is sufficient for purposes of a prima facie case of 16
retaliation. If that were not true, a simple denial by a 17
corporate officer that the officer ever communicated the 18
plaintiff’s complaint, no matter how reasonable the inference 19
of communication, would prevent the plaintiff from satisfying 20
her prima facie case, despite the fact that the prima facie 21
case requires only a de minimis showing. 22
The District Court also held that Kwan had not satisfied 23
the causation prong because she had adduced no facts plausibly 24

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suggesting that the September 3 conversation with Alex 1
Silverman was causally related to her termination by Andrew 2
Silverman. However, even without direct evidence of 3
causation, “a plaintiff can indirectly establish a causal 4
connection to support a . . . retaliation claim by showing 5
that the protected activity was closely followed in time by 6
the adverse [employment] action.” Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell 7
Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d 8
Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 9
see also Summa, 708 F.3d at 127-128. 10
The Supreme Court recently held that “Title VII 11
retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional 12
principles of but-for causation,” which “requires proof that 13
the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the 14
absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the 15
employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 16
2517, 2533 (2013). However, the but-for causation standard 17
does not alter the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate 18
causation at the prima facie stage on summary judgment or at 19
trial indirectly through temporal proximity. 20
The three-week period from Kwan’s complaint to her 21
termination is sufficiently short to make a prima facie 22
showing of causation indirectly through temporal proximity. 23
See Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 110 (“Though this Court has not 24

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-23-
drawn a bright line defining, for the purposes of a prima 1
facie case, the outer limits beyond which a temporal 2
relationship is too attenuated to establish causation, we have 3
previously held that five months is not too long to find the 4
causal relationship.”) (citations omitted); Gorman-Bakos, 252 5
F.3d at 554-55. Therefore, Kwan presented a prima facie case 6
for her retaliation claims. 7
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing 8
of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to 9
articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the 10
employment action. United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 93 11
(2d Cir. 2011). In this case, the defendant has proffered the 12
plaintiff’s poor work performance, bad behavior, and Andalex’s 13
change in business focus as the legitimate non-retaliatory 14
reasons for the plaintiff’s termination. 15
16
2. 17
Andalex’s inconsistent and contradictory explanations for 18
the plaintiff’s termination, combined with the close temporal 19
proximity between the September 3 conversation and Kwan’s 20
termination, are sufficient to create a genuine dispute of 21
material fact as to whether Kwan’s September 3 complaint of 22
gender discrimination was a but-for cause of the plaintiff’s 23
termination. 24

-- 23 of 44 --

-24-
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, after the 1
defendant has articulated a non-retaliatory reason for the 2
employment action, the presumption of retaliation arising from 3
the establishment of the prima facie case drops from the 4
picture. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d 5
Cir. 2000). The plaintiff must then come forward with 6
evidence that the defendant’s proffered, non-retaliatory 7
reason is a mere pretext for retaliation. Id. 8
The Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff alleging 9
retaliation in violation of Title VII must show that 10
retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the adverse action, and 11
not simply a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the 12
employer’s decision. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526, 2533. 13
However, “but-for” causation does not require proof that 14
retaliation was the only cause of the employer’s action, but 15
only that the adverse action would not have occurred in the 16
absence of the retaliatory motive.5
17
5 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar, in
order to demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff was only required to
demonstrate that a retaliatory motive was “a substantial or
motivating factor behind the adverse action[,]” Raniola v.
Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 625 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted), rather than a “but-for” cause of
the adverse action. In Nassar, the Supreme Court held that
“Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to
traditional principles of but-for causation,” and “[t]his
requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have
occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or

