Chian Chiu Li v. Apple Inc.

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CHIAN CHIU LI,
Appellant
v.
APPLE INC.,
Appellee
______________________
2024-2148
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2023-
00560.
______________________
Decided: June 9, 2025
______________________
CHIAN CHIU L I, Fremont, CA, pro se.
STEPHEN D ESALVO, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington,
DC, for appellee. Also represented by J OHN C. O’Q UINN.
______________________
Before P ROST , REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
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LI v. APPLE INC. 2
Chian Chiu Li, proceeding pro se, appeals the Final
Written Decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(Board), holding claims 1–6, 8–12, 14–16, and 18–20 of U.S.
Patent No. 11,016,564 (’564 patent) unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103. See Apple Inc. v. Li, No. IPR2023-00560,
2024 WL 2750500, at *7 (P.T.A.B. May 29, 2024) (Final De-
cision). For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Apple Inc. (Apple) filed a petition for inter partes re-
view, alleging that the challenged claims of the ’564 patent
were unpatentable under § 103 based on combinations of
U.S. Patent No. 10,540,013 (Ryu), U.S. Patent Application
Publication No. 2010/0079508 (Hodge), and U.S. Patent
No. 8,331,992 (Stallings). Id. at *1–2.
The ’564 patent is titled “System and Method for
Providing Information” and relates to presenting infor-
mation on an electronic device when the device senses that
it has been moved and detects that a user is looking at the
screen. See, e.g., ’564 patent at Abstract. The specification
discloses that, to save energy, “a gaze sensing system may
be off most of the time unless getting activated upon receiv-
ing shaking signals.” Id. col. 7 ll. 10–12. Claim 1 recites:
A method for presenting information at an elec-
tronic device, comprising:
1) detecting an act made by a user involving physi-
cal contact with the electronic device or physical
movement of the electronic device when a display
of the electronic device has an idle screen or a
screen in standby mode, inactive mode, or screen-
saver mode;
2) performing gaze detection only after detecting
the act;
3) ascertaining whether the user looks at a direc-
tion toward the electronic device;
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LI v. APPLE INC. 3
4) determining whether the user is recognized via
a recognition mechanism; and
5) presenting a plurality of content items when the
user is recognized via the recognition mechanism
and it is ascertained that the user looks at a direc-
tion toward the electronic device.
Id. at claim 1 (emphasis added).
The Ryu reference discloses a process that begins with
a device in standby mode; when a user rotates the device
by 180 degrees, a processor activates the device’s camera to
determine whether a user is looking at the device. Ryu
col. 19 ll. 49–67.
Before the Board, Mr. Li acknowledged that “Ryu de-
tects an act by the movement sensor and uses the act as a
trigger for gaze detection,” Final Decision, 2024 WL
2750500, at *5 (citation omitted), but argued that Ryu
“does not exclude performing gaze detection after detecting
an event using proximity information” and, thus, Ryu “does
not disclose [that] gaze detection is performed only after
detecting [movement of the device].” J.A.1 171 (emphases
omitted).
The Board found that Ryu discloses “a device entering
active mode after performing gaze detection subsequent to
physical movement of the device.” Final Decision, 2024 WL
2750500, at *3. The Board reasoned that because other
embodiments in Ryu’s specification describe sensors other
than motion sensors, but Ryu’s primary embodiment is si-
lent as to such sensors, Ryu’s primary embodiment does
not include such alternative approaches for triggering gaze
detection. See id. at *5. The Board, therefore, concluded
that “Ryu discloses a device that triggers gaze detection
1 “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed along with
the parties’ briefing.
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LI v. APPLE INC. 4
only after the device senses physical movement.” Id. Con-
cluding that Apple’s asserted grounds taught the uncon-
tested limitations, the Board held that the challenged
claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Id. at *6.
Mr. Li appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(4)(A).
D ISCUSSION
A
Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying
facts. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). What a prior art reference discloses is a ques-
tion of fact that we review for substantial evidence. Intel
Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2023). The substantial evidence standard asks
“whether a reasonable fact finder could have arrived at the
agency’s decision.” OSI Pharms., LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 939
F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
B
Mr. Li argues that Apple’s expert, Dr. Bederson, did
not adequately explain why Ryu’s disclosure of performing
gaze detection after detecting movement satisfied the “only
after” limitation. Mr. Li further argues that Ryu does not
inherently disclose the “only after” limitation: while Ryu
simply provides that motion detection is a sufficient condi-
tion for performing gaze detection, motion detection is a
necessary condition in the claimed invention.
Mr. Li’s inherency argument assumes that because the
Ryu reference does not expressly state that the device
never performs gaze detection before first detecting mo-
tion, the Board’s unpatentability holding must have relied
on inherency. But the Board never relied on an inherency
theory. To the extent that Mr. Li contends that “only after”
is akin to a negative limitation, prior art references “need
not state a feature’s absence in order to disclose a negative
limitation.” AC Techs. S.A. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 912 F.3d
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LI v. APPLE INC. 5
1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Süd-Chemie, Inc. v. Mul-
tisorb Techs., Inc., 554 F.3d 1001, 1004–05 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(affirming finding that reference disclosed “uncoated” film
where it did not describe the film as coated and did not sug-
gest necessity of coatings)).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Board’s conclusion that Ryu, when read as a whole, dis-
closes the “only after” limitation. The Board reasonably re-
lied on the Ryu reference itself, noting that Ryu disclosed
a device in “another exemplary embodiment,” which may
include a proximity sensor. Final Decision, 2024 WL
2750500, at *5 (citing Ryu col. 21 l. 37 – col. 22 l. 47). The
Board reasoned that because Ryu expressly disclosed prox-
imity sensors in the context of separate embodiments,
Ryu’s primary embodiment describes “a device with the
claimed capability and no additional sensors that would
suggest alternative approaches” and “does not contain a
proximity sensor—i.e., it is incapable of detecting proxim-
ity.” Id. In short, the Board reasonably found that Ryu’s
primary embodiment discloses a device that has a motion
sensor and no other sensors. Given that the primary em-
bodiment’s device triggers gaze detection after motion is
detected and features no other triggers, a fact finder could
reasonably conclude that a skilled artisan would read
Ryu’s preferred embodiment as performing gaze detection
only after motion is detected. The Board adequately ex-
plained its rationale, and substantial evidence supports its
finding that Ryu discloses a device that performs gaze de-
tection only after motion is detected.
Finally, Mr. Li appears to argue that even if the “only
after” limitation is disclosed in Ryu, such inherent disclo-
sure would be accidental, unintended, or unappreciated
and thus could not form the basis of a finding of anticipa-
tion. See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 17 (citing Tilghman
v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880)). This argument
lacks merit, however, because the Board’s unpatentability
holding did not rely on the conclusion that the “only after”
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LI v. APPLE INC. 6
limitation was inherent in Ryu’s disclosure. To the extent
that Mr. Li contends that there is no motivation for the Ryu
reference to achieve the “only after” limitation, the Board
did not need to find in Ryu a motivation or explanation for
why Ryu’s primary embodiment performs gaze detection
only after detecting motion. See Final Decision, 2024 WL
2750500, at *5.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Li’s remaining arguments but
do not find them persuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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