Messiah Ali-Bey v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MESSIAH ALI-BEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1629
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:23-cv-01044-EMR, Judge Eleni M. Roumel.
______________________
Decided: March 19, 2025
______________________
MESSIAH ALI-B EY , Tampa, FL, pro se.
AUGUSTUS J EFFREY G OLDEN, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY ,
D OUGLAS K. M ICKLE.
______________________
Before P ROST , L INN, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
Case: 24-1629 Document: 32 Page: 1 Filed: 03/19/2025

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ALI - BEY v. US 2
P ER CURIAM .
Messiah Ali-Bey appeals the dismissal of his Com-
plaint by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Ali-Bey filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims
“on behalf of ‘the Moorish Son’s [sic] and Daughters of
Light International institute, Clock of Destiny, Order of the
Great Seal Order’ against ‘Joseph Robinette Biden Jr’ and
‘the Estate of Abraham Lincoln’ to remedy the past en-
slavement of Moorish Americans.” Ali-Bey v. United
States, 169 Fed. Cl. 729, 731 (2024) (citation omitted) (al-
teration in original). Mr. Ali-Bey asserted that “the United
States owes Moorish Americans ‘more than
$1,284,876,372,763,481.90’ to correct a myriad of claims in-
cluding purported constitutional violations, international
treaty violations, negligence, and interference with intel-
lectual property rights.” Id. (citation omitted). The Gov-
ernment moved to dismiss the Complaint because the
claims fall outside the Court of Federal Claims’ limited ju-
risdiction.
The Court of Federal Claims held that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Mr. Ali-Bey’s monetary claims.
The court explained that the neither the Fifth Amendment
nor the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
establishes subject matter jurisdiction because (1) “[t]he
Thirteenth Amendment is not a money-mandating author-
ity that provides jurisdiction”; and (2) “[t]he Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a money-mandating
source.” Id. at 734–35. The court then explained that “[t]o
the extent [Mr. Ali-Bey] is alleging that the United States
took property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the true
nature of [his] claims sound in tort,” and “[t]ort claims are
beyond the jurisdiction of [the Court of Federal Claims].”
Id. at 735 (explaining that Mr. Ali-Bey’s tort claims of
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ALI - BEY v. US 3
“gross negligence” and “national deception” must also fail
for the same reason).
Next, the court explained that “the bulk of [Mr. Ali-
Bey’s] argument rests on purported violations of the
[1836] Treaty of Peace and Friendship” between the United
States and Morocco, but it “is well-established that [the
Court of Federal Claims] lacks jurisdiction to consider
claims arising from treaties with foreign nations.” Id. (ex-
plaining that “treaties with Indian tribes and treaties with
foreign nations are distinguishable for purposes of jurisdic-
tion” because “the Treaty of Peace and Friendship . . . is not
a treaty with an Indian Tribe”).
The court then explained that the asserted claims re-
lated to “intellectual property violations also fail to estab-
lish jurisdiction” because the Court of Federal Claims has
“jurisdiction over [intellectual property] claims based on
patents, copyrights, and protected plant varieties” but not
“claims related to trade secrets and trademarks.” Id.
at 736–37 (explaining further that Mr. Ali-Bey “has not
shown proof of a valid patent or copyright”). The court also
noted that Mr. Ali-Bey’s “allegation of unjust enrichment
is not a valid basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 737.
Last, the Court of Federal Claims held that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Ali-Bey’s requests for
equitable relief because it “is well established that [the
Court of Federal Claims’] Tucker Act jurisdiction does not
extend to claims for equitable relief.” Id. Accordingly, the
court dismissed Mr. Ali-Bey’s Complaint “without leave to
replead.” Id. at 738.
Mr. Ali-Bey appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
D ISCUSSION
We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of a
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. E.g.,
Acevedo v. United States, 824 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
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ALI - BEY v. US 4
2016). Mr. Ali-Bey bears the burden of establishing the
Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction over his claims by pre-
ponderant evidence. Id.
