Al Saidi v. Blanche

21-6589
Al Saidi v. Blanche
In the
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

A
UGUST TERM 2025
No. 21-6589

Y
AHYA AMEEN MUSLEH AL SAIDI,
Petitioner,

v.

T
ODD BLANCHE,
A
CTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

A
RGUED: OCTOBER 27, 2025
D
ECIDED: AUGUST 3, 2026

Before: C
ABRANES, PARK, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.
Yahya Al Saidi was ordered removed from the country because
of a conviction for first-degree assault. He challenges the denial of his
application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against
Torture. He argues that the immigration judge erred in dismissing his
application for lack of corroboration. The Board of Immigration

2
Appeals decided that Al Saidi forfeited his challenge to the dismissal
for lack of corroboration because he challenged only a purported
adverse credibility finding. We conclude that the BIA did not abuse
its discretion by deciding that the argument was forfeited. We hold
that an immigration judge does not need to make an adverse
credibility finding before requiring corroboration. The immigration
judge may require corroboration whenever it would be reasonably
expected to be available and would be helpful to his consideration of
the case. Accordingly, the lack of corroboration was an independent
basis for denying the relief of deferral of removal under the
Convention Against Torture. We further conclude that the decision of
the agency was supported by substantial evidence. We deny the
petition for review.

S
TEVEN HASKOS (Craig Relles, on the brief), Relles Law,
PLLC, White Plains, NY, for Petitioner.

J
OHN F. STANTON, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation (Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division; Jessica E. Burns, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, on
the brief), United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, for Respondent.

M
ENASHI, Circuit Judge:
Yahya Ameen Musleh Al Saidi petitions for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that affirmed
the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) to deny his application for
deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
See In re Al Saidi, No. A-055-782-570 (BIA Oct. 15, 2021), aff’g No. A-

3
055-782-570 (Immigr. Ct. Fishkill Apr. 20, 2021). He argues that (1) the
IJ erred by relying on “trivial” inconsistencies in his testimony to
make an adverse credibility finding and (2) the erroneous adverse
credibility finding led the IJ to deny his claim for lack of
corroboration. The BIA decided that Al Saidi failed to challenge the
IJ’s decision to require corroboration in his administrative appeal.
According to the BIA, the IJ required corroboration based on the
quality of Al Saidi’s testimony without making an adverse credibility
finding. Because Al Saidi offered no argument that the IJ improperly
required corroboration, the BIA considered that issue forfeited.
1

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by
deciding that the argument was forfeited. An immigration judge does
not need to make an adverse credibility finding before requiring
corroboration. The immigration judge may require corroboration
whenever it would be reasonably expected to be available and would
be helpful to his consideration of the case. Accordingly, the lack of
corroboration was an independent basis for denying the relief of
deferral of removal under the CAT. We further conclude that the
decision of the agency was supported by substantial evidence. We
deny the petition for review.

1
The BIA described the forfeiture as a “waiver,” but while those terms “are
often used interchangeably,” the term “[w]aiver is best reserved for a
litigant’s intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is
more appropriate when a litigant’s action or inaction is deemed to incur the
consequence of loss of a right, or a defense.” Kaplan v. Bank Saderat PLC, 77
F.4th 110, 117 n.10 (2d Cir. 2023) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).

4
BACKGROUND
During Yahya Al Saidi’s childhood, his family began to feud
with the rival Balwi family that had sought to control his home city of
Ibb, Yemen. See Cert. Admin. R. 237-38, 261. His life changed in two
ways around 2010. First, he married his wife Diana, who gave birth
to a daughter. Second, the conflict with the Balwis took on a new
dimension. According to Al Saidi, one of the elder Balwi sons, Alaw
Balwi, sought to align his family with the Houthis, a political-military
movement that planned a takeover of Yemen. Al Saidi objected to
Alaw Balwi’s “criminal behavior around our childrens and our
women,” explaining that “we don’t like ... the ideas of ... robbing
people and killing people and terrorizing people” and that the Balwis
should “take it outside the neighborhood.” Id. at 137.
Following this objection, according to Al Saidi, Alaw Balwi
started a campaign of persecution against him. Al Saidi hid in his
house for months and when he exited he disguised himself in
women’s clothing. See id. at 187. No member of the Al Saidi family
suffered harm from the Balwis during this time. See id. at 166-67.
Eventually, Al Saidi left Yemen for the United States, which he
could do because Diana is an American citizen. See id. at 508 (noting
his IR-1 visa). In November 2012, he arrived in New York, where he
was joined by Diana, their children, and his adoptive parents, the
Al Zandanis.
But the family rivalry followed him. In June 2014, Al Saidi and
his adoptive brother Bassam Al Zandani were confronted by the
father and brother of Alaw Balwi while “walking home at night” in
Yonkers. Id. at 139. In the ensuing altercation, Al Saidi stabbed the two
Balwis with a box cutter. See id. at 138-39, 176. He was convicted of

5
first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and first-degree gang
assault and is serving a fifteen-year sentence.
I
Following Al Saidi’s conviction, the Department of Homeland
Security initiated removal proceedings. If an alien is convicted of a
“particularly serious crime,” he is ineligible for asylum, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), statutory withholding of removal, id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), and withholding of removal under the CAT,
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2)(i). Al Saidi does not dispute that he was
convicted of an “aggravated felony crime of violence” and therefore
of a particularly serious crime. Cert. Admin. R. 47; see 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1158(b)(2)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Yet an alien who
has committed a particularly serious crime may still seek deferral of
removal under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). “[U]nder
regulations implementing the CAT,” removal will be “deferred if the
applicant establishes that ‘it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”
Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2)).
In support of his application for that relief, Al Saidi alleged that
he would likely be tortured if he were returned to Yemen. He claimed
that the Balwi family is determined to exact revenge on him for
opposing Alaw Balwi’s alliance with the Houthis and for the 2014
assault. Although the Balwis do not govern Ibb, Al Saidi explained
that the Houthis rule 80 percent of the population of Yemen and have
established checkpoints throughout the country. Al Saidi argued that
the Houthis would locate him and turn him over to the Balwis. The
Balwis would then subject him to torture without hope of protection
from the government.

