The Honorable Donald C. Pogue, of the United States Court of International Trade,… v. Gonzales UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2 August Term, 2006 3

* The Honorable Donald C. Pogue, of the United States Court
of International Trade, sitting by designation.
**The Court was informed on the eve of the scheduled oral
argument that Mr. Schurr was, for ample reason, unable to attend.
At the time of the scheduled argument, the respondents presented
06-0804
Chambers v. Gonzales
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
August Term, 2006 3
(Submitted: April 25, 2007 Decided: July 13, 2007 4
Amended: July 17, 2007 5
Errata Filed: July 30, 2007) 6
Docket No. 06-0804-ag 7
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Michelle A. Chambers, 9
Petitioner, 10
- v - 11
Office of Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Alberto 12
R. Gonzales, United States Attorney General, 13
Respondents. 14
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Before: McLAUGHLIN, SACK, Circuit Judges, and POGUE, Judge.*
16
Judge Pogue dissents in a separate opinion. 17
Petition for review of a decision by the Board of 18
Immigration Appeals ordering removal on the grounds that the 19
petitioner knowingly assisted the attempted entry of an illegal 20
alien. 21
Petition denied. 22
Victor Schurr, Pelham, NY, for 23
Petitioner.**
24

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no substantive argument. We then took this case under submission
on the express understanding that if any one of the three members
of the panel was of the view that oral argument would likely be
helpful, the panel would reconvene to hear it. Upon further
consideration, no member of the panel has asked for such oral
argument.
2
Ari Nazarov, Trial Attorney, Office of 1
Immigration Litigation, United States 2
Department of Justice (Peter D. Keisler, 3
Assistant Attorney General, and Alison 4
M. Igoe, Senior Litigation Counsel, on 5
the brief), Washington, DC, for 6
Respondents. 7
SACK, Circuit Judge: 8
Michelle Chambers, a Jamaican native, petitions for 9
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") 10
ordering her removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). In 11
re Michelle A. Chambers, No. A 56 034 092 (B.I.A. Jan. 24, 2006), 12
aff'g No. A 56 034 092 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Aug. 26, 2004). She 13
contends that the BIA erred in finding that she knowingly 14
assisted her former boyfriend's attempted illegal entry into the 15
United States and that irrespective of whether she knew he could 16
not legally enter the United States, her actions were 17
insufficient to constitute an affirmative act of assistance 18
within the meaning of the statute. We disagree and therefore 19
deny the petition. 20
BACKGROUND 21
Chambers was, at all relevant times, a lawful permanent 22
resident of the United States residing in Hempstead, Long Island, 23
New York. In February 2003, she traveled by automobile with her 24
brother, a United States citizen, to Ontario, Canada, to visit 25

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3
relatives. In 1990, her former boyfriend, Christopher Woolcock, 1
a resident of Jamaica, had been deported by the United States 2
after being convicted of a drug-related felony. He was also in 3
Ontario at the time of Chambers's visit, allegedly to attend his 4
uncle's wedding. Prior to Chambers's and Woolcock's trips to 5
Ontario, they agreed during the course of a telephone 6
conversation to meet there and return together to the United 7
States. 8
On February 23, 2003, with Chambers's brother driving, 9
she, her brother, and Woolcock traveled from Ontario headed for 10
the United States in an automobile with Georgia license plates. 11
Chambers was in the front passenger seat and Woolcock was in the 12
back seat. At the border crossing, Chambers's brother handed 13
United States customs officials his passport, his sister's travel 14
documents, and a green card issued in Woolcock's name. Because 15
the customs database revealed that Woolcock had previously been 16
deported, the three were referred to immigration offices for 17
further examination. 18
During subsequent questioning by an immigration 19
inspector, Chambers repeatedly said that Woolcock lived in Long 20
Island and that he had traveled to Canada with her and her 21
brother. She also denied having Woolcock's passport. Moments 22
later, however, she retrieved it from underneath a seat cushion 23
in the area where she had been waiting to be interviewed. 24
Following her interview, Chambers gave a sworn statement to the 25
inspector in which she admitted (1) lying about Woolcock's 26

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1 Woolcock, as an alien deported for commission of an
aggravated felony, is permanently ineligible to gain entry. See
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
4
residence; (2) having previously agreed with Woolcock to 1
accompany him at the Canadian border as he tried to enter the 2
United States; (3) that prior to that conversation, "[h]e was 3
going to come some other way through Kennedy airport"; (4) that 4
she thought Woolcock had last been in the United States seven 5
years before; (5) that she was aware he had been deported 6
previously; and (6) that Woolcock was planning to stay with her 7
at her home upon entering the United States. 8
Chambers was charged with knowingly aiding or assisting 9
the illegal entry of another alien under 8 U.S.C. 10
§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), and given a notice to appear at removal 11
proceedings. That removal hearing was held before Immigration 12
Judge ("IJ") Philip J. Montante, Jr., on August 26, 2004. 13
Chambers testified that she thought Woolcock was permitted to 14
enter the United States because he had shown her a green card 15
(with his "much younger" picture on it) and had told her that an 16
immigration officer at the time of his deportation in 1990 had 17
informed him that he could return to the United States after ten 18
years.1 She again admitted having lied to immigration officers 19
both when she told them that Woolcock was a Long Island resident 20
and when she said that she did not know the whereabouts of 21
Woolcock's passport. And she admitted that she had also lied 22
when she told the immigration inspector during her interview that 23

