Phillip Spyropoulos v. Social Security Administration

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
PHILLIP SPYROPOULOS,
Petitioner
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Respondent
______________________
2024-1987
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. NY-0752-17-0121-I-1.
______________________
Decided: September 25, 2025
______________________
PHILLIP S PYROPOULOS , Keansburg, NJ, pro se.
D ANIEL BERTONI, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH
M ARIE H OSFORD , PATRICIA M. M CCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE .
______________________
Case: 24-1987 Document: 39 Page: 1 Filed: 09/25/2025

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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 2
Before D YK , CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges, and H ALL,
District Judge.1
PER C URIAM.
Philip Spyropoulos petitions pro se for review of a final
order of the Merit Systems and Protection Board (“Board”),
denying the petition for review but affirming in part and
vacating in part an initial decision which sustained
Mr. Spyropoulos’s removal from employment at the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”). See Spyropoulos v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. NY-0752-17-0121-I-1, (M.S.P.B. Apr. 17,
2024) (S. App’x 1–22) (“Final Order”); Spyropoulos v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. NY-0752-17-0121-I-1, (M.S.P.B. Feb. 9,
2018) (S. App’x 23–72) (“Initial Decision”).2 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Spyropoulos was a GS-905-12 Attorney Advisor
with the SSA’s Office of Disability, Adjudication, and Re-
view in Newark, New Jersey for nearly eighteen years. Fi-
nal Order at 2; Initial Decision at 1–2; S. App’x 77. As an
attorney advisor, Mr. Spyropoulos reviewed medical and
confidential records of claimants for Social Security disa-
bility benefits, and he drafted disability decisions for SSA
administrative law judges. Initial Decision at 2;
S. App’x 78–82. On March 20, 2017, Mr. Spyropoulos was
removed from his position for failure to safeguard Person-
ally Identifiable Information (“PII”), lack of candor, and
1 Honorable Jennifer L. Hall, District Judge, United
States District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting
by designation.
2 S. App’x refers to the corrected supplemental ap-
pendix, ECF No. 38, filed by the Respondent. Citations in
this opinion are to the version included in the government’s
supplemental appendix. For example, Final Order at 1 is
found at S. App’x 1, and Initial Decision at 1 is found at
S. App’x 23.
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 3
misuse of both his position and government property. Fi-
nal Order at 2–3; Initial Decision at 5; S. App’x 129–38.
During his employment, Mr. Spyropoulos used his per-
sonal laptop computer to draft portions of disability deci-
sions via speech-to-text software and then sent this
information to his work email. Initial Decision at 2;
S. App’x 115–16. When notified that his practice violated
SSA’s PII policy, Mr. Spyropoulos insisted that his emails
did not contain PII, and he had “never included PII in any
emails, on [his] personal laptop or in any other electronic
communications outside of [his] work-issued laptop.” Ini-
tial Decision at 3 (quoting S. App’x 107); S App’x 110–12.
On May 18, 2015, the SSA terminated Mr. Spyropou-
los’s telework privileges on the ground that he no longer
met the program’s eligibility requirements, citing his al-
leged failure to use approved appropriate technology. Ini-
tial Decision at 4; S. App’x 113–14. Shortly thereafter, the
SSA further investigated Mr. Spyropoulos’s use of his per-
sonal email account. Mr. Spyropoulos stated that he would
typically send no more than four emails per week between
his personal email account and his work account and de-
nied sending other work-related materials between his
work account and any other email account. Initial Decision
at 4; S. App’x 116.
Ultimately, on October 27, 2016, the agency issued
Mr. Spyropoulos a notice of proposed removal, asserting
four charges. Final Order at 2; Initial Decision at 5;
S. App’x 117–21. The first charge, failure to safeguard PII,
was based on 32 specifications or separate instances of
emails sent to or from Mr. Spyropoulos’s work email ac-
count outside of the agency that allegedly contained PII.
Initial Decision at 6–9; S. App’x 117–20. The second
charge, lack of candor, consisted of four specifications pred-
icated upon Mr. Spyropoulos’s several denials of having
sent PII between his personal, work, and any other email
accounts. Final Order at 7–8; Initial Decision at 14–15;
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 4
S. App’x 120–21. The third charge, misuse of position, in-
dicated that Mr. Spyropoulos revealed non-public infor-
mation about how to successfully prosecute disability
claims before the agency to a third-party attorney in ex-
change for that attorney’s assistance with Mr. Spyropou-
los’s application for a position in family court. Initial
Decision at 19–22; S. App’x 121. The fourth charge, misuse
of government property, involved two instances where
Mr. Spyropoulos allegedly sent email attaching either a
confidentiality agreement or a material transfer agree-
ment3 from his work email account to an outside email ac-
count. Initial Decision at 22; S. App’x 121–22.