6
The testimony at the hearing reflected this theory but was often
vague and inconsistent. Al Saidi testified, for example, that Yemeni
custom allows a family to pay off a revenge-seeker to avoid harm. The
IJ asked whether anyone tried to settle his dispute with the Balwis. Al
Saidi named a family member, Abdullah, and then added that some
other neighbors also tried to settle the dispute. The IJ asked: “why
don’t you just tell me everybody who tried to settle the dispute.
Abdullah, who else?” Cert. Admin. R. 169. Al Saidi responded that
Hamud Balwi also tried, but no one else had. Yet Al Saidi had
submitted an affidavit stating that his friend Nageeb Ghaleb had
recently tried to settle the dispute. At the hearing, Al Saidi attempted
to explain the inconsistency by stating that although Ghaleb is “a close
friend to us,” Al Saidi had not asked him to settle the dispute. Id. at
190.
Other witness testimony reflected inconsistencies. One relative
of Al Saidi said in a sworn statement that she had “heard from the
females of the Balwi family that they were upset and affected” by the
rivalry. Id. at 406. But she later testified that she had never met any
Balwi women, and she explained that her statement was based on
secondhand hearsay. See id. at 210-12. Another relative wrote that he
“heard on the street that Balwi’s family ... wanted Yahya to shed
blood in revenge for what happened in the United States,” id. at 403,
but he later testified that he heard the threat directly from Alaw Balwi
at a wedding, see id. at 228-29. And Al Saidi’s adoptive brother Bassam
Al Zandani wrote that there was a warrant for Al Saidi’s arrest in
Yemen, but he later testified that he had no firsthand knowledge of a
warrant and did not know the original source of that information. See
id. at 263-64, 378.
At the hearing, the IJ asked Al Saidi why his other family
members did not testify or submit affidavits. His wife, sister, and

7
adoptive father live in the United States, and the IJ heard that Al Saidi
had communicated with his wife the previous night and had spoken
with his sister within the preceding few months. Al Saidi responded
that while his wife would know about the threats from the Balwis in
Yemen and about the assault in 2014, she did not testify because she
could not speak English and his lawyer said she would “come back
to her if she need[ed] anything from her.” Id. at 191. Al Saidi did not
explain the absence of his sister and adoptive father, nor did he
request time to obtain a statement from his wife or permission for her
to attend the hearing virtually. The government observed in
summation that “there’s no testimony or affidavits from key
witnesses, such as the respondent’s wife, who lived with him in
Yemen in 2011 to 2012, and who he said knew about the problems
there,” and such as “the respondent’s stepfather, as we’re referring to
the person who raised him, who should also have a great deal of
knowledge about both the scope of the feud between the families and
the scope of the efforts to resolve this feud between the families
without any blood being shed.” Id. at 270-71.
II
The IJ denied Al Saidi’s application for relief on two
independent grounds. First, the IJ noted his “concerns as to the
quality of the testimony provided and the credibility of the
witnesses.” Id. at 49. He identified inconsistencies in the testimony
and explained that, apart from the inconsistencies, the testimony was
vague and based on layers of hearsay. See id. at 49-56. The IJ did not
make an adverse credibility finding but said that he “finds it
necessary for [Al Saidi] to corroborate his application with all
reasonably available information.” Id. at 56-57. He said that “there
was reasonably available evidence to [Al Saidi] that was not provided
to the Court.” Id. at 57. Al Saidi’s wife, sister, and adoptive father were

8
in the United States and could have testified “about what happened
to [Al Saidi] in Yemen” and “the threats that the Balwi family
purportedly is making to [Al Saidi] from Yemen.” Id. Because Al Saidi
“failed to provide sufficiently persuasive testimony and failed to
sufficiently corroborate his application,” the IJ denied his application.
Id. at 58.
Second, the IJ denied the application on the merits. He
determined that Al Saidi had “not established that each [step] in his
hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to occur.” Id. at
63; see Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-18 (AG 2006) (denying
an application for CAT relief because “[t]he evidence does not
establish that any step in this hypothetical chain of events is more
likely than not to happen, let alone that the entire chain will come
together to result in the probability of torture of respondent”). The IJ
reasoned that any threat from the Balwis might no longer be serious,
given the vague testimony about the threat; that even if it were
serious, it might be resolved monetarily; that even if the Balwis or the
Houthis looked for him, he might not be located; and that even if the
Houthis intercepted him, Al Saidi had “not established that all of the
200,000 to 300,000 Houthi members or that a majority of them have
knowledge of the promise between the Balwi family and [Al Saidi].”
Cert. Admin. R. 63. So “even if the Court were to accept as true that
the Houthis control ports in Yemen and that they have established
checkpoints in Yemen, [Al Saidi] has not demonstrated it is more
likely than not that should [Al Saidi] find himself at a Houthi
checkpoint that the Houthi member at that checkpoint will have
sufficient knowledge of the dispute between [Al Saidi] and the Balwi
family, which would result in that Houthi member turning [Al Saidi]
over to the custody of the Balwi family.” Id. Indeed, Al Saidi “testified

