Jeffrey Nathaniel Boegli v. United States

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JEFFREY NATHANIEL BOEGLI,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1454
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:23-cv-01568-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling.
______________________
Decided: November 26, 2024
______________________
JEFFREY NATHANIEL BOEGLI, New Port Richey, FL, pro
se.
PATRICK ANGULO, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented
by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA
M. MCCARTHY.
______________________
Before CHEN, BRYSON, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jeffrey Boegli appeals a decision of
the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”)
(1) dismissing his complaint as barred by the statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and for failure to state a
claim under the Tucker Act because his complaint did not
invoke a money-mandating statute; (2) denying his request
to amend his complaint; and (3) denying his request to
transfer his case to district court. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
Mr. Boegli served his country in the United States
Navy from when he enlisted on June 21, 2006, until
April 18, 2012, when he was honorably discharged. He
initially enlisted for a six-year term and served as an
electrician’s mate in the nuclear field. Because of his
position, Mr. Boegli was eligible for a Selective
Reenlistment Bonus (“SRB”). In 2010, he reenlisted under
the SRB program and received a bonus of $75,000.
In accordance with Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations Instruction 1160.8A (“OPNAV INST”) in effect
at the time, Mr. Boegli received one half of the bonus when
he reenlisted, with the remainder to be paid in equal
annual installments over the contract period. He received
the lump sum and the first annual installment.
After his reenlistment, Mr. Boegli moved in with
another nuclear field sailor, Scott Dunn, who was a long-
time friend. Tragically, Mr. Dunn took his own life with a
firearm in Mr. Boegli’s presence on July 31, 2011. In
Mr. Boegli’s own words, Mr. Dunn’s passing “has little-by-
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little torn [his] life into pieces.” Appx34 (Trial Tr. 21:18–
19).1
Mr. Boegli sought counseling from the ship chaplain
and ship psychologist, who diagnosed him with acute stress
disorder. Because Mr. Boegli suffered from nightmares
and insomnia, the ship psychologist prescribed him
trazodone in October 2011. In light of these developments,
the senior medical officer recommended disqualifying
Mr. Boegli from the nuclear field. In November 2011, the
Navy officially removed his Navy enlisted classification
(“NEC”) for the nuclear field due to “psycho pharmaceutical
medication usage.” SAppx5.
Because Mr. Boegli lost his NEC, the Navy “began
recouping” the SRB it awarded him when he reenlisted.2
SAppx5. Pursuant to his December 2011 Leave and
Earning Statement, Mr. Boegli owed the Navy an SRB debt
of $37,187.50. Throughout the rest of Mr. Boegli’s service,
the Navy continued to recoup his SRB. Mr. Boegli was
“unable to pay his car payment, rent payment, and various
1 “Appx” refers to the appendix attached to
Appellant’s Principal Brief, ECF No. 13. “SAppx” refers to
the supplemental appendix attached to Appellee’s
Response Brief, ECF No. 22.
2 Under these circumstances, and in the absence of
any explanation from the Secretary of the Navy, we find it
disturbing the Navy has chosen to recoup Mr. Boegli’s
bonus when he commendably sought medical treatment in
response to these devastating circumstances that were
outside of his control. This case may be one in which a
second look by the Navy is warranted, either to reconsider
the decision to recoup Mr. Boegli’s bonus in whole or in
part, or to cease efforts to recoup the remainder of his
bonus.
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BOEGLI v. US 4
other debts” because of the amount of his pay being
recouped. SAppx6.
He eventually lost his apartment and car, and he
defaulted on other debts. Because of the “combined
emotional, mental and financial stresses,” he turned to
opioid use to self-medicate. Id. In December 2011,
Mr. Boegli turned himself in to the ship psychologist for
drug use and was discharged in April 2012. After his
discharge, the Navy continued to recoup the SRB by
garnishing his tax returns.3
II
In March 2013, Mr. Boegli, with assistance, petitioned
the Board for Correction of Naval Records (“BCNR”)4 to end
the recoupment of his SRB and to return the amount
recouped thus far. In September 2013, the BCNR denied
his petition.
Mr. Boegli has suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”) and opioid use disorder (“OUD”) since
2011. He was continuously prescribed various medications
until February 2022, when he “was removed from all mind-
altering medications,” enabling him to “think clearly and
begin pursuing his rights to correct his military record.”
SAppx51.
In November 2022, Mr. Boegli submitted a second
petition to the BCNR requesting that the SRB recoupment
3 As of April 2024, Mr. Boegli still owed a debt of
approximately $13,000.
