Ronnie Lee Bennett v. Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
RONNIE LEE BENNETT,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2024-1083
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 22-1412, Judge William S. Green-
berg.
______________________
Decided: May 10, 2024
______________________
RONNIE L EE BENNETT , Memphis, TN, pro se.
ELINOR J OUNG K IM , Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
BRIAN M. B OYNTON, MARTIN F. HOCKEY , J R., P ATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY .
______________________
Case: 24-1083 Document: 14 Page: 1 Filed: 05/10/2024

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BENNETT v. MCDONOUGH 2
Before T ARANTO, HUGHES , and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
Appellant Ronnie Lee Bennett appeals a decision from
the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that set aside a
February 2022 decision by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
and remanded to the Board for readjudication. Because
this non-final order does not fall into the limited class of
orders that we will consider under Williams v. Principi, 275
F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002), we dismiss.
I
Mr. Bennett served on active duty in the Air Force from
January 1976 to November 1977 as a dental laboratory
specialist. In October 2004, he filed a claim for service-con-
nected benefits for depression, which the regional office
(RO) denied in 2005. On July 31, 2006, Mr. Bennett filed to
reopen his claim for depression and later amended it to in-
clude post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In January
2007, the RO declined to reopen Mr. Bennett’s claim for de-
pression and denied service connection for PTSD. Mr. Ben-
nett filed a Notice of Disagreement in March 2007. As
evidenced by the record in this case, Mr. Bennett’s claims
have a long procedural history, and have been remanded
numerous times since their inception.
The underlying Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) de-
cision at issue in this appeal was issued on February 17,
2022. In that decision, the Board (1) granted a disability
rating of 70 percent for PTSD with depression, effective
July 31, 2006; (2) granted a total disability rating due to
individual unemployability (TDIU) for the period of July
31, 2006 to April 26, 2011; (3) denied entitlement to com-
pensation under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 for a psychiatric disorder
other than PTSD; and (4) denied a disability rating in ex-
cess of 70 percent for PTSD with depression. Mr. Bennett
appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (Veterans Court).
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BENNETT v. MCDONOUGH 3
Before the Veterans Court, the Secretary conceded that
the Board provided an inadequate statement of reasons or
bases for denying entitlement to compensation under 38
U.S.C. § 1151. Accordingly, the Veterans Court stated that
it would “accept the Secretary’s concessions of error, set
aside that part of the February 2022 Board decision on ap-
peal and remand the matter for readjudication consistent
with the Secretary’s concession.” Appx. 1.1 The Veterans
Court also included a footnote addressing the other three
issues that the Board had decided. In the footnote, the Vet-
erans Court stated that it would not disturb the Board’s
favorable grant of a 70 percent disability rating for PTSD
effective July 31, 2006, nor the grant of TDIU for the period
of July 31, 2006, to April 26, 2011. Next, although Mr. Ben-
nett’s informal brief had argued for an earlier effective date
for both the PTSD and TDIU ratings, the Veterans Court
found that the issue was not on appeal because Mr. Ben-
nett had not appealed the 2018 determination of his July
31, 2006, effective date. Finally, the Veterans Court found
that the Board’s denial of a rating in excess of 70 percent
for PTSD was abandoned because Mr. Bennett had not
challenged the issue. In conclusion, the Veterans Court
stated that “[b]ecause the Court is remanding the only mat-
ter on appeal, it will not address the appellant’s remaining
arguments.” Appx. 5.
II
Our jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court
is limited by statute. See Dixon v. Shinseki, 741 F.3d 1367,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d 1333,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We are vested with authority to “de-
cide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting
constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C.
§ 7292(d)(1). Absent a constitutional issue, however, we
1 Citations to “Appx.” refer to the Appendix submitted
with the Secretary’s informal brief. See ECF No. 8.
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BENNETT v. MCDONOUGH 4
“may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination,
or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the
facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2).