9
he has not received any direct threats from the Balwi family or from
the Houthis since leaving Yemen in 2012.” Id. at 62.
The IJ separately determined that Al Saidi had “not
satisfactorily demonstrated that internal relocation is impossible,”
meaning that Al Saidi could live in a part of Yemen that the Houthis
do not control, as one in five Yemenis does. Id. An alien’s “ability to
relocate internally means that he cannot establish a likelihood of
torture.” Singh, 11 F.4th at 118; see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (providing
that when “assessing whether it is more likely than not that an
applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal,” the
agency considers “[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a
part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be
tortured”).
III
Al Saidi raised two arguments on appeal to the BIA. First, he
argued that the IJ erred “because the adverse credibility
determination is based principally on perceived rather than actual
discrepancies.” Cert. Admin. R. 17 (capitalization omitted). He said
that the inconsistencies on which the IJ relied were “trivial” and
“improperly perceived,” id. at 17-21, and that there was “nothing
inherently implausible” about the testimony, id. at 21. Al Saidi told
the BIA that “[r]emand is therefore necessary” for the IJ to “render a
new credibility decision, and to independently assess the credibility
of the supporting witnesses, and whether corroborating evidence is
needed in light of the Respondent’s credible testimony.” Id. at 22.
Second, Al Saidi argued that he met his burden to establish eligibility
for relief under the CAT because “the uncontroverted evidence
reveals that the Houthi-affiliated Balwi family intends to kill
Respondent if he is returned to Yemen.” Id. at 23.

10
The BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning and decided to “adopt
and affirm his decision.” Id. at 4 (citing Matter of Burbano,
20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994)). The BIA recounted that the IJ
“highlighted significant concerns regarding the credibility of the
testimony of the respondent and his witnesses based on internal
inconsistencies and omissions.” Id. It explained that “[i]n light of these
inconsistencies, the Immigration Judge found that it was necessary for
the respondent to provide reasonably available corroboration in
support of his claim,” including “testimony from his wife, sister, and
stepfather, each of whom were in the United States at the time of the
hearing and had knowledge of the respondent’s fear of returning to
Yemen.” Id. The BIA observed that the Immigration and Nationality
Act “permits an Immigration Judge to require an applicant to provide
evidence to corroborate otherwise credible testimony, unless the
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain
the evidence.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B)). In his appeal to the
BIA, however, Al Saidi offered “no argument regarding the need for
corroboration or the availability of additional evidence,” so the BIA
concluded that “he has waived any challenge” to the “determination”
of the IJ that corroboration was required. Id. (citing Matter of R-A-M-,
25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012)).
The BIA further agreed with the IJ that the “claim for CAT
protection relied on the occurrence of a series of hypothetical events”
and concluded that the IJ “did not clearly err in finding that the
respondent did not prove that it was more likely than not that he
would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official.” Id. (citing Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 586, 590 (BIA
2015)). The BIA also said that it was not clearly erroneous for the IJ to
conclude that “that Houthis control 80 percent of Yemen” but do not

11
“have count[r]ywide control or operate with absolute impunity.” Id.
at 5. Al Saidi timely filed a petition for review in this court.
DISCUSSION
“When the BIA issues an opinion, the opinion becomes the
basis for judicial review of the decision of which the alien is
complaining.” Singh v. Bondi, 139 F.4th 189, 196 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting
Bhagtana v. Garland, 93 F.4th 592, 593 (2d Cir. 2023)). But when, as in
this case, “the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements the
IJ’s decision, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the
BIA.” Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006). “Our
review of the IJ’s decision includes the portions not explicitly
discussed by the BIA, but not those grounds explicitly rejected by the
BIA.” Malets v. Garland, 66 F.4th 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2023) (alteration
omitted) (quoting Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir.
2018)).
Congress has specified that “t he administrative findings of fact
are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, we
review the agency’s decision for “substantial evidence” and “must
defer to the factfinder’s findings based on ‘such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “The scope
of review ‘under the substantial evidence standard is exceedingly
narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless the petitioner
demonstrates that the record evidence was so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find him eligible for relief.’” Singh,
11 F.4th at 113 (quoting Mu Xiang Lin v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir.
2005)).

12
The Supreme Court has clarified that Ҥ 1252(b)(4)(B) requires
courts to review the entirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the
underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those
findings—for substantial evidence.” Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S.
537, 545 (2026). Thus, while we have previously applied a different
standard when reviewing the application of law to fact,
2
we now
apply the substantial evidence standard not only to “the underlying
factual findings” but also to “the agency’s application of the statute to
those findings.” Urias-Orellana, 607 U.S. at 544.

2
See, e.g., Sufiyan v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2026) (reviewing “the
application of law to facts anew, without deferring to the reasoning of the
BIA”); Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2025) (holding that
“the appropriate standard of review” for a “hardship determination” under
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) “is for clear error”); Reid v. Bondi, 132 F.4th 109,
121 (2d Cir. 2024) ( stating that we review “the application of law to facts”
de novo) (quoting Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2022)); Ud Din v.
Garland, 72 F.4th 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2023) ( stating that “we review de
novo ... the application of law to facts”) (quoting Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d
316, 326 (2d Cir. 2020)); Mendis v. Filip, 554 F.3d 335, 338 (2d Cir. 2009)
(stating that we “review de novo ... the application of law to fact”) (quoting
Passi v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2008)); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420
F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e review de novo the IJ’s determination of
mixed questions of law and fact, as well as ... the IJ’s application of law to
facts.”); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]f the issue
on appeal involves the proper application of legal principles to the facts and
circumstances of the individual case at hand, our review has been de novo.”);
Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen the situation
presented is the BIA’s application of legal principles to undisputed facts,
rather than its underlying determination of those facts or its interpretation
of its governing statutes, ‘our review of the BIA’s asylum and withholding
of deportation determinations is de novo.’”) (quoting Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d
1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995)).

