John Duncan Fordham v. Georgia Department of Administrative Services, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11214
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JOHN DUNCAN FORDHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00121-DHB-BKE
USCA11 Case: 23-11214 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 1 of 7

-- 1 of 7 --

2 Opinion of the Court 23-11214
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM , J ILL PRYOR , and B RASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury convicted John Duncan Fordham of healthcare
fraud, the district court imposed a prison sentence and ordered him
to pay, jointly and severally with his codefendants, over one mil-
lion dollars in restitution to the Georgia Department of Adminis-
trative Services and Great American Insurance Company. More
than a decade after his conviction, President Trump granted Ford-
ham a full and unconditional pardon. Fordham now seeks reim-
bursement of the restitution payments he made before his pardon,
arguing that his presidential pardon requires the Department and
Great American to refund his money. We disagree and affirm the
district court’s dismissal of his claim.
I.
The seeds of this controversy were sown when a jury con-
victed Fordham of one count of healthcare fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1347. The district court sentenced Fordham to fifty-two
months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Rele-
vant here, it also ordered Fordham, jointly and severally with his
codefendants, to pay $1,021,888 in restitution to the Department
and its insurer, Great American, the victims of Fordham’s artifice.
After ordering the seizure and liquidation of Fordham’s assets, the
district court disbursed the resulting proceeds to the Department
USCA11 Case: 23-11214 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 2 of 7

-- 2 of 7 --

23-11214 Opinion of the Court 3
and Great American. Fordham also made monthly restitution pay-
ments following his incarceration, as required by the district court.
More than fifteen years after his conviction, President
Trump granted Fordham a full and unconditional pardon. With
pardon in hand, Fordham moved for an accounting of all his resti-
tution payments, which the district court granted. The district
court also relieved Fordham of any additional restitution obliga-
tion.
Fordham then sued for a return of all past restitution pay-
ments to the Department and Great American, which totaled over
five hundred thousand dollars, alleging that his presidential pardon
entitled him to such relief. The district court dismissed the claim
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, failure
to state a claim. Fordham timely appealed.
II.
We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). A district
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim also receives de novo re-
view. Luke v. Galley, 975 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020). And we
may affirm on any basis supported by the record, “even if not relied
upon by the district court.” United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971,
975 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184,
1189 (11th Cir. 2008)).
III.
USCA11 Case: 23-11214 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 3 of 7

-- 3 of 7 --

4 Opinion of the Court 23-11214
Fordham argues that the full and unconditional pardon from
President Trump compels the Department and Great American to
refund all restitution payments. The district court resolved this case
primarily through the lens of subject-matter jurisdiction, but we
believe the better approach is to ask whether Fordham has stated a
plausible claim for relief. We start by sketching the Rule 12(b)(6)
standard and then turn to Fordham’s argument.
A.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff
must “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) applies in tandem with Rule 8, which re-
quires a claim for relief to include “a short and plain state-
ment . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. 8(a)(2).
The complaint must state a claim to relief that is more than con-
ceivable—it must be plausible. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). In other words, a facially sufficient complaint pre-
supposes “some viable legal theory” for relief. Id. at 562 (quoting Car
Carriers v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “[A]
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not”
suffice. Id. at 555. In short, if a complaint does not provide legal
grounds for entitlement to relief, a court must dismiss. See id. at
555. And “the tenet that . . . [we] must accept as true all of the alle-
gations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added).
With these principles in mind, we address Fordham’s argu-
ment.
USCA11 Case: 23-11214 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 4 of 7

-- 4 of 7 --

23-11214 Opinion of the Court 5
B.
Fordham posits that a presidential pardon is much more
than a badge of forgiveness. Rather, a presidential pardon, he as-
serts, entitles its recipient to recoup property that has vested in
third parties. We disagree.
The Constitution provides that the President “shall have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” U.S. Const., art.
II, § 2, cl. 1. The pardon power gives the President “plenary author-
ity . . . to ‘forgive’ the convicted person in part or entirely, to re-
duce” a prison sentence, or to amend a penalty “with conditions
which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable.” Schick
v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974). “The pardon . . . shuts out from
sight the offending act.” Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 66 (1877).
A full pardon “releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt,” rendering the offender innocent “in the eye of the law.”
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). But a pardon
does not affect any property rights “vested in others directly by the
execution of the judgment for the offence, or which have been ac-
quired by others whilst that judgment was in force.” Knote v. United
States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877). Though a pardon “releases the of-
fender from the consequences of his offence,” including asset for-
feiture, that release must not impair the accrued property rights of
others. See Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 477 (1875). In this
sense, the only limitation on the presidential pardon is that it does
not reinstate “offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in
USCA11 Case: 23-11214 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 5 of 7

-- 5 of 7 --

6 Opinion of the Court 23-11214
others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.” Garland,
71 U.S. at 381.
Everyone agrees that the district court has already distrib-
uted to the Department and Great American the proceeds from the
sale of Fordham’s assets and the monthly restitution payments.
And the financial administrator for the district court confirmed as
much, stating that all restitution payments “have been sent out the
to the victims, Department of Administrative Service and Great
American Insurance.”
No doubt, the Supreme Court has long held that, as long as
proceeds from a restitution order remain in the court’s possession,
they fall within a pardon’s grasp. See Osborn, 91 U.S. at 476; cf. Knote,
95 U.S. at 154 (holding that forfeited property does not vest when
it “remain[s] under control of the Executive, or of officers subject
to his orders, or . . . in the custody of the judicial tribunals” and
“will be restored . . . to the original owner, upon his full pardon”).
Thus, the district court properly concluded that Fordham’s pardon
discharged his obligation to make future restitution payments. But
the federal “government can only release what it holds,” Osborn, 91
U.S. at 477, and here, it holds nothing. The district court transferred
all restitution monies to the victims, so the property rights to those
funds have fully vested in the Department and Great American. See
Knote, 95 U.S. at 154 (holding that, when monetary proceeds “have
been paid to a party to whom the law has assigned them,” the
party’s “rights . . . have become vested, and are as complete as if
they were acquired in any other legal way”). In short, the money
USCA11 Case: 23-11214 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 6 of 7

-- 6 of 7 --

23-11214 Opinion of the Court 7
Fordham seeks is long gone. Allowing him to claw back past resti-
tution payments under guise of a presidential pardon would impair
the Department and Great American’s accrued property rights in
that money, an outcome plainly proscribed by the Supreme Court.
See Osborn, 91 U.S. at 476; Garland, 71 U.S. at 381.
Fordham’s claim that his presidential pardon entitles him to
a refund of money vested in the Department and Great American
directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, his
complaint did not advance any viable legal theory or a plausible
basis for relief, and the district court correctly dismissed it. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 570; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
IV.
The district court is AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 23-11214 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 7 of 7

-- 7 of 7 --