Vincent v. Comm’r of Social Security

1
10-2437-cv
Vincent v. Comm’r of Social Security
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
3
August Term 2010 4
(Argued: May 3, 2011 Decided: July 8, 2011) 5
Docket No. 10-2437-cv 6
-----------------------------------------------------x 7
LORETTA VINCENT, 8
9
Plaintiff - Appellant, 10
11
-- v. -- 12
13
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 14
15
Defendant - Appellee. 16
17
-----------------------------------------------------x 18
19
B e f o r e : WALKER, CALABRESI, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges. 20
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for 21
the Northern District of New York (Victor E. Bianchini, 22
Magistrate Judge) reducing by two-thirds the attorney’s fees 23
awarded following a successful appeal from the administrative 24
denial of an application for Social Security disability benefits. 25
We hold that the failure of claimant’s counsel to develop the 26
administrative record as to issues collateral to the disability 27
determination does not constitute a “special circumstance” 28

-- 1 of 22 --

2
warranting a fee reduction under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 1
We also hold that the district court abused its discretion in 2
reducing the fee award based on its sua sponte critique of 3
counsel’s billing records and its assessment that the time billed 4
was excessive. 5
REVERSED and REMANDED. 6
MARK CURLEY, New York, NY, for 7
Plaintiff-Appellant. 8
9
VERNON NORWOOD, Special Assistant 10
U.S. Attorney, Social Security 11
Administration (Richard S. 12
Hartunian, United States Attorney, 13
Northern District of New York, 14
Stephen P. Conte, Regional Chief 15
Counsel, Social Security 16
Administration, on the brief), New 17
York, NY for Defendant-Appellee. 18
19
Catherine M. Callery, Louise M. 20
Tarantino, Empire Justice Center, 21
Rochester, NY, for Amicus Curiae 22
Empire Justice Center. 23
24
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge: 25
Plaintiff-Appellant Loretta Vincent appeals from an order of 26
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New 27
York (Victor E. Bianchini, Magistrate Judge) that reduced by two- 28
thirds the attorney’s fee award she requested for successfully 29
appealing from the administrative denial of her application for 30
disability benefits. The district court, attributing gaps in the 31
administrative record to Vincent’s counsel, concluded that this 32
alleged deficiency constituted “special circumstances” justifying 33

-- 2 of 22 --

3
a reduction in the attorney’s fees awarded under the Equal Access 1
to Justice Act. We hold that the failure of a claimant’s 2
attorney to develop the administrative record on issues 3
collateral to the disability determination does not constitute a 4
“special circumstance” warranting a reduction in attorney’s fees. 5
We also hold that the district court abused its discretion in 6
reducing the fee award based on its sua sponte critique of 7
counsel’s billing records and its conclusion that the time billed 8
was excessive because no novel issues were raised. 9
BACKGROUND 10
Attorney Mark Schneider represented Vincent in her 11
successful appeal from the administrative denial of her claim for 12
disability benefits. His efforts at getting paid for those 13
services have been less successful. After ruling in Vincent’s 14
favor on the merits, the district court chided Schneider for 15
apparent deficiencies in his representation and awarded only one- 16
third of the amount requested in Vincent’s motion for attorney’s 17
fees. Vincent now appeals from that order. 18
Vincent applied to the Social Security Administration for 19
disability insurance benefits on November 23, 2005. After an 20
initial denial, Vincent requested a hearing and appeared before 21
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) J. Lawson Brown, who rejected 22
the application on December 20, 2007. On August 21, 2008, the 23
Social Security Appeals Council (“Appeals Council”) denied 24