13
We have not previously identified the standard by which we
review the determination of the BIA that a petitioner’s claim has been
waived or forfeited. See Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 118 n.2 (2d
Cir. 2007) (noting that “this Court has not determined a standard of
review of the BIA’s procedural determination that a claim before the
BIA has been waived”). Because in this case we must apply a standard
of review, we hold that we review a BIA determination of waiver or
forfeiture for abuse of discretion.
Under the applicable regulations, the BIA “may summarily
dismiss any appeal or portion of any appeal in any case in which,”
among other circumstances, “[t]he party concerned fails to specify the
reasons for the appeal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A) (emphasis
added). To avoid summary dismissal, “[t]he party taking the appeal
must identify the reasons for the appeal,” “must specifically identify
the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, or both, that are being
challenged,” and “must identify the specific factual and legal finding
or findings that are being challenged.” Id. § 1003.3(b).
The Supreme Court “has repeatedly observed” that “the word
‘may’ clearly connotes discretion.” Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6, 13
(2024) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Our court
has also recognized that “may” indicates that the relevant “officials
have discretion.” Garcia v. Heath, 74 F.4th 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2023). We
therefore agree with the Third Circuit that because the BIA “may
determine when to summarily dismiss an appeal for lack of specificity
and when the BIA is sufficiently appraised of the appealable issues to
entertain the appeal,” the proper standard is to “review such
dismissals for abuse of discretion.” Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282,
288 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

14
omitted). Other circuits have reached similar conclusions.
3
Abuse of
discretion is the appropriate standard even when the BIA says that it
has dismissed an applicant’s claim because it “found his claim
‘waived,’ and not ‘summarily dismissed.’” Uddin, 870 F.3d at 288.
Even if the BIA “may not have used the magic words ‘summarily
dismiss,’ it was clearly unable to address [the] claim because it could
not discern [the applicant’s] grievance with the IJ’s CAT ruling, and
it dismissed the claim on those grounds.” Id.
Bearing in mind these standards of review, we proceed to
consider the agency’s dismissal of Al Saidi’s application for CAT
relief based on (1) the failure to provide corroboration and (2) the
failure to establish a likelihood of torture.
I
The IJ denied Al Saidi’s application for deferral of removal
under the CAT for failure to present reasonably available
corroborating evidence. The BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ by
adopting the determination of the IJ that corroboration was required
and by concluding that Al Saidi forfeited any challenge to that
determination. Al Saidi argues that the BIA erred in doing so. In his
view, the determination that corroboration was required relied on a
finding that the hearing testimony was incredible without

3
See Esponda v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because
the regulation at issue here indicates that the BIA ‘may’ summarily dismiss
an appeal, it vests discretion in the BIA. Thus, we review the BIA’s
application of the regulation to summarily dismiss the [petitioners’] appeal
for abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted); Singh v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1006,
1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The regulation at issue here states that the BIA ‘may’
summarily dismiss an appeal for failure to state specific reasons or file a
promised brief. ... Accordingly, we will not reverse a dismissal under [the
regulation] unless the Board has abused its discretion.”) (citation omitted).

15
corroboration because of the purported inconsistencies. Because Al
Saidi argued to the BIA that the IJ should have found the testimony
credible, he claims that he raised a challenge to the determination that
corroboration was required. And he argues that the determination
itself was erroneous.
We disagree. We conclude that the agency did not abuse its
discretion by treating a challenge to the corroboration requirement as
forfeited. Moreover, even if Al Saidi had not forfeited a challenge to
the corroboration requirement, we would conclude that the agency
did not abuse its discretion by requiring corroboration.
A
Before the BIA, Al Saidi argued that the inconsistencies the IJ
identified were too “trivial” to justify an adverse credibility finding.
Cert. Admin. R. 17. He inferred that the IJ made an adverse credibility
finding because, in his view, corroboration may be required only
when the testimony is incredible without corroboration. But that
premise is incorrect. The IJ neither made nor needed to make an
adverse credibility finding before requiring corroboration. Instead,
the IJ expressed “concerns as to the quality of the testimony provided
and the credibility of the witnesses” before concluding that he “finds
it is necessary for [Al Saidi] to corroborate his application with all
reasonably available information.” Id. at 49, 56-57. In reaching that
conclusion, the IJ relied on precedent of the BIA holding that
“regardless of whether an applicant is deemed credible, he still has
the burden to corroborate the material elements of his claim where
evidence is reasonably available.” Id. at 57 (citing Matter of L-A-C-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 518-19 (BIA 2015)).
Whether the inconsistencies provided a sufficient basis for an
adverse credibility finding is a different question from whether, given

16
the IJ’s concerns about the testimony, he was entitled to require
corroboration. “Credibility and corroboration are distinct but related
issues discussed in separate provisions of the INA and require
separate analysis.” Matter of G-C-I-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 176, 180 (BIA 2025).
For that reason, “credibility and corroboration are distinct principles
in this Circuit’s immigration jurisprudence.” Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575
F.3d 193, 198 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has also
recognized that “the INA expressly distinguishes between credibility,
persuasiveness, and the burden of proof,” so even when the agency
“treats an alien’s evidence as credible, the agency need not find his
evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof.”
Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 371 (2021).
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “the
immigration judge will determine whether or not the testimony is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the applicant has satisfied the applicant’s burden of
proof.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). It
addresses credibility by providing that “the immigration judge may
base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or
responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility
of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the
applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements,” and other
inconsistencies, “inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” Id.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(C); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). It addresses
corroboration by separately providing that “[w]here the immigration
judge determines that the applicant should provide evidence which
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be
provided unless the applicant demonstrates that the applicant does
not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(B). These separate authorities of the IJ—to make an