In his appellate briefing, which is difficult to follow,
Mr. Ali-Bey argues that the Court of Federal Claims “ap-
plied the wrong law,” Appellant’s Informal Br. 9, 15, and
“incorrectly determined that [his] case was claiming that
the 14th Amendment, the 13th Amendment, the 5th, and
the 8th Amendment is [sic] the source of rights[] [a]nd that
[his case] is arising out of a tort, when in fact it is arising
out of an Act of Congress,” Appellant’s Informal Br. 1. But
see Appellant’s Informal Br. 11–13, 16 (listing the Fifth
and Thirteenth Amendments as being “at issue in this
case”). Mr. Ali-Bey repeatedly states that his claims arise
out of the 1836 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the
United States and Morocco, which he believes to be an “Act
of Congress.” See generally Appellant’s Informal Br.
Mr. Ali-Bey also argues that the Court of Federal Claims
failed to “take into account [his] standing as a Moorish
America[n].” Appellant’s Informal Br. 8.
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Court of
Federal Claims that it “lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over [Mr. Ali-Bey’s] claims even affording [him] the most
liberal construction.” Ali-Bey, 169 Fed. Cl. at 734.
First, we reject the argument that the treaty on which
Mr. Ali-Bey relies is an Act of Congress. “The commonly
understood meaning of an ‘Act of Congress’ does not in-
clude a ‘treaty’ . . . .” Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Un-
derwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 723 (5th Cir.
2009) (en banc); CLMS Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship v. Amwins
Brokerage of Ga., LLC, 8 F.4th 1007, 1016–17 (9th Cir.
2021) (“Because treaties require only the approval of the
Senate, a treaty is more accurately described as an exercise
of executive power constrained by the Constitution, not as
an ‘Act of Congress.’ Indeed, the Supremacy Clause itself
distinguishes between ‘the Laws of the United States,’
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ALI - BEY v. US 5
which must comport with the bicameralism and present-
ment requirements, and ‘Treaties.’” (citations omitted)); see
also Appellee’s Informal Br. 12 (“[Mr. Ali-Bey] identifies
‘8 statute at large, 484 to 487,’ as the alleged ‘Act of Con-
gress.’ However, the pages of the statutes at large that he
identifies are a treaty, not an act of Congress.” (citation
omitted)).
Second, we have held that “[c]laims arising under trea-
ties with foreign nations are expressly excluded from the
jurisdiction” of the Court of Federal Claims. Greene
v. United States, 100 F.4th 1364, 1367 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2024);
28 U.S.C. § 1502 (“[T]he United States Court of Federal
Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim against the
United States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty
entered into with foreign nations.”).
Third, the Court of Federal Claims correctly held that
“[t]he Thirteenth Amendment is not a money-mandating
authority that provides jurisdiction.” Ali-Bey, 169 Fed. Cl.
at 734; see, e.g., Brashear v. United States, 776 F. App’x
679, 682 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Maxberry v. United States,
722 F. App’x 997, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Harris v. United
States, 686 F. App’x 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
As for Mr. Ali-Bey’s assertion that the “[b]asis for
[j]urisdiction . . . is founded on . . . the 5 th Amendment hu-
man trafficking of Moors in taking human beings as chattel
property without compensation,” Appellant’s Informal
Br. 11 (emphasis omitted), we have held that the Court of
Federal Claims “has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any
claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code and the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth
Amendment do not provide for the payment of monies, even
if there were a violation.” Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d
378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Consistent with this, the Court
of Federal Claims has correctly held that it lacks jurisdic-
tion over claims of human trafficking. See, e.g., Stewart
v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 172, 177–78 (2017) (claims of
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ALI - BEY v. US 6
human trafficking “sound in tort or allege criminal acts”);
Modena v. Neff, 91 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (2010) (claims of human
trafficking by government officials “may not be heard in
this court”); cf. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (the Court of Federal Claims “lacks juris-
diction over tort actions against the United States”).
Lastly, as for Mr. Ali-Bey’s argument that the Court of
Federal Claims failed to “take into account [his] standing
as a Moorish America[n],” Appellant’s Informal Br. 8, we
agree with the Government that the questions of whether
Mr. Ali-Bey is a “Moorish American” and whether he
lacked standing were not at issue before the Court of Fed-
eral Claims and, thus, not decided by that court. Appellee’s
Informal Br. 8 & n.4.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Ali-Bey’s remaining argu-
ments and are not persuaded. For the foregoing reasons,
we affirm the dismissal by the Court of Federal Claims.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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