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2 There is no indication that Chambers received compensation
for assisting Woolcock's attempted entry into the United States.
5
Woolcock was going to live with her when they returned to Long 1
Island. In fact, Chambers testified, he was to live with his 2
mother. 3
Chambers explained her misstatements by saying she was 4
frightened because she had been told she would be deported. 5
Asked on cross-examination why she had never decided to visit her 6
family in Canada until the weekend that Woolcock was also in 7
Canada, Chambers answered, "Well, we just decided."2
8
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ issued an oral 9
decision concluding that Chambers had knowingly aided the illegal 10
entry of another alien. The IJ noted Chambers's several 11
misstatements at the Canadian border and found that "she lied to 12
the Court today." In re Michelle A Chambers, A 56 034 092, at 9. 13
Relying on these misstatements and Chambers's sworn statement 14
that she and Woolcock had planned the trip across the border, the 15
IJ concluded that Chambers knew that Woolcock could not legally 16
enter the United States and that her actions "were an attempt to 17
induce and to encourage" Woolcock's illegal entry. Id. at 9-13. 18
The IJ also noted that he perceived Chambers's testimony that 19
Woolcock told her that he could reenter the United States ten 20
years after his deportation to be inconsistent with Chambers's 21
statement to the immigration inspector that Woolcock was last in 22
the United States seven years prior to the 2003 incident at the 23
border. Id. at 11 ("Well, if he had been in the United States 24

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6
seven years ago, doesn't that fly in the face of her statement 1
that [Woolcock] told her allegedly that he could return after 10 2
years and here it was seven years ago that he was in the United 3
States."). 4
On January 24, 2006, the BIA affirmed in a short 5
opinion that closely followed the IJ's reasoning. First, the BIA 6
determined that "if [Chambers] believed that Mr. Woolcock could 7
only reenter the United States after having been absent for 10 8
years after his deportation, [Chambers] would have had knowledge 9
that Mr. Woolcock would not have been able to reenter the United 10
States after the passage of only 7 years." In re Michelle A. 11
Chambers, A 56 034 092, at 2. Second, it concluded that in light 12
of Chambers's numerous admitted and deliberate misrepresentations 13
to customs officials at the border, the IJ did not err in finding 14
Chambers's testimony at the hearing incredible or in "finding 15
that her deception at the border reflected guilty knowledge." 16
Id. 17
Chambers petitions for review. 18
DISCUSSION 19
I. Standard of Review 20
"Since the BIA affirmed the IJ's order in a 'brief 21
opinion [that] closely tracks the IJ's reasoning,' and since our 22
conclusion is the same regardless of which decision we review, 23
'we will consider both the IJ's and the BIA's opinions.'" Lewis 24
v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Wangchuck 25

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3 Aliens such as Chambers who have achieved lawful permanent
resident status in the United States are regarded as seeking
admission to the United States if they have "engaged in illegal
activity after having departed the United States." 8 U.S.C.
7
v. Dep't of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006)) 1
(brackets in original). 2
We review the IJ's and BIA's factual findings for 3
substantial evidence, and we consider questions of law and 4
applications of law to fact de novo. Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 5
F.3d 297, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2003). The BIA's findings of fact "are 6
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled 7
to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The 8
petitioner's knowledge at the time in question is a question of 9
fact. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994); 10
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996); see 11
also Locurto v. Guliani, 447 F.3d 159, 177 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006) 12
("[T]he defendants' intent is a factual question . . . ."). 13
II. Chambers Acted Knowingly 14
Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Immigration and 15
Naturalization Act provides that an alien is not admissible into 16
the United States if he or she "at any time knowingly has 17
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien 18
to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of the 19
law." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).3 Chambers argues that the 20