-- 24 of 44 --

-25-
A plaintiff may prove that retaliation was a but-for 1
cause of an adverse employment action by demonstrating 2
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or 3
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate, non- 4
retaliatory reasons for its action. From such discrepancies, 5
a reasonable juror could conclude that the explanations were a 6
pretext for a prohibited reason. See, e.g., Byrnie v. Town of 7
actions of the employer.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533.
However, a plaintiff’s injury can have multiple “but-for”
causes, each one of which may be sufficient to support
liability. See Fowler V. Harper et al., 4 Harper, James and
Gray on Torts § 20.2, at 100-101 (3d ed. 2007) (“Probably it
cannot be said of any event that it has a single causal
antecedent . . . .”) (collecting cases); W. Page Keeton et
al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 41, at 264-66 (5th ed.
1984). Requiring proof that a prohibited consideration was a
“but-for” cause of an adverse action does not equate to a
burden to show that such consideration was the “sole” cause.
See, e.g., Fagan v. U.S. Carpet Installation, Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 490, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act “[t]he condition that a
plaintiff’s age must be the ‘but for’ cause of the adverse
employment action is not equivalent to a requirement that age
was the employer’s only consideration, but rather that the
adverse employment actions would not have occurred without
it.”) (citation omitted).
In this case, the parties have put forward several
alleged causes of the plaintiff’s termination: retaliation,
unsuitability of skills, poor performance, and inappropriate
behavior. The determination of whether retaliation was a
“but-for” cause, rather than just a motivating factor, is
particularly poorly suited to disposition by summary judgment,
because it requires weighing of the disputed facts, rather
than a determination that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact. A jury should eventually determine whether
the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that she did in fact complain about discrimination and that
she would not have been terminated if she had not complained
about discrimination.

-- 25 of 44 --

-26-
Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 105-07 (2d Cir. 2001) 1
(age and gender discrimination); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., 2
Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2000) (age discrimination); 3
Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 4
156-57 (2d Cir. 1998) (disability discrimination), superseded 5
by statute on other grounds as stated in Hilton v. Wright, 673 6
F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 7
F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1994) (age discrimination) (collecting 8
cases). 9
In this case, Andalex offered shifting and somewhat 10
inconsistent explanations for Kwan’s termination. Andalex 11
claimed throughout its Position Statement to the EEOC that 12
Kwan and Burton Garber were both terminated largely because of 13
Andalex’s change in business focus from domestic real estate 14
to international gaming and hospitality. This was a 15
convenient explanation because it undercut any claim of gender 16
or national origin discrimination. However, Marks, Andalex’s 17
CFO and Kwan’s direct supervisor, later testified that Kwan, 18
unlike Garber, was not terminated because of a shift in 19
company focus. Marks’s testimony directly contradicts 20
Andalex’s main representation to the EEOC. Moreover, while 21
Kwan’s poor performance on the Argentina and Mexico projects 22
became critical parts of Andalex’s argument that Kwan had 23
performed poorly, those projects were never even mentioned to 24

-- 26 of 44 --

-27-
the EEOC as reasons for Kwan’s termination. “From such 1
discrepancies a reasonable juror could infer that the 2
explanations given by [Andalex] were pretextual.” Ethan 3
Allen, 44 F.3d at 120; see also Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 106.6
4
Kwan’s evidence of Andalex’s inconsistent explanations 5
for her termination and the very close temporal proximity 6
between her protected conduct and her termination are 7
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact with regard to 8
whether the September 3 complaint was a but-for cause of her 9
termination. Temporal proximity alone is insufficient to 10
defeat summary judgment at the pretext stage. See El Sayed v. 11
Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (per 12
curiam). However, a plaintiff may rely on evidence comprising 13
her prima facie case, including temporal proximity, together 14
with other evidence such as inconsistent employer 15
explanations, to defeat summary judgment at that stage. See 16
6 The District Court addressed the inconsistencies in
the defendant’s stated reasons for the plaintiff’s
termination. The District Court noted Marks’s denial that the
shift in Andalex’s business was a basis for the plaintiff’s
termination. The District Court found that Marks’s statement
was not inconsistent with Andrew Silverman’s testimony that
while the change in business was a factor that influenced his
decision, the plaintiff’s termination was due primarily to
work performance issues. The District Court found these to be
different but consistent explanations. This ignores that the
thrust of the defendant’s position before the EEOC was that
the plaintiff was terminated because of a shift in the
defendant’s business, a rationale that was disowned by Marks,
the plaintiff’s direct supervisor.