4 Mr. Boegli’s complaint uses BCNR, NBCNR, and
NBCMR (Naval Board for Correction of Military Records)
interchangeably and we understand the terms to refer to
the same board. SAppx1. Because both parties use the
abbreviation BCNR in their briefing before this court, we
do the same.
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BOEGLI v. US 5
stop and the recouped funds be returned to him. The
BCNR recommended granting him relief because it found
“the existence of an injustice warranting . . . corrective
action.” SAppx10. The BCNR explained Mr. Boegli’s “loss
of NEC was due to the use of prescribed medication to treat
a condition which was not due to misconduct or willful
neglect, therefore, [he] should not be subject to
recoupment.” Appx12.
The BCNR recommended that Mr. Boegli’s record be
corrected to reflect that his classification removal did not
result from misconduct or willful neglect, and therefore
recoupment of bonus payments he had already received
was “not required.” Id. The BCNR directed the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service to audit Mr. Boegli’s
records to determine if he was due any back pay. The
BCNR forwarded its recommendation to the Secretary of
the Navy for his approval of the decision, who denied relief
and rejected the BCNR’s recommendation without
explanation.
III
Following the Secretary’s denial, Mr. Boegli filed suit
in the Claims Court, alleging that the Secretary violated
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by failing to
provide an adequate explanation for his decision to deny
the relief sought and that this failure rendered the decision
arbitrary and capricious. He asked the Claims Court to
direct the Navy to correct his record per the BCNR
recommendation and declare that he is entitled to receive
back the money improperly recouped. The Government
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the six-
year statute of limitations barred the claim and,
alternatively, that the complaint failed to invoke a money-
mandating statute for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
The Claims Court scheduled oral argument and ordered
the parties to be prepared to discuss, inter alia,
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BOEGLI v. US 6
Mr. Boegli’s “argument that the statute of limitations
should be tolled to preserve his claim.” SAppx26.
At oral argument, “Mr. Boegli argue[d] that he is
entitled to take advantage of the exception for legal
disability found in the statute [of limitations, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2501].” Appx51 (Trial Tr. 38:18–20). Following oral
argument, the Claims Court ruled from the bench:
[Mr. Boegli] has failed to show that he suffered a
legal disability that prevented him from pursuing
relief before the Naval Correction Board and in this
Court . . . .
Even assuming that [Mr. Boegli] suffered a legal
disability at the time of his discharge . . . that
disability . . . had passed by March 2013, when [he]
was able to file his first petition before the Naval
Correction Board. Therefore, the six-year statute
of limitations set by [28 U.S.C. § 2501] was at least,
on the facts presented, from March 2013 not
subject to being tolled. As a result, . . . the statute
of limitations expired, at the latest, in March 2019,
and . . . this suit [filed] in August 2023 . . . is,
therefore, untimely under the Tucker Act.
Appx55 (Trial Tr. 42:2–19). Accordingly, the court “ha[d]
no choice but to . . . dismiss the claim under the Tucker
Act.” Appx58 (Trial Tr. 45:20–21). The court then
considered whether Mr. Boegli’s complaint invoked “a
money-mandating source of law” for jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act. Appx59 (Trial Tr. 46:24). The Claims Court
explained that neither the APA nor the statute authorizing
SRB are money-mandating within the meaning of the
Tucker Act because “it is well settled that the APA is not a
money-mandating statute,” id. (Trial Tr. 46:8–9), and
Mr. Boegli did not rebut the presumption that the SRB
statute (37 U.S.C. § 308) is not money-mandating.
Appx60–62.
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BOEGLI v. US 7
Mr. Boegli sought leave “to amend [his] complaint to
provide additional information of [his] disability” or, in the
alternative, to transfer his complaint to a district court.
Appx35 (Trial Tr. 22:3–4). The Claims Court denied the
request to amend as “fruitless and unavailing,” Appx65
(Trial Tr. 52:4), because his claim was barred under the
statute of limitations, and the court denied the request to
transfer because the “claim is framed in the context of a
claim for money damages and so [transfer] would be
inappropriate. If [the Claims Court] sent it to the District
Court, it would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”
Appx70–71 (Trial Tr. 58:1–5).
Mr. Boegli appeals from the dismissal of his claim. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Ravi v. United States,
104 F.4th 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2024). We review its factual
findings for clear error. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United
States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We accept the
facts alleged in a complaint as true when reviewing the
propriety of a dismissal. San Carlos Apache Tribe
v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
On appeal Mr. Boegli argues: (1) the Claims Court
erred in determining his action was barred by the statute
of limitations because he was subject to legal disability
when his claim accrued; (2) his complaint invokes a money-
mandating source of law; (3) the Claims Court erred in
failing to allow him an opportunity to amend his complaint;
(4) the court abused its discretion when it declined to
transfer his claim to district court; and (5) the court failed
to fulfill the requirements of Rule 52.1(a) of the Rules of the
Court of Federal Claims. We take each issue in turn.