17
adverse credibility finding and to require corroboration—each aid the
IJ in deciding whether the applicant has met his “burden.” Id.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(B); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
We have previously recognized that the INA “affords
factfinders considerable flexibility in requiring corroborating
evidence, even for credible testimony.” Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137,
149 n.11 (2d Cir. 2020). The statute authorizes the IJ to determine that
the applicant should provide corroborating evidence. Once the IJ
makes that determination, the “evidence must be provided” subject
only to a sufficient demonstration by the applicant that “the applicant
does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the
evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (emphasis added); id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
The IJ, like any rational factfinder, might require corroborating
evidence for reasons aside from incredible testimony. “An IJ who
finds an applicant’s testimony credible may still decide that the
testimony falls short of satisfying the applicant’s burden of proof,
either because it is unpersuasive or because it did not include specific
facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee,” so he
might “require evidence to corroborate otherwise credible
testimony.” Pinel-Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523, 529-30 (2d Cir. 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ might determine that “it is
reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts
pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim,” so “[t]he absence
of such [expected] corroborating evidence can lead to a finding
that an applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof.” Matter of S-
M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725-26 (BIA 1997). The IJ “may not be able to
decide sufficiency of evidence until all the evidence has been
presented,” so he might require corroborating evidence. Chuilu Liu,
575 F.3d at 198. The IJ might require corroborating evidence in order

18
to decide whether the testimony is credible: “[T]here must be sufficient
information in the record to judge the plausibility and accuracy of the
applicant’s claim. Without background information against which to
judge the alien’s testimony, it may well be difficult to evaluate the
credibility of the testimony.” Matter of Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124
(BIA 1989). As a result, “corroborative background evidence that
establishes a plausible context for the persecution claim (or an
explanation for the absence of such evidence) may well be essential.”
Id. at 125. And, of course, “corroboration may be found to fill an
evidentiary gap created when testimony is unspecific or otherwise
unpersuasive on its own.” Matter of G-C-I-, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 181.
To be sure, we have said that “[a]n applicant’s failure to
corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the
absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to
rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”
Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). But that means
that a failure of corroboration may support an adverse credibility
finding. It does not mean that the only circumstance in which an IJ
may require corroboration is when he has already made an adverse
credibility finding. To the contrary, we and other courts have
recognized that “an applicant may be generally credible but his
testimony may not be sufficient to carry the burden of persuading the
fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of crucial facts if he fails to put
forth corroboration that should be readily available.” Wei Sun v.
Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018). As a result, “the agency is
entitled to require reasonably available corroborating evidence even
for credible testimony.” Moller v. Garland, No. 21-6564, 2024 WL
2747253, at *2 (2d Cir. May 29, 2024). Thus, “an immigration judge
exercises ‘substantial leeway to demand corroboration of an asylum
applicant’s allegations whether or not the judge finds the applicant

19
credible.’” Raghunathan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2009)).
“Only if such evidence is beyond the reasonable ability of the
immigrant to obtain is the judge precluded from demanding
corroboration.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 618. An IJ need not even
provide a “continuance for the applicant to obtain that evidence prior
to rendering a decision on the application,” Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 29;
see also Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 198 n.6, because the corroboration
requirement reflects the fact that “the alien bears the ultimate burden
of introducing such evidence without prompting from the IJ,” Chuilu
Liu, 575 F.3d at 198; see also Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he REAL ID Act clearly states that corroborative
evidence may be required, placing immigrants on notice of the
consequences for failing to provide corroborative evidence.”).
We have not previously needed to decide “whether the IJ’s
decision to require corroboration is a legal or discretionary
determination.” Pinel-Gomez, 52 F.4th at 530. We conclude here that it
is discretionary because the INA authorizes the IJ to determine that
the applicant has met his burden of proof without corroboration, but
it also authorizes the IJ to “determine[] that the applicant should
provide evidence which corroborates otherwise credible testimony.”
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The IJ may make such
a determination subject to a single statutory limitation: “Only if such
evidence is beyond the reasonable ability of the immigrant to obtain
is the judge precluded from demanding corroboration.” Krishnapillai,
563 F.3d at 618 (emphasis added). And the INA expressly directs that
“[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with
respect to the availability of corroborating evidence, as described in
section 1158(b)(1)(B), 1229a(c)(4)(B), or 1231(b)(3)(C) of this title,
unless the court finds, pursuant to subsection (b)(4)(B), that a

20
reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating
evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (emphasis added); see
also Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 197-98 (“[W]e review with substantial
deference an IJ’s determination that corroborating evidence was
reasonably available to the applicant.”). That statutory framework
creates a range of circumstances under which the IJ has the discretion
to require corroboration. Cf. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 524
(explaining that § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) “was intended to codify Matter of
S-M-J- and not to impose additional rigid requirements for the
consideration of corroboration”).
4

An IJ does not abuse his discretion when he requires
corroborating evidence in the absence of an adverse credibility

4
We have also recognized that the IJ must explain “why it is reasonable
under the BIA’s standards to expect such corroboration.” Manning v. Barr,
954 F.3d 477, 485 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Diallo, 232 F.3d at 290). The
obligation to follow the precedents of the BIA reflects the regulatory
requirement that the published decisions of the BIA and of the Attorney
General “serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or
issues.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(2). “It is a familiar rule of administrative law
that an agency must abide by its own regulations.” United States v. Kahn, 5
F.4th 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2021) (Menashi, J., dissenting) (quoting Fort Stewart
Schs. v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 654 (1990)). As a result, “the Board’s
interpretation of the immigration law, when set forth in a published Board
decision, remains an authoritative statement of the law unless modified or
overruled by the Attorney General.” Matter of E-L-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 814,
825 (BIA 2005). The BIA may revise its precedents but in doing so it must
show “that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better.” FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasis omitted); see also
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011). That the agency may constrain
its own discretion by regulation or precedent, however, does not alter the
conclusion that the agency has a range of discretion to require
corroboration.