-- 27 of 44 --

-28-
Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 625 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Under 1
some circumstances, retaliatory intent may . . . be shown, in 2
conjunction with the plaintiff’s prima facie case, by 3
sufficient proof to rebut the employer’s proffered reason for 4
the termination.”); James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 5
156-57 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[E]vidence satisfying the minimal 6
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, coupled with evidence of 7
falsity of the employer’s explanation, may or may not be 8
sufficient to sustain a finding of [retaliation]; . . . the 9
way to tell whether a plaintiff’s case is sufficient to 10
sustain a verdict is to analyze the particular evidence to 11
determine whether it reasonably supports an inference of the 12
facts plaintiff must prove”); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit 13
Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 770 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a strong 14
temporal connection between the plaintiff’s complaint and 15
other circumstantial evidence is sufficient to raise an issue 16
of fact with respect to pretext), abrogated in part on other 17
grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 18
(2002). 19
Based on the discrepancies between the EEOC statement and 20
subsequent testimony, a reasonable juror could infer that the 21
explanation given by the defendant was pretextual, and that, 22
coupled with the temporal proximity between the complaint and 23
the termination, the September 3 complaint was a but-for cause 24

-- 28 of 44 --

-29-
of Kwan’s termination. Viewing the evidence in the light most 1
favorable to the plaintiff, as required on a motion for 2
summary judgment, there is sufficient evidence to require 3
denial of the summary judgment motion on the claims for 4
retaliation.7
5
6
II. COBRA Claim 7
The plaintiff’s final claim is based on Andalex’s alleged 8
failure to provide her with timely notice of her health 9
insurance continuation coverage rights as required under 10
COBRA. The District Court dismissed Kwan’s COBRA claim 11
because there was no evidence that the plaintiff suffered harm 12
from her lack of coverage. Because Kwan has made no showing 13
of bad faith by Andalex or prejudice resulting from the lack 14
of notice, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 15
dismissing Kwan’s claim for statutory penalties. 16
We review the District Court’s determination that a 17
plaintiff is not entitled to statutory penalties under 29 18
U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) for abuse of discretion. See Demery v. 19
Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283, 290 (2d Cir. 20
2000). COBRA permits a qualifying employee to continue to 21
7 Because the plaintiff’s claims survive under the
Nassar “but-for” standard, we do not decide whether the NYSHRL
claim is affected by Nassar, which by its terms dealt only
with retaliation in violation of Title VII.

-- 29 of 44 --

-30-
receive health benefits at the group rate even after the 1
termination of her employment. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161(a), 1163(2). 2
The statute specifies that “the employer . . . must notify the 3
[health plan] administrator . . . within 30 days” of the 4
employee’s termination, id. § 1166(a)(2), and the 5
administrator must then notify the employee of her rights to 6
continuing coverage within 14 days, id. §§ 1166(a)(4), (c). 7
Under ERISA, of which COBRA is a part, a plan administrator 8
who fails to meet the COBRA notice requirements “may in the 9
court’s discretion be personally liable to such participant or 10
beneficiary in the amount of up to [$110]8 a day from the date 11
of such failure or refusal . . . .” id. § 1132(c)(1); see 12
also Deckard v. Interstate Bakeries Corp. (In re Interstate 13
Bakeries Corp.), 704 F.3d 528, 534-37 (8th Cir. 2013).9
14
In assessing a claim for statutory penalties under ERISA, 15
a district court should consider various factors, including 16
“bad faith or intentional conduct on the part of the 17
8 The statute provides for a civil penalty of up to $100
per day; however that amount has been increased to $110 per
day. See Adjusted Civil Penalty Under Section 502(c)(1), 29
C.F.R. § 2575.502c-1; De Nicola v. Adelphi Acad., No. 05 Civ.
4231, 2006 WL 2844384, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006).
9 We note that the parties have not raised the issue of
whether Kwan is barred from recovery against Andalex because
statutory penalties are only available against the plan
administrator. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). We therefore
decline to address that issue.