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I
“Every claim of which the United States Court of
Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the
petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim
first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. “This six-year limitations
period is jurisdictional and may not be waived or tolled.”
FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1380–81
(Fed. Cir. 2012). But § 2501 also provides that a “petition
on the claim of a person under legal disability . . . at the
time the claim accrues may be filed within three years after
the disability ceases.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
We have “long held that the plaintiff ’s cause of action
for back pay accrues at the time of the plaintiff ’s discharge”
and “is not a ‘continuing claim’ that accrues each time a
payment would be due.” Martinez v. United States,
333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). Because
Mr. Boegli’s claim is for funds improperly being withheld,
i.e., back pay, he had “the right to sue immediately upon
discharge.” Id.
Although Mr. Boegli had the right to sue immediately
upon his discharge on April 18, 2012, he did not bring suit
in the Claims Court until September 11, 2023. [SAppx3,
14]. Therefore, applying § 2501 to this case, the statute of
limitations bars his claim unless he was under a legal
disability until at least September 11, 2020, three years
before filing suit. We agree with the Claims Court’s
determination that Mr. Boegli failed to provide evidence to
meet his burden to establish legal disability for this entire
time frame.
“The law presumes sanity and competency . . . . The
burden of proving mental incapacity is on the claimant in
order to qualify as suffering from a legal disability within
the intendment of 28 U.S.C. § 2501.” Goewey v. United
States, 612 F.2d 539, 544 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (per curiam). Legal
disability under § 2501 requires mental impairment
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“precluding a person from comprehending rights which he
would be otherwise bound to understand.” Id. at 545.
Mr. Boegli raises three arguments on appeal related to
legal disability: (1) that Congress’s intent in adopting
§ 2501 was to broaden the meaning of legal disability;5
(2) that co-occurring PTSD and OUD qualifies as a legal
disability; and (3) that the Claims Court erred in its legal
disability determination because Mr. Boegli has suffered
from PTSD and OUD since 2011.
Regarding his first argument, Mr. Boegli contends that
the 1946 predecessor of § 2501 used the language “idiots,
lunatics, [and] insane persons” and the amendment
supports that “Congress made a conscience [sic] change” to
move from a specific classification to “more general
language in order to be more inclusive of any disability that
impacts a litigant’s ability to bring a timely suit.”
Appellant’s Br. 10–11. Mr. Boegli is correct that the
language governing legal disability changed, and the
language is inclusive of any disability that impacts a
litigant’s ability to bring suit, but legal disability still
requires a disability to be severe enough that a person fails
to comprehend their rights on a continuing basis. Goewey,
612 F.2d at 543–44 (explaining the changes were “intended
to consolidate by substitution the prior archaic
5 Although this issue was not raised below, given
Mr. Boegli is proceeding pro se, we use our discretion to
consider this argument. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471, 487 (2008) (explaining that the decision to
deviate from the general rule that an appellate court does
not consider issues not raised before the trial court is “left
primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be
exercised on the facts of individual cases” (citation
omitted)).
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BOEGLI v. US 10
terminology” and “were not designed to change existing
law”).
We turn now to Mr. Boegli’s second and third
arguments regarding legal disability. Mr. Boegli argues
that research supports that “PTSD, OUD, and use of
prescribed medication to treat these disabilities, depending
on the individual, can affect an individual litigant’s ability
to bring a timely suit.” Appellant’s Br. 14. He argues that,
because he has suffered from PTSD and OUD and has been
“continuously prescribed various mind-altering
substances . . . inhibit[ing] his mental capacity and ability
to pursue his claims” since his friend’s tragic death in 2011,
he had a legal disability, and the statute of limitations
should be tolled under § 2501. Appellant’s Br. 15.