-- 3 of 22 --

4
Vincent’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision a final 1
order of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). 2
On September 9, 2008, Vincent filed a complaint in the district 3
court challenging the Commissioner’s final order. Schneider 4
represented Vincent at every step of this process. 5
Vincent based her benefits application on a claim that a 6
work-related back injury had rendered her unable to work as of 7
August 2, 2004. To determine whether or not Vincent was disabled 8
as defined by the Social Security Act, the ALJ engaged in the 9
five-step sequential analysis prescribed by regulations. See 20 10
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In finding her not to be disabled, 11
the ALJ put significant weight on his negative assessment of 12
Vincent’s credibility. While acknowledging that Vincent’s 13
“medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected 14
to produce the alleged symptoms,” the ALJ found that her 15
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 16
effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible.” Vincent’s 17
disability report listed ten years of full-time factory 18
employment from 1994 to 2004, but her earnings records reflected 19
less than three years of work in that period. Vincent’s 20
statements to the Social Security Administration therefore 21
suggested, according to the ALJ, “that she tends to exaggerate.” 22
The ALJ’s review of Vincent’s medical records, including a 23
doctor’s recommendation, unheeded by Vincent, that she attend 24

-- 4 of 22 --

5
physical therapy or a “back school” program, further “call[ed] 1
into question [Vincent’s] credibility.” The ALJ also observed 2
that Vincent’s assertion of having been enrolled in special 3
education through tenth grade was not “corroborated by the 4
records” of the school district, which was unable to locate any 5
special education records in Vincent’s name. Having discounted 6
Vincent’s own account of her impairment based on these 7
credibility concerns, the ALJ concluded that she had the residual 8
functional capacity to perform light work and was not disabled. 9
The Appeals Council denied review. 10
On March 30, 2010, the district court reversed and remanded 11
because the ALJ failed to develop the record as to several 12
issues. First, the ALJ could not rely on Vincent’s alleged 13
noncompliance with prescribed treatment as a basis for denying 14
benefits, or even for an adverse credibility finding, without 15
allowing her to explain why she did not follow any such 16
treatment. The ALJ also erred by relying, without further 17
inquiry, on the apparent exaggeration in Vincent’s work history 18
(which could have resulted from a data entry error) and on the 19
absence of corroboration for Vincent’s special education history 20
(which may have been attributable to the use of Vincent’s married 21
name in the records request). Finally, the district court found 22
that the ALJ should have considered the effect of Vincent’s 23
obesity in assessing whether she was disabled. In light of these 24

-- 5 of 22 --

6
gaps in the record, the district court remanded for further 1
administrative proceedings. 2
The district court did not limit its criticisms to the ALJ, 3
however. It also blamed Schneider, who represented Vincent at 4
the administrative hearing: “the underdeveloped issues clearly 5
could have, and should have, been addressed by [Vincent’s] 6
counsel at the administrative stage” as part of his “ethical 7
obligation to act with reasonable diligence.” Once the ALJ had 8
denied Vincent’s applications, Schneider again faltered – in the 9
district court’s view – by waiving the filing of a brief when he 10
requested Appeals Council review. Questioning whether 11
Schneider’s alleged lapses constituted “a strategic and 12
deliberate choice,” the district court anticipated examining his 13
conduct further when Schneider applied for attorney’s fees. 14
On April 27, 2010, Vincent moved the district court for an 15
award of $8,272.00 in attorney’s fees. Vincent sought fees for 16
47 hours of Schneider’s time: 24.1 hours spent working on the 17
appeal to the district court; 13.9 hours on the fee petition and 18
brief; and 9.0 hours on the reply brief and affidavit for the fee 19
petition. In a May 24, 2010 order, the district court granted 20
the motion in part and denied it in part, reducing the requested 21
fee award by two-thirds based on a number of purported 22
deficiencies. The district court held that Schneider’s failure 23
to develop the record constituted “special circumstances” that, 24

