In Re KOEHLER OBERKIRCH GMBH, fka Papierf- abrik August Koehler SE, fka… v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 1987 . The Court of International Trade permits…

N OTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
In Re KOEHLER OBERKIRCH GMBH, fka Papierf-
abrik August Koehler SE, fka Papierfabrik August
Koehler AG, KOEHLER PAPER SE,
Petitioners
______________________
2025-106
______________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States
Court of International Trade in No. 1:24-cv-00014, Judge
Gary S. Katzmann.
______________________
ON PETITION
______________________
Before D YK, CUNNINGHAM , and STARK, Circuit Judges.
CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judge.
O R D E R
The United States Court of International Trade may
order service on a defendant “at a place not within any ju-
dicial district of the United States” by means “not prohib-
ited by international agreement.” United States Court of
International Trade Rule (“CIT Rule”) 4(e)(3). Petitioners,
two foreign corporations, are subject to such an order, au-
thorizing the United States to effect service on them by de-
livering a copy of the complaint and summons to their
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IN RE KOEHLER OBERKIRCH GMBH 2
domestic counsel. In this petition for a writ of mandamus,
we are asked to decide whether that order clearly exceeds
the trial court’s authority. Because Petitioners have not
shown entitlement to relief, we deny the petition.
I.
“Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant, the procedural requirement of ser-
vice of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Cap. Int'l, Ltd.
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). The Court
of International Trade permits different ways of serving
process on a defendant depending on whether service will
be “within a judicial district of the United States” or “in a
Foreign Country.” CIT Rule 4(d), (e). As relevant here,
those rules authorize an individual or corporation to be
“served at a place not within any judicial district of the
United States” by “any internationally agreed means of
service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as
those authorized by the Hague Convention,” or “by other
means not prohibited by international agreement, as the
court orders.” CIT Rule 4(e); CIT Rule 4(g)(2).
In January 2024, the United States brought this action
alleging that Petitioners Koehler Oberkirch GmbH and
Koehler Paper SE, two German corporations that manufac-
ture and import lightweight thermal paper, owe approxi-
mately $200 million in unpaid antidumping duties. After
a failed attempt to comply with the Hague Convention
through service to a German court, which concluded that
the Hague Convention was inapplicable and requested
“that a request should be made through diplomatic chan-
nels,” Appx101 (translation) (emphasis omitted), the
United States moved the Court of International Trade to
authorize service through Petitioners’ counsel of record in
a related case. In August 2024, the court granted the mo-
tion, invoking its authority to order such service under CIT
Rules 4(e)(3) and 4(g). Petitioners now challenge that or-
der on mandamus.
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IN RE KOEHLER OBERKIRCH GMBH 3
II.
A writ of mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary
remedy” reserved for “exceptional circumstances.” Cheney
v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (citations
omitted). “In general, three conditions must be satisfied
for a writ to issue.” In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81). First,
petitioners must demonstrate a clear and indisputable
right to relief. Id. Second, “the petitioner[s] must have no
other adequate method of attaining the desired relief.” Id.
And third, “the court must be satisfied that the writ is ap-
propriate under the circumstances.” Id.
Petitioners have failed to satisfy that demanding
standard here. For one thing, Petitioners have an ade-
quate alternative means to challenge the trial court’s or-
der: They can wait until final resolution of the case and
raise their challenge on direct appeal. See In re Aputure
Imaging Indus. Co., Ltd., No. 2024-103, 2024 WL 302404,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2024); see also Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) (“[Mandamus] may not
appropriately be used merely as a substitute for the appeal
procedure prescribed by the statute.”). For another, we
cannot say that Petitioners have demonstrated that it is
indisputably clear that the trial court exceeded its author-
ity in granting the government’s motion here.
Far from it. Petitioners’ primary contention—that ser-
vice through domestic counsel is not authorized by CIT
Rule 4(e)(3) because that rule only permits service “at a
place not within any judicial district of the United
States”—is at odds with decisions of this and other courts
dealing with materially identical language in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). See, e.g., Nuance Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1239 (Fed. Cir.
2010); In re OnePlus Tech. (Shenzhen) Co., No. 2021-165,
2021 WL 4130643, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 2021); cf.
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IN RE KOEHLER OBERKIRCH GMBH 4
Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC, 766 F.3d 74, 84 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (observing that “arguably, when a court orders ser-
vice on a foreign entity through its counsel in the United
States, the attorney functions as a mechanism to transmit
the service to its intended recipient abroad”).
Petitioners’ secondary contention—that the trial court
should not have authorized alternative service under these
circumstances because the German district court requested
“that a request should be made through diplomatic chan-
nels,” Appx101 (translation) (emphasis omitted)—also does
not establish clear entitlement to relief. We have explained
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) stands “on equal footing” with
the other service provisions, Nuance Commc’ns, 626 F.3d
at 1239 (citation omitted), and that, while some courts
“have looked to whether there has been a showing that the
plaintiff has reasonably attempted to effectuate service . . .
by conventional means,” those considerations merely
“guide the exercise of discretion,” OnePlus Tech, 2021 WL
4130643, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). We have not been shown compelling reason to reach
a different conclusion as to CIT Rule 4(e)(3) on limited re-
view. And we are not prepared to say the trial court clearly
abused its considerable discretion in ordering such service.
Accordingly,
I T I S O RDERED T HAT :
The petition is denied.
January 16, 2025
Date
F OR THE COURT
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