-- 30 of 44 --

-31-
administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests 1
made and documents withheld, and the existence of any 2
prejudice to the participant or beneficiary.” Devlin v. 3
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir. 4
2001) (quoting Pagovich v. Moskowitz, 865 F. Supp. 130, 137 5
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (collecting cases)) (internal quotation marks 6
omitted); see also In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 704 F.3d 7
at 534; De Nicola, 2006 WL 2844384, at *7-10; Chambers v. 8
European Am. Bank & Trust Co., 601 F. Supp. 630, 638-39 9
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (collecting cases) (“The weight of authority 10
indicates that penalties are not imposed when a plaintiff has 11
failed to demonstrate that his rights were harmed or otherwise 12
prejudiced by the delay in his receipt of the information.”). 13
Applying these factors, we conclude that the District 14
Court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the 15
plaintiff was not entitled to statutory penalties. Kwan 16
presented no evidence of bad faith or intentional misconduct 17
by Paychex or Andalex. See Devlin, 274 F.3d at 90; In re 18
Interstate Bakeries Corp., 704 F.3d at 537. 19
Kwan has also failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting 20
from the lack of coverage. By the plaintiff’s own account, 21
she incurred medical bills of only a few hundred dollars. Had 22
she elected to receive coverage under COBRA, it is undisputed 23
that she would have had to pay premiums in the range of 24

-- 31 of 44 --

-32-
hundreds or thousands of dollars each month. The plaintiff 1
therefore suffered no monetary loss from her failure to obtain 2
insurance coverage until she obtained new employment. See 3
Partridge v. HIP of Greater N.Y., No. 97 Civ. 0453, 2000 WL 4
827299, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2000), aff’d, No. 00-7920, 5
2001 WL 950682 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2001) (Summary Order). To 6
the extent Kwan alleges that she would have sought healthcare 7
had she had health insurance, her claim fails because she 8
presented no evidence to support this allegation. See In re 9
Interstate Bakeries Corp., 704 F.3d at 536. Therefore, the 10
District Court acted well within its discretion when it 11
dismissed the claim for statutory penalties because there was 12
no showing of bad faith and Kwan suffered no harm.10
13
CONCLUSION 14
We have considered all of the arguments of the parties. 15
To the extent not specifically addressed above, they are 16
10 Kwan was also not entitled to actual damages. The
only damages that she could recover are based on the several
hundred dollars of medical bills she allegedly incurred.
However, “[t]o be eligible to collect the [unreimbursed
medical bills], the plaintiff would need to pay the COBRA
premium payments.” Rinaldo v. Grand Union Co., No. 89 Civ.
3850, 1995 WL 116418, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1995) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1162(2)(C)). “Where, as here, [the] plaintiff is in
a better position not having exercised [her] rights under
COBRA, there can be no actual damages.” Id.; see also Soliman
v. Shark Inc., No. 00 Civ. 9049, 2004 WL 1672458, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).

-- 32 of 44 --

-33-
either moot or without merit. For the reasons explained 1
above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court dismissing 2
all claims, except we VACATE the judgment of the District 3
Court dismissing the retaliation claims. The case is REMANDED 4
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5

-- 33 of 44 --

B ARRINGTON D. PARKER , Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 1
in part: 2
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the dismissal of 3
Kwan’s gender and national origin discrimination, hostile work 4
environment, and COBRA claims. I would affirm the dismissal of 5
her federal retaliation claim as well. District Judge Katherine B. 6
Forrest concluded after a thorough and careful review that “no 7
rational juror could find for the plaintiff in this case after comparing 8
the overwhelming facts in the record supportive of legitimate 9
business reasons for plaintiff’s termination with what may only be 10
characterized as cobbled together conduct allegedly supportive 11
of . . . retaliation.” In my view, she was correct. 12
I will assume for the moment that Kwan established a prima 13
facie case of retaliation, and that Andalex proffered legitimate, 14
performance‐based reasons for her termination. As the majority 15
notes, at that point, Kwan was obligated to come forward with 16
sufficient evidence on the basis of which a reasonable jury could find 17
that Andalex’s performance‐based reasons were pretextual. See 18
Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000). In other 19
words, evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that she 20
engaged in a protected activity, and that the activity, as opposed to 21
the reasons proffered by Andalex, led to her termination. The bar is 22
even higher in the wake of Nassar, as Kwan must now adduce facts 23
sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that retaliation 24
was the “but for” cause of her termination. Univ. Of Tx. Sw. Med. 25
1