-- 6 of 22 --

7
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, would render a full award 1
“unjust.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). In addition, the district 2
court viewed the length of time Schneider billed for preparing 3
the fee application as “clearly excessive and unreasonable.” The 4
district court also expressed concern that Schneider’s billing 5
records provided only “conclusory explanations” for “several 6
lengthy increments of time” and improperly intermingled legal and 7
clerical tasks. To account for these flaws, the district court 8
awarded only $2,757.33 in attorney’s fees, one-third of the 9
amount requested. Vincent now appeals from this order. 10
DISCUSSION 11
The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) provides that “a 12
court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other 13
expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other 14
than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial 15
review of agency action, brought by or against the United States 16
. . . unless the court finds that the position of the United 17
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances 18
make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). It is 19
undisputed that Vincent prevailed before the district court and 20
that the position of the United States was not substantially 21
justified. In assessing Vincent’s entitlement to fees, however, 22
the district court concluded that the deficiencies referred to 23
above were “special circumstances” justifying a substantial 24

-- 7 of 22 --

8
reduction in the fees awarded. Our review of that decision “is 1
narrow; we will only reverse if we find the court abused its 2
discretion.” United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 43 F.3d 769, 3
772 (2d Cir. 1994). A district court abuses its discretion “when 4
(1) its decision rests on an error of law (such as application of 5
the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual 6
finding, or (2) its decision – though not necessarily the product 7
of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding – cannot 8
be located within the range of permissible decisions.” In re 9
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2005) 10
(quoting Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 11
2001)). 12
Vincent argues that the district court abused its discretion 13
in denying the full amount of fees requested in her motion. She 14
contends that Schneider’s representation was not deficient and 15
therefore cannot constitute “special circumstances” rendering a 16
full award unjust. She further argues that the time billed on 17
the fee application was appropriate because a novel issue was 18
raised, and that the district court, by evaluating the billing 19
entries sua sponte, improperly denied Schneider the opportunity 20
to respond to its concerns. The Commissioner responds that the 21
district court acted within its discretion and asks us to affirm. 22
I. 23
The EAJA’s “special circumstances” exception is a “safety 24
valve” that gives “the court discretion to deny awards where 25

-- 8 of 22 --

9
equitable considerations dictate an award should not be made.” 1
Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 422-23 (2004) (quoting 2
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 11 (1980)). The contours of that 3
safety valve are indistinct. The Second Circuit has spoken only 4
twice in published opinions to the question of what constitutes 5
“special circumstances [that] make an award unjust,” and in 6
neither case did it address whether – or to what extent – 7
deficiencies in counsel’s performance may justify a denial or 8
reduction in EAJA fees. See Oguachuba v. INS, 706 F.2d 93 (2d 9
Cir. 1983); United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 43 F.3d 769 (2d 10
Cir. 1994). With those decisions as our baseline, we must decide 11
whether the district court abused its discretion in applying the 12
“special circumstances” exception in this case. 13
In Oguachuba, we affirmed the district court’s denial of 14
attorney’s fees under the EAJA where the petitioner’s own 15
conceded history of repeated and flagrant misconduct caused the 16
improper incarceration that he successfully challenged. John 17
Oguachuba, a Nigerian citizen, was granted a writ of habeas 18
corpus based on a violation by the Immigration and Naturalization 19
Service (“INS”) of a statutory six-month limit on the detention 20
of any alien under final order of deportation. Oguachuba, 706 21
F.2d at 96. Oguachuba then sought attorney’s fees under the EAJA 22
as the prevailing party in that action. Id. at 96-97. 23
Oguachuba’s history of misconduct was little short of 24
extraordinary: after overstaying a student visa, Oguachuba 25

