Jernice Hamilton, Aka Garnaris Hamilton v. United States

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JERNICE HAMILTON,
AKA GARNARIS HAMILTON
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________
2024-2200
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:23-cv-02153-CNL, Judge Carolyn N. Lerner.
______________________
Decided: August 14, 2025
______________________
JERNICE HAMILTON, Goose Creek, SC, pro se.
COLLIN T. MATHIAS, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, WILLIAM J.
GRIMALDI.
______________________

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HAMILTON v. US 2
Before PROST, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Jernice Hamilton, appearing pro se, appeals from the
United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) de-
cision dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 23-2153
(Fed. Cl. May 20, 2024); S. App’x 4–12.1 For the following
reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Hamilton filed a complaint which, liberally con-
strued by the Claims Court, includes, among others, the
following requests for relief: entitlement to disability re-
tirement and back pay, correction of military records, and
violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. These
claims arise from his service in the United States Army
(Army) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) beginning
in the late 1970s.
In August 1977, Mr. Hamilton reported for his en-
trance examination to join the Army. While playing bas-
ketball with a group of other recruits, he suffered an eye
injury. After a successful surgery, he was cleared for ser-
vice and formally enlisted in the USAR for a six-year term
in October 1977. Days later, he signed a change of status
form which required three years of active-duty service with
the Army, followed by three years of reserve duty with the
USAR. During basic training, Mr. Hamilton suffered a
hand injury that required surgery in November 1977. Af-
ter a successful operation, the Army cleared him for duty
with limitation.
1 “S. App’x” refers to the supplemental appendix
filed with the government’s informal response brief.

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HAMILTON v. US 3
Mr. Hamilton continued on active duty until January
1980, when he was court-martialed and convicted of vari-
ous offenses, including indecent exposure, assault, battery,
and drug-related misconduct. He was officially discharged
from the Army in September 1980. In August 1981,
Mr. Hamilton filed a claim with the United States Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs (VA), but was denied due to his
bad conduct discharge.
Nearly four decades later, starting in 2018, he filed
multiple applications with the VA and Army Board for Cor-
rection of Military Records (ABCMR) seeking, among other
relief, disability benefits, an upgrade of his bad conduct dis-
charge to honorable, and correction of his Certificate of Re-
lease or Discharge from Active Duty, or DD Form 214.
Each request was denied.
In December 2023, Mr. Hamilton filed suit in the
Claims Court. The court dismissed the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that many of his
claims were time-barred under the six-year statute of lim-
itations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2501, and that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the remaining claims. S. App’x 7–
12. Mr. Hamilton appeals.
DISCUSSION
We review the Claims Court’s dismissal of a complaint
for a lack of jurisdiction de novo. Diversified Grp. Inc. v.
United States, 841 F.3d 975, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The
Tucker Act gives the Claims Court jurisdiction over claims
against the United States “founded either upon the Consti-
tution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an exec-
utive department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28
U.S.C.§ 1491(a)(1). Such claims must adhere to the Tucker
Act’s six-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Alt-
hough pro se filings are held to “less stringent standards,”

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HAMILTON v. US 4
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), a
pro se litigant still bears the burden of establishing juris-
diction, Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
We see no error in the Claims Court’s dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Claims brought before
the Claims Court must adhere to the Tucker Act’s six-year
statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2501; John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008)
(holding that the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limita-
tions is jurisdictional). Mr. Hamilton’s claims related to
correction of records, back pay, or retirement began to ac-
crue in September 1980 when he was discharged from ser-
vice. His complaint—filed over 40 years later—is well
beyond the six-year limitation.
On appeal, Mr. Hamilton appears to argue that he was
never discharged from the USAR when he was transferred
to the Army in October 1977 because he did not receive a
DD Form 214. Pet’r’s Informal Br. 5. He contends that, as
a result, the statute of limitations on his claims never be-
gan to run. See id. However, a DD Form 214 (also known
as a Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty)
is issued upon discharge from active duty. See Army Reg.
635–5 at 1 (Sept. 15, 2000) (providing that a DD Form 214
“must be prepared for soldiers on retirement, discharge,
[or] release from active duty service”). It is not ordinarily
issued for release from the reserve component unless that
service included qualifying active duty. See Department of
Defense, Instr. 1336.01, Certificate of Uniformed Service
(DD Form 214/5 Series) (Feb. 2022). Mr. Hamilton does
not dispute that he properly received a DD Form 214 upon
his discharge from the Army in 1980, which, as noted by
the Claims Court, was found by the ABCMR to contain “no
error . . . concerning his two days in the active reserve.”
S. App’x 5. In any event, because Mr. Hamilton did not file
suit within six years of his 1980 discharge, all claims

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HAMILTON v. US 5
arising from that or any earlier separation are untimely.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2501; Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d
1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Mr. Hamilton also appears to contend that his disabil-
ity claim did not accrue until the ABCMR’s final action in
2022, rather than upon the date of his discharge in 1980.
Pet’r’s Informal Br. 8–12. He relies on Chambers v. United
States, in which this Court held that “[u]nlike claims for
unlawful discharge, however, claims of entitlement to dis-
ability retirement pay generally do not accrue until an ap-
propriate military board either finally denies such a claim
or refuses to hear it.” 417 F. 3d 1218, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
However, Chambers also makes clear that the statute of
limitations may begin to run at the time of discharge if the
service member had “sufficient actual or constructive no-
tice of his disability, and hence, of his entitlement to disa-
bility retirement pay.” Id. at 1226. Here, as the Claims
Court noted, Mr. Hamilton sought treatment for eye, hand,
and back injuries in the late 1970s—demonstrating actual
knowledge of the conditions underlying his disability claim.
S. App’x 9. Because he had actual knowledge upon his dis-
charge in 1980, his claims accrued at that time and are
therefore time-barred by the six-year limitations period.
See Chambers, 417 F.3d at 1226.
To the extent that Mr. Hamilton raises violations of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments on appeal, this Court
has made clear that the Claims Court does not have juris-
diction to consider claims arising under the Due Process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Le-
Blanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Further, Mr. Hamilton has not stated a Takings Claim
within the Claims Court’s jurisdiction because “a statutory
right to be paid money, at least in the context of federal
employee compensation and benefit entitlement statutes,
is not a property interest for purposes of the Takings

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HAMILTON v. US 6
Clause.” Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1225
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
We have considered Mr. Hamilton’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm the decision of the Claims Court.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.

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