This court has “generally declined to review non-final
orders of the Veterans Court.” Williams, 275 F.3d at
1363−65 (quoting Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also Winn v. Brown, 110 F.3d 56, 57
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Consequently, remand orders are “ordi-
narily . . . not appealable because they are not final.” Ad-
ams, 256 F.3d at 1320.
Our decision in Williams provides a limited exception
to this rule. We will depart from the strict rule of finality
when a veteran establishes that: (1) the Veterans Court is-
sued a clear and final decision on a legal issue that (a) is
separate from the remand proceedings, (b) will directly
govern the remand proceedings, or, (c) if reversed by this
court, would render the remand proceedings unnecessary;
(2) the resolution of the legal issue adversely affects the
party seeking review; and (3) there is a substantial risk
that the decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that the
remand proceeding may moot the issue. Williams, 275 F.3d
at 1364. All three conditions must be satisfied for the ex-
ception to apply. Id.
III
Mr. Bennett argues that the three Williams conditions
are satisfied and, therefore, we should “depart from the
strict rule of finality” to address the merits of his argu-
ments. Reply Br. 1 (referencing Williams, 275 F.3d at
1364). According to Mr. Bennett, “the remand decision may
moot the issues,” and therefore, “the remand deprives the
Petitioner of his claimed right to a decision in his favor.”
Reply Br. 1, 3. We disagree, and hold that the remand de-
cision before us does not satisfy any of the Williams condi-
tions.
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BENNETT v. MCDONOUGH 5
At the outset, the remand decision does not satisfy the
first condition because there was no clear and final decision
of a legal issue. Rather, the Veterans Court merely ac-
cepted the Secretary’s concession of error and remanded for
readjudication by the Board. The remand decision also does
not satisfy the second condition because the remand does
not adversely affect Mr. Bennett. In fact, the remand opens
the possibility that Mr. Bennett might be entitled to higher
compensation if the Board alters its § 1151 decision. Fi-
nally, the remand decision does not satisfy the third condi-
tion because there is not a substantial risk that the remand
proceedings will moot any issues raised here.
Mr. Bennett also challenges various factual determina-
tions made by the Veterans Court, such as its determina-
tion that Mr. Bennett abandoned the issue of entitlement
to a rating in excess of 70 percent for PTSD and its deter-
mination that Mr. Bennett did not appeal the 2018 decision
setting his effective date as July 31, 2006. Appellant’s Br.
2. As discussed previously, however, we lack jurisdiction to
review factual determinations or the application of law to
fact in appeals from the Veterans Court absent a constitu-
tional issue. See, e.g., Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2000). Because these determinations involve the
application of law to the facts of Mr. Bennett’s case, we are
without authority to review them. See Beasley v. Shinseki,
709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that this
court may “not interfere with the [Veterans Court’s] role as
the final appellate arbiter of the facts underlying a vet-
eran’s claim or the application of veterans’ benefits law to
the particular facts of a veteran’s case”).
Finally, Mr. Bennett alleges that his due process rights
have been violated by the protracted nature of his case in-
volving numerous remands and appeals. See Appellant’s
Br. 4–5, 8. While we empathize with Mr. Bennett’s frustra-
tion over the many delays in this case, such delays do not
transform his factual arguments into ones over which we
may exercise jurisdiction. Because the Veterans Court did
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BENNETT v. MCDONOUGH 6
not decide any constitutional issues and Mr. Bennett pre-
sents only bare assertions that his due process rights have
been violated, we conclude that his challenges are consti-
tutional in name only. As such, these challenges are not
reviewable by this court. See Flores v. Nicholson, 476 F.3d
1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that a veteran’s
mere characterization of an issue as constitutional in na-
ture is insufficient to establish appellate jurisdiction in this
court); Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(emphasizing that “[t]o the extent that [a veteran] has
simply put a ‘due process’ label on his contention that he
should have prevailed . . . his claim is constitutional in
name only”).
IV
We have considered Mr. Bennett’s remaining argu-
ments and found them unpersuasive. Because the decision
that Mr. Bennett challenges is a non-final order and does
not meet the Williams conditions, the appeal is dismissed.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
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