-- 9 of 22 --

10
repeatedly flouted a deportation order by lying to INS officials, 1
fleeing INS custody, delaying the procurement of travel documents 2
from the Nigerian consulate, and flying back to New York 3
immediately after having been deported to Nigeria. Id. at 94-96. 4
Oguachuba’s incarceration exceeded the six-month limit only 5
because the “recalcitrance of Nigerian officials” prevented INS 6
officials from obtaining the travel documents necessary to re- 7
deport him. Id. at 96. We held that “Oguachuba’s extraordinary 8
persistence in evading the lawful efforts of the INS to deport 9
him to Nigeria, his flagrant contempt for United States law and 10
the fact that his own decision not to acquiesce in deportation 11
caused his incarceration constitute the ‘special circumstances’ 12
which make it inequitable to award him attorneys’ fees under the 13
EAJA.” Id. at 94. 14
We have also affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees under 15
the EAJA for a party who played an only marginal role in the 16
litigation. The attorney’s fees requested in 27.09 Acres of Land 17
related to “a discrete early phase of the litigation” in which 18
the claimant “achieved nothing but its own intervention.” 43 19
F.3d at 771. The claimant’s “efforts in the later, productive 20
phase of the litigation were marginal, duplicative and 21
unnecessary because of the laboring oar taken by parties whose 22
fees are not recoverable under EAJA.” Id. Because “the claim of 23
the prevailing parties rest[ed] largely on a result to which the 24
claimant made no contribution,” we held that “[g]eneral equitable 25

-- 10 of 22 --

11
principles support the district court’s finding that an award of 1
fees would have been unjust.” Id. at 773-75. 2
A prevailing party can therefore be denied attorney’s fees 3
under the EAJA for “special circumstances” when his own 4
misconduct created the circumstances that led to the litigation, 5
see Oguachaba, 706 F.2d at 94, and when that party’s 6
contributions to the litigation’s success were “marginal, 7
duplicative and unnecessary,” see 27.09 Acres, 43 F.3d at 771. 8
These two examples of “special circumstances,” while 9
illustrative, do not define the exception. Indeed, if the 10
“special circumstances” exception is to function as an equitable 11
“safety valve,” its contours can emerge only on a case-by-case 12
basis. 13
When the exception is invoked in the context of the adequacy 14
of counsel’s representation, however, we think greater clarity is 15
needed if only because counsel must know the parameters of their 16
responsibilities. The EAJA’s fee-shifting provision is meant to 17
reduce the “economic deterrents to contesting governmental 18
action” and “the disparity between the resources and expertise of 19
. . . individuals and their government.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, 20
at 5-6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4984. The 21
EAJA provides access to justice by encouraging access to counsel, 22
which not only ensures “the thoughtful presentation and 23
consideration of opposing views,” but also assists the government 24
in “refining and formulating public policy.” Id. at 10, 25

-- 11 of 22 --

12
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988. That goal is not 1
advanced if an indeterminate standard is applied to reduce or 2
deny a fee award based on alleged deficiencies in representation. 3
“[I]t is common sense that increasing the risk that an attorney 4
will not receive a fee award will inevitably decrease the 5
willingness of attorneys to undertake representation in these 6
kinds of cases.” Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2531 (2010) 7
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 8
Clarity is of heightened importance in the context of Social 9
Security appeals, which predominate among the cases in which EAJA 10
awards are made. Social Security adjudications represent a 11
unique variant from the traditional model of adversarial 12
litigation. “Social Security disability determinations are 13
investigatory, or inquisitorial, rather than adversarial.” Moran 14
v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 15
marks omitted). The duty of the ALJ, unlike that of a judge at 16
trial, is to “investigate and develop the facts and develop the 17
arguments both for and against the granting of benefits.” Butts 18
v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Seavey v. 19
Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001)), reh’g granted in part 20
and denied in part, 416 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2005). Still, counsel 21
is not relieved of the duty to provide competent representation, 22
including the obligation “to assist the claimant in bringing to 23
[the ALJ’s] attention everything that shows that the claimant is 24
disabled.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(1). Because of the ALJ’s 25