21
finding. Indeed, an adverse credibility finding by itself would be a
sufficient ground for denying an application for immigration relief.
See, e.g., Xue Hong Yang v. DOJ, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). If
corroboration could not be required unless the IJ had already made
an adverse credibility finding, then the requirement to provide
corroborating evidence would never contribute to the IJ’s
determination of “whether the applicant has met [his] burden.”
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Corroboration would
become relevant only after the IJ had already determined that the
applicant failed to satisfy his burden, and its function would be only
to rehabilitate an insufficient evidentiary showing. Cf. Chuilu Liu, 575
F.3d at 199 (noting that an alien might provide an “explanation for the
failure to provide such corroborating evidence, either in a motion to
reopen or on appeal to the BIA”). That approach conflicts with a fair
reading of the INA and with the recognition that the IJ has
“substantial leeway to demand corroboration.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d
at 618.
In this case, the IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding
before he determined that corroborating evidence was required. An
IJ may require corroboration “where it is reasonable to expect
corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the
specifics of an applicant’s claim,” Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at
725, and that was the basis of the IJ’s decision to require corroboration
here. If it were true that Al Saidi lived under such a severe threat that
he spent nine months hiding from the Balwi family disguised in
women’s clothing, it would be reasonable to expect his wife to testify
to that experience. And if the Balwis then chased him all the way to
Yonkers, it would be reasonable to expect his wife or his adoptive
father—with whom he lived in Yonkers, see Cert. Admin. R. 128-29—
to corroborate that threat too. In a prior case in which an applicant

22
failed to corroborate facts material to his claim of persecution, the BIA
said that “[w]e do not find it unreasonable to expect some type of
corroboration from the sister in the form of a letter or affidavit,
especially given her frequent contact with the respondent.” Matter of
M-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1183 (BIA 1998). When requiring
corroboration in this case, the IJ followed a similar rationale.
B
Understanding the basis of the corroboration requirement
allows us to evaluate whether the BIA abused its own discretion by
concluding that Al Saidi forfeited any challenge to that requirement
on appeal. See Cert. Admin. R. 4 (“On appeal, the respondent makes
no argument regarding the need for corroboration or the availability
of the additional evidence.”). We conclude that it did not.
To establish that the IJ abused his discretion by requiring
corroboration, Al Saidi needed to demonstrate that he “does not have
the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(B); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), or that it was
“[un]reasonable under the BIA’s standards to expect such
corroboration,” Manning, 954 F.3d at 485. He needed to make such an
argument with at least as much specificity as would be required to
preserve an issue for review on appeal to this court.
5

5
The parties have “cited no authority, and we are aware of none,
suggesting that the specificity required of an alien to raise sufficiently an
issue for review by the BIA is any more lenient than the specificity required
of an alien to preserve an issue for review by this Court. To so conclude
would create, moreover, the anomalous situation where the BIA would be
forced to consider a claim that this Court, absent that consideration by the
BIA, would be barred from reviewing.” Steevenez, 476 F.3d at 118 n.2.

23
Al Saidi argued to the BIA that inconsistencies in the testimony
did not justify an adverse credibility finding, but that argument did
not address whether the IJ abused his discretion in requiring
corroboration. The IJ had explained that Al Saidi’s “wife is not only
here in the United States, she is in the state of New York in the Bronx,”
and even though Al Saidi “confirmed that his wife has knowledge
about what happened to [him] in Yemen and has knowledge about
the threats that the Balwi family purportedly is making to [him] from
Yemen,” she “was not offered as a witness to testify and ... offers no
affidavit to the Court.” Cert. Admin. R. 57. The IJ had further
explained that Al Saidi’s adoptive father “also has personal
knowledge as to the basis of [Al Saidi’s] fear of returning to Yemen,”
“had property that was affected by the Balwi family in Yemen,” and
“is also in New York and could have provided testimony or an
affidavit to the Court” but “did not do so.” Id. And the IJ had observed
that Al Saidi “has a sibling in California,” and he “spoke to his
sister ... a few months ago,” but “no affidavit or testimony were
tendered.” Id.
On appeal to the BIA, Al Saidi made no argument that the IJ
erred in his determination (1) that corroborating evidence from Al
Saidi’s relatives was “reasonably available,” (2) that Al Saidi failed to
provide that evidence or adequately explain its absence, or (3) that a
precedent of the BIA denied the IJ the discretion to require
corroboration under these circumstances. Id. He stated only that
remand was “necessary” for “a new credibility decision” and, based
on that new decision, there would be further consideration of
“whether corroborating evidence is needed in light of Respondent’s
credible testimony.” Id. at 22. The BIA did not abuse its discretion
when it decided that Al Saidi had forfeited “any challenge” to the IJ’s

24
requirement of corroboration because he offered no argument that the
IJ lacked the discretion to impose the requirement. Id. at 4.
When our court evaluates a petition for review, “‘[w]e consider
abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s
brief,’ and an appellant’s failure to make ‘legal or factual arguments’
constitutes abandonment.” Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d
Cir. 2023) (quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.
1997)). The BIA has the discretion to apply a similar standard when
evaluating an appeal from the decision of an IJ. See supra note 5.
6

“[W]here the agency properly applies its own waiver rule and refuses
to consider the merits of an argument that was not raised before the
IJ, we will not permit an end run around those discretionary agency
procedures by addressing the argument for the first time in a petition
for judicial review.” Prabhudial v. Holder, 780 F.3d 553, 555 (2d Cir.
2015) (alteration omitted) (quoting Pinos-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d
436, 440 (8th Cir. 2008)).
C
The BIA adopted the decision of the IJ to deny the application
for relief under the CAT based on the failure to provide reasonably
available corroborating evidence. It is well established that the agency
may deny an application based on a lack of corroboration—at least
with respect to asylum and statutory withholding of removal as
opposed to withholding or deferral of removal under the CAT. See