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§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) ("An alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking
an admission into the United States for purposes of the
immigration laws unless the alien . . . (iii) has engaged in
illegal activity after having departed the United States.").
8
circumstances surrounding her stop at the border compel the 1
conclusion that she did not act "knowingly." Specifically, she 2
contends that her behavior was consistent with the acts of 3
someone who thought she was participating in a legal act: her 4
brother readily handed over Woolcock's green card to the customs 5
officer; no subterfuge in the form of fraudulent documents or 6
hidden compartments was used; and Chambers complied with all of 7
the various officers' requests. She argues further that her 8
misstatements were not only immaterial to the charge of aiding 9
illegal alien entry, but also were later recanted. 10
But Chambers does not contest that she lied at the 11
border regarding Woolcock's residency and the whereabouts of his 12
passport. The nature of these misstatements plainly supports the 13
inference drawn by the IJ and the BIA that Chambers knew Woolcock 14
could not legally enter the United States. For example, her 15
statements that Woolcock lived in Long Island and drove with her 16
and her brother to Canada could reasonably be construed as an 17
attempt by Chambers to convince officials that Woolcock then 18
resided in the United States lawfully. Such an inference would 19
in turn support the corollary inference that Chambers wanted 20

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9
border officials to think Woolcock was a legal resident of the 1
United States because she knew he would otherwise not be 2
permitted to enter in light of his immigration status. These 3
inferences, taken together with Chambers's admissions that she 4
and Woolcock planned the means and method of his return to the 5
United States and that she knew that he had been deported 6
previously, constitute substantial evidence to support the IJ's 7
and BIA's findings that Chambers acted knowingly to assist 8
Woolcock's attempted illegal entry. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 9
F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) ("So long as there is a basis in the 10
evidence for a challenged inference, we do not question whether a 11
different inference was available or more likely."); see also id. 12
("[W]e will reject a deduction made by an IJ only when there is a 13
complete absence of probative facts to support it . . . ."). 14
To be sure, the IJ and BIA appear to have ascribed 15
misplaced significance to the fact that Chambers professed to 16
believe both that Woolcock had been in the United States within 17
the past seven years and that an immigration officer had told 18
Woolcock he could reenter after ten years. These two assertions 19
are not inherently contradictory. Assuming that Chambers had 20
believed Woolcock's assertion that he could reenter the United 21
States ten years after his deportation in 1990, nothing about the 22
statement would compel Chambers to think that the ten-year clock 23

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10
restarted each time Woolcock entered the United States, as the IJ 1
and BIA seemed to believe. Nevertheless, neither the IJ nor the 2
BIA relied solely -- or, in the case of the IJ, substantially -- 3
on this reasoning in finding that Chambers knowingly assisted 4
Woolcock's attempted illegal entry. Instead, each expressly and 5
additionally relied on Chambers's repeated misstatements and the 6
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. We therefore conclude 7
that the record contains substantial evidence in support of the 8
agency's finding that Chambers acted with the requisite knowledge 9
and that, were we to remand, the agency would reach the same 10
result even absent the likely error that we have identified. See 11
Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401 (2d Cir. 12
2005) ("Certainly if the IJ explicitly adopts an alternative and 13
sufficient basis for her determination, no remand is required."); 14
see also Siewe, 480 F.3d at 166-67; Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 15
129, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2006). 16
III. Chambers's Actions Are Sufficient to Constitute 17
Assistance Under Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) 18
19
As an alternative basis for granting her petition, 20
Chambers argues that her actions do not as a matter of law rise 21
to the requisite affirmative assistance that § 212(a)(6)(E)(i) 22
requires. In support, she cites cases in which divided panels of 23
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that the anti-smuggling 24

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11
statute requires an affirmative act of assistance or 1
encouragement beyond either "openly presenting an alien to border 2
officials with accurate identification and citizenship papers," 3
Tapucu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 736, 737 (6th Cir. 2005), or "mere 4
presence in [a] vehicle with knowledge of [a] plan" to smuggle an 5
alien into the United States, Altamirano v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 6
586, 596 (9th Cir. 2005). 7
Our Circuit has yet to set forth anything approaching a 8
bright-line test as to the nature of the actions that will or 9
will not suffice to support a finding that an alien has 10
"encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided" another in 11
illegally entering the United States. 8 U.S.C. 12
§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). We need not do so here. Chambers did not 13
present agents at the border with accurate information, as did 14
the petitioner in Tapucu, and she was not "mere[ly] presen[t] in 15
the vehicle" in which her brother drove Woolcock across the 16
border like the petitioner in Altamirano. She does not qualify 17
as an innocent bystander on any reading of the facts. The fact 18
that no fraudulent documents were used and no payments by 19
Woolcock were made does not overcome the ample evidence to 20
support the IJ's and BIA's findings that Chambers personally 21
arranged to provide transportation for Woolcock into the United 22
States and purposefully deceived customs officials at the time of 23

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12
his attempted entry. Chambers traveled to Canada with the pre- 1
planned intent to bring Woolcock across the border in her car 2
upon her return, and she actively sought to mislead customs 3
officials about Woolcock's residency status in a way that, if 4
believed, would have made it easier for him to enter the United 5
States. There is thus sufficient evidence from which the IJ and 6
the BIA could conclude that she assisted, abetted, or aided 7
Woolcock in his attempt illegally to enter the United States. 8
Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) requires no more. 9
CONCLUSION 10
For the foregoing reasons, Chambers's petition for 11
review is denied. 12

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