-- 12 of 22 --

13
duty to investigate, if counsel’s entitlement to fees is 1
questioned due to an undeveloped record, it must be clear that 2
counsel bore primary responsibility for those deficiencies before 3
the fee recovery is reduced. That was the case in Bryant v. 4
Apfel, 37 F. Supp. 2d 210, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), in which EAJA 5
fees were denied to a prevailing plaintiff whose attorney’s 6
failure to “seek or produce critical medical records from the 7
period of plaintiff’s claimed disability . . . made it impossible 8
to determine whether plaintiff was, in fact, entitled to 9
disability benefits.” 10
Those are not, however, the facts in this case. The 11
district court purports to follow Bryant, but in reality goes 12
beyond it. Unlike counsel in Bryant, Schneider fulfilled his 13
obligation to present evidence establishing Vincent’s disability. 14
The denial of benefits at the administrative level was based not 15
on the absence of such evidence, but upon the ALJ’s refusal to 16
credit it. The deficiencies in the record that the district 17
court cited all relate to the ALJ’s negative assessment of 18
Vincent’s credibility. In the circumstances of this case, in 19
which the ALJ gave Vincent no notice of his credibility concerns, 20
it was the ALJ’s responsibility to develop the facts related to 21
this collateral issue. For example, the ALJ cited Vincent’s 22
noncompliance with treatment recommendations without having 23
raised the issue at the hearing or otherwise allowing Vincent to 24
address it. The ALJ also relied on the discrepancy between 25

-- 13 of 22 --

14
Vincent’s earnings record – which showed less than three years of 1
employment – and a form she submitted listing ten years’ full- 2
time factory employment as evidence of her tendency to 3
exaggerate. Again, however, the ALJ never questioned Vincent 4
about the inconsistency or flagged it as a potential credibility 5
concern. 6
The district court erred in concluding that Schneider shared 7
responsibility with the ALJ for these omissions. In the district 8
court’s view, Schneider should have identified the discrepancy in 9
Vincent’s work history and preemptively addressed it, and also 10
should have developed the record to explain Vincent’s 11
noncompliance with treatment recommendations. The district court 12
demanded too much of counsel. If we endorsed the district 13
court’s position, counsel would have to anticipate and refute all 14
conceivable credibility issues to be assured recovery of 15
attorney’s fees after prevailing on appeal. This is not, nor 16
should it be, the bar against which representation in Social 17
Security matters is assessed for purposes of awarding EAJA fees. 18
Although refuting potential credibility questions before they 19
arise and without notice as to their potential significance may 20
be an effective strategy, it could also generate unnecessary 21
costs in a context where efficiency and economy are at a premium. 22
Counsel’s failure to anticipate collateral issues thus cannot 23
constitute “special circumstances” justifying a denial or 24
reduction in attorney’s fees on appeal. The equitable “special 25

-- 14 of 22 --

15
circumstances” exception, which applies only when an attorney’s 1
fee award would be “unjust,” is not so broad. Where a plaintiff 2
prevails in a Social Security appeal by winning remand to fill 3
gaps in the record, “special circumstances” do not justify a 4
reduction in or denial of attorney’s fees if plaintiff’s counsel 5
does not reasonably bear responsibility for the evidentiary 6
deficit. 7
The district court’s approach does not accord with the 8
realities of representation in the Social Security disability 9
context. The limited resources of clients and legal service 10
providers demand that counsel act with expediency. It would be 11
unreasonable to insist that counsel pursue issues collateral to 12
the medical disability determination without any notice from the 13
ALJ that such issues are likely material to the outcome. This is 14
particularly true in light of the ALJ’s independent duty to 15
develop the record. 16
The deficits in the record caused by the ALJ’s failure to 17
investigate and to notify counsel of his concerns are 18
illustrative. Schneider explained in an affidavit that the 19
report that erroneously listed Vincent’s ten-year work history 20
was prepared by a Social Security Administration employee, not 21
Vincent, and therefore could not have been probative of her 22
credibility. Schneider therefore had no reason, absent notice 23
from the ALJ, to devote any resources to addressing what appeared 24
to be a nonexistent credibility issue. 25