6
Because the standard the BIA applied corresponds to what would be
“required of an alien to preserve an issue for review by this Court,”
Steevenez, 476 F.3d at 118 n.2, we need not decide whether the BIA may
impose a standard that is “tougher than the waiver standard in our court,”
Rangel-Fuentes v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1138, 1150 (10th Cir. 2025) (Hartz, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

25
Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28; Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 518-19. We
have frequently held that when an application for relief under the
CAT relies “on the same factual predicate” as an application for
asylum or statutory withholding of removal, the agency may deny all
relief based on the same lack of corroboration. De Qin Li v. Gonzales,
220 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Xue Hong Yang, 426 F.3d
at 523).
It might be argued, however, that an IJ cannot rely on a lack of
corroboration to deny an application for CAT relief to the same extent
as an application for other immigration relief. The INA authorizes the
IJ to require corroboration in the context of a removal proceeding, see
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B), and an asylum adjudication, see id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), and it clarifies that the asylum standards apply to
an application for statutory withholding of removal, see id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(C) (“[T]he trier of fact shall determine whether the alien
has sustained the alien’s burden of proof, and shall make credibility
determinations, in the manner described in ... section 1158(b)(1)(B)”).
By contrast, the INA does not address an application for relief under
the CAT. Such an application is governed by regulations that
implement the Convention Against Torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c).
Those regulations do not contain the same language as the statutes
explicitly authorizing the IJ to require corroboration.
Nevertheless, we conclude that an application for CAT relief
may be denied for lack of corroboration in the same manner as an
application for asylum or statutory withholding of removal.
7
“In

7
Accord Luziga v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2019) (“As with
asylum or withholding of removal, noncitizens seeking deferral of removal
[under the CAT] bear the burden of proof. ... [C]orroborating evidence may
be required when it is reasonable to expect it, such as for facts that are
central to a claim and easily verified.”) (internal quotation marks and

26
considering an application for withholding [or deferral] of removal
under the Convention Against Torture, the immigration judge shall
first determine whether the alien is more likely than not to be tortured
in the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4); id. § 1208.17(a).
During that adjudication, “[t]he burden of proof is on the
applicant ... to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”
Id. § 1208.16(c)(2). The regulations specify that “[t]he testimony of the
applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof
without corroboration.” Id.; see also id. § 208.16(c)(2). By expressly
providing that the testimony may be sufficient without corroboration,
the regulation acknowledges that the testimony may not be sufficient
without corroboration.
In other words, like the statutory provisions about
corroboration, the regulation “anticipates that corroboration will
generally be necessary to meet an applicant’s burden of proof.” Matter

alteration omitted); see also Bazile v. Garland, 76 F.4th 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2023)
(“Uncorroborated conjecture, without more, cannot carry the day on a
claim under the CAT.”); Cabrera-Ruiz v. Garland, 37 F.4th 395, 400 (7th Cir.
2022) (holding that an alien’s “showing is insufficient for him to receive
CAT relief” because one witness “did not have personal knowledge to
independently corroborate his torture claims” and the attestation of another
“does not corroborate [the alien’s] torture claim”); Gutierrez-Vargas v.
Garland, 42 F.4th 877, 883 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Although an applicant’s credible
testimony ‘may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without
corroboration,’ the IJ found that Gutierrez-Vargas’s testimony, even taken
as true, did not satisfy that burden. Gutierrez-Vargas has failed to
demonstrate any abuse of discretion in that ruling.”) (citation omitted)
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)); Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 938
(9th Cir. 2005) (approving the denial of a CAT claim when the IJ “found that
corroborating proof was ‘more than necessary here’” and “[c]orroborative
evidence in this case would have been readily available”).

27
of G-C-I-, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 180; see also Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28. An IJ
evaluating an application for CAT relief accordingly has the
discretion to decide that “where it is reasonable to expect
corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the
specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be provided.”
Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 725.
The language applicable to an application for CAT relief is
exactly the same as the parallel language applicable to an application
for statutory withholding of removal. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)
(CAT) (“The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient
to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.”), with id.
§ 1208.16(b) (statutory withholding of removal) (“The testimony of
the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of
proof without corroboration.”). And it is beyond dispute that when
an IJ adjudicates an application for withholding of removal, the IJ
may “determine[] that the applicant should provide evidence
that corroborates otherwise credible testimony.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); id. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (applying § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) to
statutory withholding of removal). The identical language in the CAT
regulation must have the same meaning. “[G]enerally, identical
words used in different parts of the same statute are presumed to
have the same meaning.” Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. 639, 643
(2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86
(2006)). The regulation would “not use the same words to accomplish
the opposite objective.” Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund v. ATF,
984 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2020).
The BIA has long held that the authority of an adjudicator to
require corroboration was a consequence of putting the burden of
proof on the alien seeking immigration relief: “Because the burden of

28
proof is on the alien, an applicant should provide supporting
evidence, both of general country conditions and of the specific facts
sought to be relied on by the applicant, where such evidence is
available.” Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 724. The BIA concluded
that “where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for
certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim,
such evidence should be provided.” Id. at 725.
At one point, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA and
adopted a rule that corroboration could be required only when there
has been an adverse credibility finding.
8
But Congress then amended
the INA with the REAL ID Act of 2005. Among other things, Congress
expressly authorized the IJ to require corroboration during a removal
proceeding or when adjudicating an application for asylum or
statutory withholding of removal.
9
Those amendments “overrode
these judge-made requirements” and restored the preexisting agency
discretion. Singh, 139 F.4th at 200 n.6. In particular, “the standards
concerning corroboration that Congress intended to codify were
those set forth by the Board in Matter of S-M-J-.” Matter of L-A-C-,
26 I. & N. Dec. at 519.
10