On March 20, 2017, the deciding officer at the SSA,
Ms. Lynn Shellhamer, formally notified Mr. Spyropoulos of
her decision to remove him from federal service. Initial De-
cision at 5; S. App’x 129. Mr. Spyropoulos appealed his re-
moval to the Board. Initial Decision at 1. The
administrative judge sustained 29 of the 32 specifications
supporting the first charge against Mr. Spyropoulos for his
failure to safeguard PII. Initial Decision at 13–14. The ad-
ministrative judge next sustained the lack of candor charge
and all its underlying specifications. Initial Decision
at 17–19. The administrative judge likewise sustained the
charge of misuse of Mr. Spyropoulos’s position, finding that
he sought to leverage nonpublic information learned in the
course of his employment in exchange for assistance from
a third-party on his application for family-court work. Ini-
tial Decision at 19–22. Fourth, the administrative judge
sustained the charge of misuse of government property
based on finding that Mr. Spyropoulos sent emails from his
3 The confidentiality agreement and the material
transfer agreement are between people or entities related
to the University of Virginia and Biker Entourage, LLC, a
company where Mr. Spyropoulos is identified as the man-
aging member. Initial Decision at 22.
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 5
work account to “further his personal business.” Initial De-
cision at 23.
The administrative judge also found no merit to
Mr. Spyropoulos’s claim that his removal constituted whis-
tleblower retaliation because Mr. Spyropoulos failed to es-
tablish that he had made a “protected disclosure” within
the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Initial Decision
at 40–41. Assuming that Mr. Spyropoulos made protected
disclosures, the administrative judge determined that the
agency would have removed Mr. Spyropoulos absent those
alleged disclosures. Initial Decision at 42–43. Finally, the
administrative judge sustained the penalty of removal for
the charges brought by the agency, concluding that re-
moval was reasonable under the factors articulated in
Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981).
Initial Decision at 44–46.
Mr. Spyropoulos then petitioned for review before the
full Board, which denied the petition and vacated in part
and affirmed in part the initial decision. See Final Order
at 1–17. The Board’s decision differed from the initial de-
cision in two primary respects. First, the Board vacated
the portion of the initial decision sustaining the fourth
specification underlying the lack of candor charge because
of no finding that Mr. Spyropoulos acted knowingly in mak-
ing certain misrepresentations to the agency. Final Order
at 8–9. The Board ultimately sustained the overall charge
for lack of candor based on the other specifications. Final
Order at 8–9. Second, because the administrative judge
determined that Mr. Spyropoulos made no protected disclo-
sures, the Board vacated the portion of the initial decision
regarding whether the agency would have removed
Mr. Spyropoulos even absent his protected disclosures. Fi-
nal Order at 12. The Board otherwise affirmed the initial
decision. Final Order at 13–15.
Mr. Spyropoulos petitions for review. We have juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 6
II. D ISCUSSION
We may not set aside a decision of the Board unless it
is: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not
otherwise in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the Board’s conclusions of
law de novo. McEntee v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 404 F.3d
1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We review the Board’s find-
ings of fact for substantial evidence. Brenner v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affs., 990 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “Sub-
stantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin, 800 F.3d 1332,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). “The petitioner bears the burden of
establishing error in the [Board]’s decision.” Id. (quoting
Jenkins v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 911 F.3d 1370, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2019)).
Before this court, Mr. Spyropoulos raises three princi-
pal arguments.4 First, he argues that the Board should not
have sustained his removal because the charges justifying
his removal “were either manufactured or unsupported.”
Petitioner’s Corrected Informal Opening Br. 12–20 (“Peti-
tioner’s Br.”). Second, Mr. Spyropoulos asserts that the
Board “failed to address the voluminous evidence of retali-
atory actions in response to [his] protected whistleblower
activity.” Id. at 20–26. Third, he contends that the Board
ignored or discounted evidence that the deciding officer,
Ms. Shellhamer, failed to apply or misapplied certain
Douglas factors in rendering her final decision to remove
4 Mr. Spyropoulos pursued disability discrimination
and retaliation claims in the proceeding before the Board.
Initial Decision at 28–33. On appeal, he has abandoned
those claims. See ECF No. 14 at 2.
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 7
him from federal service. See id. at 3–12. We address each
argument in turn.
A.