-- 15 of 22 --

16
The district court further faulted Schneider for declining 1
to submit a brief to the Appeals Council. Granting an unreduced 2
attorney’s fee award would, in the district court’s view, 3
effectively reward Schneider for “saving” his arguments for the 4
district court. However, the decision not to file a brief before 5
the Appeals Council fell well within Schneider’s tactical 6
discretion. The regulations “permit - but do not require - the 7
filing of a brief with the Council (even when the Council grants 8
review).” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000); see also 20 9
C.F.R. § 404.975 (“Upon request, the Appeals Council shall give 10
you and all other parties a reasonable opportunity to file briefs 11
or other written statements about the facts and law relevant to 12
the case.”). The Supreme Court held in Sims that Social Security 13
claimants “who exhaust administrative remedies need not also 14
exhaust issues in a request for review by the Appeals Council in 15
order to preserve judicial review of those issues.” 530 U.S. at 16
112. The Supreme Court declined to impose an exhaustion 17
requirement due to the non-adversarial nature of Social Security 18
proceedings and appeals, in which “[t]he Council, not the 19
claimant, has primary responsibility for identifying and 20
developing the issues.” Id. Given that neither the regulations 21
nor the exhaustion rules require the filing of a brief before the 22
Appeals Council, the decision not to do so is not a “special 23
circumstance” making a full award of attorney’s fees unjust. 24
25

-- 16 of 22 --

17
Counsel representing Social Security claimants cannot be 1
penalized with a reduction in attorney’s fees for failing to 2
address issues collateral to the disability determination as to 3
which counsel had no notice. Thus, responsibility for the gaps 4
in Vincent’s administrative record fell exclusively on the ALJ. 5
Schneider’s representation was in no way deficient; to the 6
contrary, it appears to have been more than adequate. The 7
district court therefore abused its discretion in concluding that 8
“special circumstances” warranted a reduction in the EAJA award 9
in this case. 10
II. 11
The district court cited two other reasons to justify its 12
sharp reduction in the attorney’s fee award: the length of time 13
Schneider billed for the application for attorney’s fees, and the 14
quality of Schneider’s billing records. Nearly half of the 47 15
hours that Schneider billed were for his work on the EAJA fee 16
motion and reply, a figure the district court concluded was 17
“clearly excessive and unreasonable.” The district court also 18
criticized Schneider’s billing entries, which it felt were 19
insufficiently detailed and appeared to merge clerical tasks with 20
legal ones. 21
The district court enjoys broad discretion in determining 22
the amount of a fee award. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 23
424, 437 (1983). Such discretion “is appropriate in view of the 24
district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the 25

-- 17 of 22 --

18
desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what 1
essentially are factual matters.” Id.; see also Comm’r, INS v. 2
Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990) (applying Hensley standard to EAJA 3
fee determination once party has met EAJA’s eligibility 4
requirements). When “the documentation of hours is inadequate,” 5
the district court “may reduce the award accordingly” but must 6
“provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the 7
fee award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437. 8
Although we respect the district court’s ample discretion to 9
reduce a fee award, deference is not warranted when the reduction 10
rests on an erroneous premise. Vincent justified the 22.9 hours 11
Schneider billed for the EAJA application and reply as 12
necessitated by the novelty of the district court’s construction 13
of the “special circumstances” exception. The district court, by 14
contrast, found that Vincent’s case “did not involve issues of a 15
particularly novel or complex nature.” Vincent is correct that 16
this case presented a novel question; indeed, we have not 17
identified any precedents in which EAJA fees were reduced under 18
comparable reasoning. It is therefore unsurprising that the EAJA 19
briefing here would demand more attention and time than a 20
standard fee application. Furthermore, by rebuking Schneider in 21
the remand order, which preceded Vincent’s fee motion, the 22
district court alerted Schneider that it viewed his entitlement 23
to fees with skepticism. That alone made this an atypical EAJA 24
application, one that required Schneider to concentrate more 25