8
See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We reaffirm that an
alien’s testimony, if unrefuted and credible, direct and specific, is sufficient
to establish the facts testified without the need for any corroboration. To the
extent that decisions such as Matter of S-M-J- and Matter of M-D- establish a
corroboration requirement for credible testimony, they are disapproved.”).
9
See Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101, 119 Stat. 231, 303-04 (2005).
10
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 166 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 292 (“Congress anticipates that the standards in Matter of
S-M-J-, including the BIA’s conclusions on situations where corroborating
evidence is or is not required, will guide the BIA and the courts in
interpreting this clause.”).

29
While the INA does not address the standards by which the
agency adjudicates an application for CAT relief, the congressional
endorsement of Matter of S-M-J- further supports the conclusion that
the BIA was correct that an IJ has the discretion to require an alien to
provide corroboration in order to meet his burden of proof. With
respect to an application for CAT relief, “[t]he burden of proof is on
the applicant ... to establish that it is more likely than not that he or
she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The Third Circuit has explained
that “[a]s with asylum or [statutory] withholding of removal,
noncitizens seeking deferral of removal [under the CAT] bear the
burden of proof.” Luziga, 937 F.3d at 254. It follows that
“corroborating evidence may be required when it is reasonable to
expect it.” Id. at 255. We agree.
Because Al Saidi’s failure to provide reasonably available
corroborating evidence was a valid basis for denying an application
for relief under the CAT, the agency did not err by relying on that
ground for dismissal here. Nor, for the reasons described above, was
requiring corroboration an abuse of discretion in the first place.
II
The agency also did not err in denying Al Saidi’s application
for relief on the merits because he failed to establish a likelihood of
torture. As noted, an applicant for relief under the CAT bears the
burden “to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). When the applicant’s claim that he will be
tortured depends on a possible chain of future events, the “alien will
never be able to show that he faces a more likely than not chance of
torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be more likely than

30
not to occur.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 918 n.4). “It is the
likelihood of all necessary events coming together that must more
likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of events cannot be more
likely than its least likely link.” Id. (quoting Matter of J-F-F-,
23 I. & N. Dec. at 918 n.4).
In this case, the decision of the agency that Al Saidi failed to
meet his burden was supported by substantial evidence. See Nasrallah
v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 583-84 (2020) (identifying the standard of review
for “factual challenges to CAT orders” as “the substantial-evidence
standard”).
Al Saidi argues that if he returns to Yemen, the Houthis may
stop him at the airport or at an inland checkpoint, those Houthis may
know that the Balwi family of Ibb wants retribution from Al Saidi,
those Houthis will deliver Al Saidi to the Balwis in Ibb, and the Balwis
will not be satisfied with a new offer of payment or other satisfaction
but will subject Al Saidi to torture. It cannot be said that “any
reasonable adjudicator” evaluating the evidence that Al Saidi
presented “would be compelled to conclude” that these events are all
more likely than not to occur. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Majidi,
430 F.3d at 80 (explaining that to overcome the substantial evidence
standard, a petitioner “must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder
would be compelled to credit his testimony.”) (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang
v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2004)).
To the contrary, the agency relied on “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Majidi, 430 F.3d at 81 (quoting Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at
229). First, Al Saidi did not establish that the Houthis either could or

31
would track down a single person entering Yemen.
11
Neither he nor
his family members were harmed while in Yemen either before or
after 2014.
12
Al Saidi cannot “demonstrate[] that the record evidence
was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find him
eligible for relief.” Singh, 11 F.4th at 113 (quoting Mu Xiang Lin, 432
F.3d at 159).
Al Saidi does not challenge the determination of the IJ that he
had “not satisfactorily demonstrated that internal relocation is
impossible.” Cert. Admin. R. 62. The BIA adopted that determination
and decided that it was “not clearly erroneous” for the IJ to find “that
Houthis control 80 percent of Yemen” but do not “have count[r]ywide
control or operate with absolute impunity.” Id. at 5. Al Saidi’s “ability
to relocate internally means that he cannot establish a likelihood of
torture.” Singh, 11 F.4th at 118; see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).

11
Cf. Singh, 11 F.4th at 117 (holding that a petitioner could not overcome
the substantial evidence standard when the record “reflected that there is
no central countrywide registration system or nationwide police database
that members of [an opposition party] could use to track rivals”).
12
Cf. Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The absence
of any claims that members of her uncle’s family were persecuted after his
death, in conjunction with evidence that her own mother and daughters
continued to live in El Salvador after Melgar emigrated without harm, cuts
against her argument that she has a well-founded fear of persecution.”);
Singh, 11 F.4th at 117 (“As the IJ noted, there have been no recent reports of
persecution against members of the Akali Dal Mann anywhere in India and
Singh did not identify any.”); Shizhuang Dai v. Barr, 836 F. App’x 25, 27 (2d
Cir. 2020) (“The agency reasonably concluded that the record did not show
such a likelihood because Dai testified that he and his family had practiced
Christianity in China for years without suffering persecution.”).

32
CONCLUSION
The agency did not abuse its discretion by determining either
that corroborating evidence was required or that Al Saidi forfeited
any challenge to the corroboration requirement on appeal. The
agency did not err by denying his application for CAT relief based on
his failure to provide corroborating evidence. And the decision of the
agency that he failed to meet his burden to establish the likelihood of
torture was supported by substantial evidence. We deny the petition
for review.