-- 34 of 44 --

Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2514, 2533 (2013). 1 Kwan failed to carry this 1
burden. 2
The majority opinion hangs by a slender factual thread – that 3
Kwan purports to have complained to Alex Silverman that she was 4
being discriminated against, that she was fired three weeks later, 5
and that her employer gave multiple reasons for her termination. 6
Because more than one reason was offered, the majority concludes 7
that Andalex’s reasons were necessarily pretextual. The problem 8
with this analysis is that it obscures the failure of proof on Kwan’s 9
part that the myriad performance‐based reasons for her discharge 10
were “mere pretext for actual [retaliation],” Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42, 11
and that this supposed retaliation was the “but for” cause of her 12
termination, Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. 13
Even accepting, for the purposes of argument, that Kwan has 14
established that Andalex offered differing and thus apparently 15
pretextual explanations for her termination, summary judgment 16
would still be appropriate. As we explained in Schnabel v. Abramson, 17
even where a plaintiff has demonstrated pretext, rather than simply 18
applying a per se rule precluding summary judgment for the 19
defendant, we must instead employ a “case‐by‐case approach” and 20
1 The “but for” causation standard would apply to Kwan’s Title VII and NYSHRL
claims, but not to her retaliation claims under the NYCHRL. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole
Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 116 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that under the NYCHRL
“summary judgment is appropriate only if the plaintiff cannot show that retailation played
any part in the employer’s decision.”). I decline to address Kwan’s claims under the
NYCHRL, because in the absence of a viable federal claim, I would decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state or city law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
2

-- 35 of 44 --

“examin[e] the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could 1
satisfy h[er] ‘ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 2
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.’” 232 3
F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 4
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (internal quotation marks 5
omitted)). While Schnabel dealt with an age discrimination claim, 6
this approach applies to retaliation claims as well. In conducting 7
this “case‐by‐case” analysis, “[t]he relevant factors . . . ‘include the 8
strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the 9
proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other 10
evidence that supports [or undermines] the employer’s case.’” James 11
v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2000) (third alteration 12
in original) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148‐49). 13
First, Kwan’s prima facie case was particularly weak. To 14
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, she was 15
obligated to demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in an activity 16
protected under Title VII; (2) her employer was aware of her 17
participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse 18
action against her; and (4) a causal connection existed between the 19
protected activity and the adverse action. See Gordon v. New York 20
City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Cosgrove v. 21
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir.1993)). 22
Kwan addressed the knowledge and causation prongs in the 23
most minimal way possible, relying exclusively on the legal fiction 24
of general corporate knowledge and on a temporal proximity 25
between her complaint and her discharge. Notably, she failed to 26
3

-- 36 of 44 --

even allege, much less proffer evidence after taking extensive 1
discovery, that the complaint she purportedly made to Alex 2
Silverman was actually communicated to or known by the 3
executives who terminated her, Andrew Silverman and Gregory 4
Marks. This critical factual omission is telling. 5
Moreover, the probative value of her proof of pretext was 6
minimal. As discussed below, Andalex consistently relied on the 7
same facts and events justifying Kwan’s termination at each stage of 8
the proceedings. There is no evidence that Andalex shifted its 9
position for strategic reasons because, for example, new evidence 10
undermined a prior asserted justification, see Carlton v. Mystic 11
Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Ethan Allen, 44 12
F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1994). To the extent its position has shifted at 13
all (and I would find, for the reasons discussed below, that it has 14
not), that shift merely reflected a change in the description it applied 15
to a consistent set of facts. 16
In any event, Andalex presented ample evidence of legitimate, 17
non‐retaliatory reasons for its termination of Kwan. Andalex 18
established that, consistent with their shift in business strategy, 19
another employee who held a similar position, but also lacked the 20
skills and experiences Andalex was seeking, was terminated three 21
days before Kwan. In addition, Andalex demonstrated that Kwan 22
was replaced by a woman with the Spanish language skills that 23
Kwan lacked. 24
4