First, Mr. Spyropoulos challenges the charge regarding
failure to safeguard PII, arguing that the agency applied
an “overly broad definition of PII” and that the vast major-
ity of the emails at issue did not contain PII or that the PII
cannot be linked to a specific individual. Petitioner’s Br. 19
& 19 n.40. He also contends that, in some instances, his
inclusion of PII was because he had a “reasonable belief
that a duty to preserve whistleblower evidence outweighed
PII directives.” Id. We need not address each of Mr. Spy-
ropoulos’s arguments as to the first charge because he has
conceded that he made “four or five inadvertent PII viola-
tions” over the course of his career. Id. at 18. Moreover, in
the context of the lack of candor charge, the SSA found that
Mr. Spyropoulos sent “at least nine emails containing
claimant information outside of SSA custody.”5 S. App’x
135. The above concession along with sending some emails
containing PII outside of SSA custody are sufficient to sus-
tain the first charge against him. See Lachance v. Merit
Sys. Prot. Bd., 147 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“[W]here more than one event or factual specification is
set out to support a single charge . . . proof of one or more,
but not all, of the supporting specifications is sufficient to
sustain the charge.” (quoting Burroughs v. Dep’t of the
Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).
5 Although Mr. Spyropoulos disputes some of these
nine emails, he conceded to sending some emails contain-
ing claimant information outside of SSA custody in this
time period. Petitioner’s Br. 18–19 & 19 n.38 (conceding to
Specification No. 26 as part of his “four or five” PII viola-
tions); S. App’x 132, 135.
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 8
Second, Mr. Spyropoulos argues that the charge for
lack of candor was “unfounded” because he did not know-
ingly make any false representations to the agency
throughout its investigation. Petitioner’s Br. 17–18. A
charge for lack of candor may be sustained if the agency
demonstrates that the employee’s conduct “involve[d] a
failure to disclose something that, in the circumstances,
should have been disclosed in order to make the given
statement accurate and complete.” Ludlum v. Dep’t of
Just., 278 F.3d 1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
As to three of the four relevant specifications, the
Board determined that the agency had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Spyropoulos know-
ingly made certain misrepresentations or omissions. Final
Order at 8–9. This determination was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. See, e.g., S. App’x 135 (“You stated that
you do not send these emails anymore because you were
told not to. However, as specified above, from April 6, 2015
through May 5, 2015, you sent at least nine emails contain-
ing claimant information outside of SSA custody.”); Final
Order at 8–9. The Board’s conclusion to sustain the second
charge against Mr. Spyropoulos based on this specification
was supported by substantial evidence, see Brenner,
990 F.3d at 1322, and the agency need only establish a sin-
gle specification to support a charge, see Burroughs,
918 F.2d at 172. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Spyropoulos’s
challenge to his charge for lack of candor.
In his petition to the full Board, Mr. Spyropoulos did
not challenge the administrative judge’s findings as to the
third and fourth charges against him, for misuse of position
and misuse of government property, respectively. Final
Order at 4 n.4. Before this court, he argues that these
charges were either “manufacture[d]” or “specious.” Peti-
tioner’s Br. 12. We disagree.
As to the misuse of position charge, the administrative
judge credited the testimony of agency witnesses over
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 9
Mr. Spyropoulos’s testimony regarding whether the infor-
mation he disclosed to the third-party attorney was non-
public. Specifically, the administrative judge rejected
Mr. Spyropoulos’s contention that he shared only publicly
available information because the email to the third-party
attorney “explained which of the steps of the process [were]
most crucial to an [administrative law judge’s] determina-
tion as to whether to grant disability benefits,” and the
agency witnesses credibly testified that this “information
he shared was not readily available to the public.” Initial
Decision at 21. The administrative judge found that
Mr. Spyropoulos furnished this information to “further his
own private interests in violation of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(a),
(b).” Id. The Board did not err in upholding this finding.
As to the misuse of government property charge,
Mr. Spyropoulos asserts that it was unfounded because he
testified that he sent the emails containing contractual
agreements between the University of Virginia and Bike
Entourage, LLC while he was on a break, and the agency
did not present any contrary evidence. Petitioner’s Br. 16–
17. The applicable federal regulation limits the use of gov-
ernment property to “authorized purposes.” 5 C.F.R
§ 2635.704(a). The regulation allows for “limited or de min-
imis personal use” if that use is in accordance “with an
agency’s . . . policy.” Id. § 2635.704(b)(2). The administra-
tive judge determined that the SSA’s policy prohibited per-
sonal use of government property “when such use is to
‘maintain or support a personal business,’” regardless of
whether that use may otherwise qualify as a de minimis
use. Initial Decision at 22 (citation omitted). Here, the ad-
ministrative judge found that the emails, including the at-
tached agreements, “were inappropriate personal uses of
[his] government equipment.” Initial Decision at 23.
Given the evidence proffered, this finding was supported
by substantial evidence as a reasonable mind could con-
clude that Mr. Spyropoulos sought to further his private
business interests using government property.
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 10
In sum, the Board did not err in sustaining the four
charges against Mr. Spyropoulos because its decision was
supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accord-
ance with law.
B.
Next, Mr. Spyropoulos argues that the Board failed to
appropriately consider the evidence he submitted with re-
spect to two categories of allegedly protected disclosures.