-- 18 of 22 --

19
effort than usual in convincing the district court that he had 1
earned the fees requested. The district court therefore appears 2
to have underappreciated the degree of effort warranted by the 3
EAJA motion. 4
We also question the district court’s sua sponte decision to 5
address the quality of Schneider’s billing records without 6
allowing him to respond to its concerns. The district court 7
noted with disapproval that Schneider accounted for lengthy 8
increments of time with cursory explanations such as “Research, 9
draft brief,” making it difficult to assess the appropriateness 10
of the time spent. According to the district court, Schneider 11
also improperly billed for clerical tasks like “index record,” 12
and combined clerical and legal tasks in single entries without 13
differentiating the two. The Commissioner never raised the issue 14
of inadequate records; his opposition to Vincent’s EAJA motion 15
was based only on “special circumstances” and the allegedly 16
excessive hours billed on the EAJA application. Schneider first 17
learned of the district court’s record-keeping concerns only when 18
he was penalized for them in the EAJA fee order. Had Schneider 19
been given the opportunity to address these concerns, he likely 20
could have answered them, at least in part. For example, he has 21
now explained that “index record” is not a clerical task, but 22
refers to his review of the record for facts supporting his 23
client’s claim. 24
25

-- 19 of 22 --

1 We decline Vincent’s invitation to adopt the Third Circuit’s 1
rule that “a court may not reduce counsel fees sua sponte as 2
‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’ in the absence 3
of a sufficiently specific objection to the amount of fees 4
requested.” United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 211 5
(3d Cir. 2000). The problem here was not that the district court 6
raised the issue sua sponte, but that it did so without giving 7
counsel prior notice of its concerns. 8
20
Although we do not agree with Vincent’s contention that an 1
evidentiary hearing was required here, the district court erred 2
in depriving Schneider of the opportunity to respond to its 3
criticisms. An evidentiary hearing may be necessary “if it is 4
evident that the material facts necessary [to determine the fee 5
award] are genuinely in dispute and cannot be resolved from the 6
record.” Farbotko v. Clinton Cnty., 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 7
2005) (quoting Crescent Publ’g Group, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 8
Inc., 246 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 2001)). The evidentiary hearing 9
in Farbotko was necessary to determine that district’s 10
“prevailing market rate,” a factual question that required “an 11
evaluation of evidence proffered by the parties.” Id. Because 12
the only factual questions here relate to the interpretation of 13
Schneider’s billing records, the need for an evidentiary hearing 14
is unlikely. Before relying on the perceived billing flaws as a 15
basis for reducing the attorney’s fee award, however, the 16
district court should have given Schneider notice of its concerns 17
and allowed the attorney to address them. 1 That way, the 18
district court would have been the first to assess Schneider’s 19
explanation of his billing practices, which is appropriate given 20

-- 20 of 22 --

21
its greater familiarity with the context in which the legal work 1
was performed. 2
III. 3
For the foregoing reasons, we cannot affirm the district 4
court’s fee reduction; neither can we conclude, however, that 5
Schneider is due the full award requested. After giving 6
Schneider an opportunity to address the billing record issues, 7
the district court may award the fees in full, or it may still 8
conclude that excessive or inadequate billing warrants some 9
reduction. While there are no “special circumstances” that would 10
render a full fee award unjust, the district court continues to 11
have the discretion to adjust the fee award if there are valid 12
reasons for doing so. We therefore remand for further 13
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 14
We note that this is the second time in as many years we 15
have reversed an EAJA fee order by this magistrate judge reducing 16
or denying fees requested for Schneider’s work. See Burger v. 17
Astrue, 363 F. App’x 73 (2d Cir. 2010). In Burger, as in the 18
present case, we rejected the district court’s assessment that 19
Schneider bore responsibility for failing to develop the record. 20
When circumstances “might reasonably cause an objective observer 21
to question [the judge’s] impartiality,” we have the power to 22
remand a case to a different judge. Pescatore v. Pan Am. World 23
Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United 24
States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 25

-- 21 of 22 --

22
(per curiam)) (alteration in original). We believe it would be 1
prudent to do so here. We therefore order that on remand this 2
matter be transferred to a different judge. 3
CONCLUSION 4
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 5
court is REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with 6
this opinion, with instructions to assign the case to a different 7
judge. 8

-- 22 of 22 --