-- 37 of 44 --

In addition, Andalex documented a host of performance based 1
reasons why Kwan was fired. For example, in December 2007, in 2
connection with a casino acquisition project in Argentina, Marks 3
asked Kwan to prepare a financial model over the weekend so that it 4
could be checked Monday morning in preparation for a business trip 5
that evening. Kwan avoided working over the weekend and 6
claimed that she needed help translating the Spanish‐language 7
documents. Although another employee, fluent in Spanish, offered 8
to help Kwan complete the work on Sunday, she declined. Kwan 9
began work on the model on Monday morning, and was unable to 10
complete the assignment in a timely fashion, forcing the executives 11
to travel without the model. 12
In October 2007, Kwan was asked to update a financial model 13
for a pending deal by adding and removing certain projected 14
acquisitions. Marks found numerous errors in Kwan’s work product 15
and was forced to assign the project to a more junior analyst to be 16
completed properly. Kwan does not deny that the incident 17
occurred, but only denies that she was ever told of this incident. 18
In September 2008, Marks asked Kwan to prepare a financial 19
projection for a deal involving the acquisition of a chain of Mexican 20
casinos. Kwan made errors in the model that led to grossly 21
overstated losses. After a potential investor noticed the mistake and 22
contacted Andrew Silverman to ask why Andalex was 23
recommending an investment that was projected to have a 24
significant loss, Marks and another employee were forced to redo 25
Kwan’s work and to suffer the obvious embarrassment to the 26
5

-- 38 of 44 --

company’s reputation. In response, Kwan denies that she was ever 1
told she had made “errors,” and argues that Marks and the other 2
employee merely were “simplifying” the formulae, rather than 3
redoing her work. 4
In his deposition, Andrew Silverman noted that he received 5
feedback from other employees that Kwan had conducted herself in 6
an unprofessional manner during several business meetings, 7
including inappropriately taking photos of Marks on two occasions. 8
Further, at the end of her employment Kwan was taking long 9
lunches and leaving the office early even when work remained 10
unfinished. As a result, Marks required Kwan to let him know 11
before she left so that he could make sure there was no additional 12
work that needed to be completed, but she regularly failed to do so. 13
On the day before her termination, Marks observed Kwan leaving 14
the office around 5:00 p.m even though she had a looming deadline. 15
Kwan denies taking long lunches, and provides a different 16
explanation for leaving early the day before her termination and 17
avers that she was a competent employee. However, her subjective 18
disagreement with her employer’s assessment of her performance is 19
not sufficient to demonstrate retaliatory intent and defeat summary 20
judgement. Ricks v. Conde Nast Publ’ns, 6 F. App’x 74, 78 (2d Cir. 21
2001) (summary order); see also Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in 22
City of New York, 131 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 1997) (“‘This court does 23
not sit as a super‐personnel department that reexamines an entity’s 24
business decisions.’” (quoting Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 25
458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986)). In any event, in light of this abundance of 26
6

-- 39 of 44 --

largely unrefuted evidence of poor performance, no reasonable trier 1
of fact could conclude that retaliation was the “but for “reason for 2
Kwan’s termination. 3
But we need not even reach the foregoing analysis, however, 4
as I would find that Kwan has neither demonstrated that Andalex 5
shifted positions, nor, as a result, pretext. The majority finds that 6
she has done so by characterizing Andalex’s position as shifting 7
between its Position Statement in the Equal Employment 8
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) proceedings and this lawsuit. 9
As our precedent recognizes, however, it is not uncommon for an 10
employer to have multiple reasons for terminating an employee, and 11
we have held that where the employer offers “variations . . . on the 12
same theme rather than separate inconsistent justifications,” there is 13
not sufficient evidence of pretext to preclude the entry of summary 14
judgment. Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 15
2001); see also Timothy v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 233 F. App’x 17, 16
20 (2d Cir. 2007). 17
In Roge, after the employer cited, among other things, the lack 18
of work for the plaintiff‐employee and its own business 19
restructuring as reasons for the employee’s termination, the 20
employee argued that those two reasons were inconsistent and thus 21
pretextual. 257 F.3d at 169‐70. We disagreed, finding that the 22
business restructuring was motivated by the lack of work, and thus 23
that these two explanations were “variations . . . on the same 24
theme.” Id. at 170. Similarly, in Timothy, we found that the 25
employer’s various and shifting justifications for an employee’s 26
7