“[T]he Government does not dispute that co-occurring
PTSD and OUD could, in some circumstances, qualify as a
legal disability,” but it argues that “Mr. Boegli has not put
forth any argument or evidence . . . showing that he was
incapable of understanding his legal rights or
responsibilities from the period of his discharge until three
years before filing his complaint.” Appellee’s Br. 13. The
undisputed fact central to this case is that Mr. Boegli, with
assistance, petitioned the BCNR in 2013, attempting to
remedy the recoupment of his bonus. Our precedent makes
clear that a person comprehends their rights when they are
able to take steps to vindicate their rights. See e.g.,
Goewey, 612 F.2d at 545. More specifically, one of our
predecessor courts has held that a claimant’s “active
involvement . . . in efforts to secure” Veterans Affairs (“VA”)
benefits can help show that he is “able to understand [legal]
complexities and [is] . . . not adverse to protecting his
interests to the utmost.” Id. We see no error in the Claims
Court’s finding that “[e]ven if [Mr. Boegli] did not know
exactly why the reenlistment bonus was being recoupled,
he knew at the time that his reenlistment bonus was
subject to recoupment and indeed he challenged that
recoupment.” Appx58 (Trial Tr. 45:11–14).
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Because the record shows that Mr. Boegli was able to
comprehend his legal rights in 2013 but did not file suit
until 2023, we hold that the Claims Court correctly
dismissed his claim for back pay as time-barred. In
addition, because we affirm the Claims Court’s
determination that the statute of limitations bars his suit,
we need not reach the issue of whether Mr. Boegli invoked
a money-mandating statute.
II
As to Mr. Boegli’s argument that the Claims Court
erred because it denied his request to amend his complaint,
we review the Claims Court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion. See Steffen v. United States, 995 F.3d 1377,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The Claims Court determined that
allowing Mr. Boegli to amend his complaint “would be
fruitless and unavailing because of the statute of
limitations and what actually occurred on the record with
the 2013 claim before the [BCNR].” Appx65 (Trial Tr. 52:4–
6). Mr. Boegli argues the Claims Court erred because it
denied his request without knowing what evidence he
would have pled regarding his alleged legal disability.
Appellant’s Br. 20. Although we are sympathetic to
Mr. Boegli’s argument, we cannot say the Claims Court
abused its discretion because it is not unreasonable for the
trial court to deny amendment where the statute of
limitations on a claim bars relief. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron
Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 469 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] court need not
grant leave to amend when the filing would be futile
because the proposed claims are time-barred.”); Abraham
v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst., 553 F.3d 114, 118–19
(1st Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse its discretion in
not allowing amendment “because said amendment would
be futile since the claim would be time barred”).
III
Mr. Boegli alternatively sought to transfer his case to
district court based on his APA claim—contending that the
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BOEGLI v. US 12
Secretary of the Navy violated the APA by failing to “justify
a decision to overturn a recommendation” of the BCNR—
and now on appeal objects to the Claims Court’s denial of
his request to transfer. SAppx11. We review the Claims
Court’s decision on a motion to transfer the case for an
abuse of discretion. See Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc.
v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
Claims Court denied Mr. Boegli’s request because his
complaint principally seeks monetary relief, and the
district court lacks jurisdiction to provide such a remedy.
As the Claims Court correctly noted, Mr. Boegli’s
“claim is framed in the context of a claim for money
damages.” Appx71 (Trial Tr. 58:1–2). The APA provides for
judicial review of a final agency action only where there is
“is no other adequate remedy.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. And
because Mr. Boegli seeks monetary relief, he had another
adequate remedy6 in the form of his Tucker Act claim: the
Claims Court had power to grant all the relief he requested
“because his complaint sought money and relief ancillary
to the request for money.” Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1320.
Where “the Court of Federal Claims could have granted all
the relief requested in the complaint if the complaint had
been timely filed,” a district court lacks APA jurisdiction
over those claims because there is another adequate
remedy. Id. Therefore, Mr. Boegli’s “money-based
complaint could not have been brought in the district court
in the first instance.” Id. The Claims Court did not abuse
its discretion by declining to transfer his case.
6 The expiration of the statute of limitations does not
undercut the fact that there was an adequate remedy.
Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1320 (“The fact that the complaint
was untimely filed in the Court of Federal Claims does not
mean that court could not offer a full and adequate remedy;
it merely means that [the claimant] did not file his
complaint in time to take advantage of that remedy.”).
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IV
Lastly, Mr. Boegli asserts that the Claims Court erred
when it denied his motion for an order directing the
Government to produce the administrative record, as
required by Rule 52.1 of the Rules of the Court of Federal
Claims. We see no such error. Jurisdiction is a threshold
matter and “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed
at all.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 514 (1868)). Where the court determines jurisdiction
is lacking, “the only function remaining to the court is that
of announcing the [lack of jurisdiction] and dismissing the
cause.” Id. Because the Claims Court properly determined
it lacked jurisdiction, it did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Mr. Boegli’s motion.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Boegli’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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