Petitioner’s Br. 20–26. First, Mr. Spyropoulos contends
that he disclosed “gross and tortuous managerial miscon-
duct and mismanagement” by a supervisor within the New-
ark hearing office. Id. at 20–23. Second, Mr. Spyropoulos
claims he made protected disclosures when he advised the
agency about alleged judicial misconduct by one of the ad-
ministrative law judges who purportedly had a history of
rendering “discriminatory decisions.” Id. at 23–24. As to
both arguments, Mr. Spyropoulos attacks the credibility of
the agency’s witnesses and suggests that the evidence he
presented was more compelling. See id. at 20–26.
The Board properly rejected Mr. Spyropoulos’s affirm-
ative defense of whistleblower retaliation because he did
not establish that he made any protected disclosures enti-
tling him to whistleblower protection. To prevail on a claim
for whistleblower retaliation, a petitioner must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she made a “pro-
tected disclosure” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8). See Carr v. Social Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A “protected disclosure” is defined
as “any disclosure of information by an employee or appli-
cant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes
evidences—(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,
or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
The administrative judge found that neither of the cat-
egories of disclosure constituted a protected disclosure
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 11
within the meaning of the statute. Specifically, the admin-
istrative judge found that the disclosure relating to the
Newark hearing office supervisor’s management style did
not sufficiently allege “gross mismanagement” under 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) because the conduct complained
of did not create “a substantial risk of significant adverse
impact upon the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission.”
Initial Decision at 41.
As for Mr. Spyropoulos’s allegations of judicial miscon-
duct, the administrative judge found that they “amounted
to nothing more than disagreements with the [administra-
tive law judge’s] conclusions, over which the [administra-
tive law judge] had discretion.” Initial Decision at 38.
Tellingly, Mr. Spyropoulos did not identify any “law, rule,
or regulation” allegedly violated by the administrative law
judge’s actions, and Mr. Spyropoulos could not show that
the administrative law judge’s decisions resulted in “gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of au-
thority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety.” Initial Decision at 40–41 (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii)). On review, the full Board deter-
mined that Mr. Spyropoulos’s arguments with respect to
his protected disclosures amounted to “mere disagreement
with the administrative judge’s well-reasoned finding that
the appellant did not make protected disclosures.” Final
Order at 12. We conclude that the Board did not err with
respect to Mr. Spyropoulos’s allegations of judicial miscon-
duct.
C.
Finally, Mr. Spyropoulos argues that Ms. Shellhamer’s
decision cannot be sustained because she failed to consider
most of the Douglas factors before deciding to remove him
from federal service. Petitioner’s Br. 3. Mr. Spyropoulos
contends that Ms. Shellhamer testified that she had not
considered the Douglas factors at all before issuing the no-
tice of removal. Petitioner’s Br. 3–12. This argument is
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 12
belied by the record. Ms. Shellhamer’s notice of removal
demonstrates that she considered the Douglas factors; in-
deed, each factor is listed in her notice of removal, accom-
panied by her reasoning as to each one. S. App’x 140–46.
The Board’s determination that Ms. Shellhamer properly
weighed the Douglas factors was supported by substantial
evidence and otherwise in accordance with law.
Mr. Spyropoulos’s other arguments are likewise of lit-
tle merit. Although Mr. Spyropoulos contends that the
agency failed to sufficiently credit his eighteen years of ser-
vice without prior disciplinary actions, Petitioner’s Br. 4–
5, we have previously affirmed the removal of employees
for misuse of personal information even when they have
been employed in federal service for many years. See, e.g.,
Morgan v. Dep’t of the Army, 934 F.2d 310, 312–13
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming removal after seventeen years
of service); see also Brewer v. United States Postal Serv.,
647 F.2d 1093, 1098 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (affirming removal after
twenty-seven years of service). We further disagree with
Mr. Spyropoulos’s contention that removal was dispropor-
tionate when compared to the penalties imposed on other
employees within his region who disclosed PII outside of
the agency. See Petitioner’s Br. 5–7; App’x Vol. 4, Ex. M
(proposed comparator evidence).6 Although Mr. Spyropou-
los could identify other employees who failed to safeguard
PII and similar discrete violations, the Board appropriately
rejected this argument on the ground that Mr. Spyropoulos
“failed to establish that the agency knowingly and unjusti-
fiably treated employees differently” because he could not
identify any comparator who was similarly situated who
engaged in comparable conduct. Final Order at 17.
6 App’x refers to the appendix filed with the appel-
lant’s informal brief, ECF No. 19.
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SPYROPOULOS v. SSA 13
In short, we cannot conclude that removal was a dis-
proportionate or otherwise unreasonable penalty for
Mr. Spyropoulos.
III. CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Spyropoulos’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm the Board’s decision.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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