-- 40 of 44 --

repeated reassignments were not pretextual because they “share[d] a 1
consistent theme of a[n employer] facing the double bind of a severe 2
labor shortage and desperate financial straits that is trying to deal 3
with this terrible situation through reorganization and 4
reassignments.” 233 F. App’x at 20. 5
Rather than “inconsistent explanations,” as the majority 6
asserts, Andalex has offered complementary justifications for 7
Kwan’s discharge: a shift in the company’s business focus as well as 8
her poor performance – that are part of the same theme and which 9
support her termination. These rationales, and the key facts 10
supporting them, are consistently reflected in Andalex’s 11
submissions. 12
In a pre‐litigation letter, Andalex relied not only on the fact 13
that its “business shifted,” but also on Kwan’s poor performance to 14
justify her termination. Andalex explained that as a result of the 15
shift in business focus Kwan’s “skill set became increasingly 16
obsolete,” and that “[Kwan] repeatedly took long lunches, arrived to 17
the office late, left early, and generally made little effort to make 18
herself valuable to the company as its business focus changed.” 19
Similarly, in Andalex’s Position Statement before the EEOC, it 20
explained that its “business changed dramatically,” that “[Kwan’s] 21
skill set no longer matched the needs” of the company, and that “she 22
had failed and had been unable to make the transition to the foreign 23
hospitality and gaming aspect of the business operation,” as 24
evidenced by Andrew Silverman’s recollection of “several instances 25
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in which [her] work product contained significant errors, which in at 1
least one case adversely affected a transaction being negotiated with 2
a global financial institution.” The EEOC Position Statement also 3
recounted the instances where Kwan had inappropriately 4
photographed Marks during business meetings, as well as her “long 5
lunches” and penchant for “leaving the office early” in violation of 6
Marks’ requirement that he first check in with him, including the 7
specific instance on the day before she was terminated. 8
The majority’s narrow focus on a single answer Marks gave in 9
his deposition, disputing that Kwan was fired due to the business 10
shift, ignores the other facts that Marks relied upon. Like both 11
Andalex’s pre‐litigation letter and EEOC Position Statement, 12
Marks’s deposition testimony described a number of specific 13
projects in which Kwan had performed poorly, both in the quality of 14
her work, and her unwillingness or inability to complete her work in 15
a timely fashion. The fact that in one answer Marks characterized 16
these events as strictly performance problems does not change the 17
reality that Andalex and its executives have advanced the same facts 18
justifying Kwan’s termination throughout these proceedings. 19
In its summary judgment brief, Andalex also relied upon these 20
same facts to support its argument that the combination of the 21
company’s shifting business focus and Kwan’s poor performance 22
justified her termination. In the brief, Andalex explained that the 23
decision to terminate Kwan was “a culmination of ongoing issues 24
that were brought to [its] attention by a number of people regarding 25
the quality and accuracy of Kwan’s work product, the level of her 26
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performance, and her attitude.” The brief reviewed the instances 1
where Kwan’s work was deficient or late to the detriment of the 2
company, and where she resisted working the hours necessary to 3
finish her work before deadlines, or left the office early despite 4
pressing responsibilities. 5
Further, there is no evidence that Andalex ever altered its 6
rationale because new evidence undermined a previously asserted 7
justification for her discharge, see Carlton, 202 F.3d at 137, and Ethan 8
Allen, 44 F.3d at 120, nor does the record establish that the allegedly 9
shifting reasons Andalex has asserted are in fact contradictory. 10
Rather, the shift in business focus and Kwan’s poor performance are 11
complementary — indeed the shift in focus may in fact be a cause of 12
at least some of Kwan’s performance problems. Therefore, to the 13
extent one or the other is more heavily emphasized at times, that 14
does not mean that they are not part of a consistent theme. 15
Consequently, Kwan failed to demonstrate that Andalex shifted its 16
positions, let alone that such a shift rendered its proffered, legitimate 17
reasons for her termination pretextual. 18
The only remaining evidence of pretext offered by Kwan is the 19
temporal proximity of her alleged complaint and her termination. 20
We have, however, repeatedly held that temporal proximity alone is 21
insufficient as a matter of law to defeat summary judgment. See, e.g., 22
El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) 23
(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant 24
where plaintiff relied only upon temporal proximity and made no 25
showing of pretext). Whatever modest probative value temporal 26
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proximity might have in this case is washed away by the facts that 1
Plaintiff did not offer any evidence to suggest that the decision‐ 2
makers who fired her knew about the complaints she allegedly 3
made and that Plaintiff did not produce any evidence to undermine 4
Andalex’s position that her performance was demonstrably poor 5
and incompatible with its shift in business focus. 6
7
CONCLUSION 8
I would affirm the judgment of the district court in its entirety.
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