Ashley Lynn Andrade v. Joseph Clark, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10438
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ASHLEY LYNN ANDRADE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF OF LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
JOSEPH CLARK,
in his official capacity and individually,
EARTHEN BROWN,
in his official capacity and individually,
Defendants-Appellees,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
LEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
a division of Lee County,
Defendant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00887-JES-NPM
____________________
Before NEWSOM , GRANT, and B RASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We must decide whether officers had probable cause to ar-
rest Ashley Andrade under Fla. Stat. § 843.02 and whether they
used excessive force in arresting her. The district court held that
the officers had probable cause and did not use excessive force. Af-
ter watching multiple videos of the incident and taking any facts
not on video in the light most favorable to Andrade, we agree with
the district court. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
Ashley Andrade’s acquaintance, Jacob Oade, was arrested af-
ter allegedly groping another woman at the beach. Along with a
crowd of other beachgoers, Andrade and her cousin, Danielle
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23-10438 Opinion of the Court 3
Breehne, followed the arresting officers to their patrol vehicle as
they made the arrest. Andrade and Breehne approached the vehicle
while the officers placed Oade in the back seat, yelling at the offic-
ers. The officers ordered them to back away from the vehicle. An-
drade and Breehne briefly backed up, but then returned to the ve-
hicle and again yelled at the officers.
The officers again ordered Andrade and Breehne to back
away from the vehicle. They began slowly backing away, with An-
drade pulling Breehne by her waist. Deputy Clark, who was called
on the scene as backup, approached the women from behind.
Meanwhile, Deputy Brown pushed Breehne backwards. A scuffle
ensued between Breehne and Brown, with Andrade still pulling
Breehne towards her. Deputy Clark then intervened and grabbed
Andrade to pull her away from the scuffle. Andrade’s ex-husband
also became involved, placing his arms around Andrade and pull-
ing her away from Deputy Clark. Clark lost his grip on Andrade,
which caused him, Andrade, and her ex-husband to fall to the
ground. Clark then secured Andrade on the ground with his knee
and hand, stood her up, and handcuffed her.
The officers charged Andrade with resisting a police officer
without violence. Fla. Stat. § 843.02. She was transported to a local
hospital before being taken to Lee County Jail. She says her arrest
resulted in injuries that caused her to lose her job, undergo surgery,
and incur tens of thousands of dollars in medical expenses.
Andrade sued Deputies Clark and Brown and Lee County
Sheriff Marceno under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida state law for
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prose-
cution, First Amendment retaliation, battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and negligent training and supervision. The
district court granted summary judgment for the officers on all the
claims.
Andrade appealed the district court’s ruling on the false ar-
rest, false imprisonment, excessive force, First Amendment retalia-
tion, and battery claims. The district court dismissed the false ar-
rest, false imprisonment, and First Amendment retaliation claims
because it concluded the officers had probable cause to arrest An-
drade. It dismissed the excessive force claim because it concluded
the officer’s use of force was reasonable. And it dismissed the bat-
tery claim because it concluded the officers had probable cause to
arrest Andrade and did not use excessive force.
II.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Amy v. Carnival Corp.,
961 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “A grant of
summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (cleaned up).
“A fact is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” BBX Capital v. FDIC, 956 F.3d 1304, 1314
(11th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986)). “A dispute over such a fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence
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23-10438 Opinion of the Court 5
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party.” Id. Although we must view the facts in favor of the
nonmoving party, we accept video evidence over the nonmoving
party's account when the former obviously contradicts the lat-
ter. See Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir.
2010).
III.
Andrade argues that the district court erred when it con-
cluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest her and did not
use excessive force in arresting her. We agree with the district court
that the officers had probable cause to arrest Andrade and did not
use excessive force. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant
of the officer’s summary judgment.
A.
We start with whether the officers had probable cause to ar-
rest Andrade. Andrade sued the officers for Florida and Section
1983 false arrest, Florida and Section 1983 false imprisonment, and
Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation. Each claim fails if the
officers had probable cause to arrest Andrade.
To succeed on her federal false arrest claim, Andrade must
establish (1) a lack of probable cause and (2) an arrest. Thus, when
the government has probable cause to make an arrest, a false arrest
claim necessarily fails. Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2021). An arrestee similarly has a false arrest claim under Sec-
tion 1983 where “a police officer lacks probable cause to make an
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
arrest.” Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996).
Thus, a false imprisonment claim is also defeated if the officer has
probable cause to arrest. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th
Cir. 2009).
The same is true under Florida law. In Florida, false arrest
and false imprisonment are “different labels for the same cause of
action.” Coleman v. Hillsborough Cnty., 41 F.4th 1319, 1326 (11th Cir.
2022) (quoting Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1431 n.5 (11th Cir.
1998)). The existence of probable cause is a complete bar to claims
of false arrest and false imprisonment. See Lewis v. Morgan, 79 So.
3d 926, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (false arrest); Baxter v. Roberts, 54
F.4th 1241, 1271 (11th Cir. 2022) (false imprisonment).
“[T]he presence of probable cause will . . . generally defeat a
§ 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim for an underlying retali-
atory arrest.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1297
(11th Cir. 2019). While there are exceptions to this general rule, see
id., Andrade does not rely on those exceptions. So her First Amend-
ment retaliation claim fails if the officers had probable cause to ar-
rest her.
“[P]robable cause exists when the facts, considering the to-
tality of the circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a
reasonable officer, establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity.’” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898–99
(11th Cir. 2022) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 538 U.S. 48,
57 (2018)). “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an indi-
vidual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
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23-10438 Opinion of the Court 7
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354
(2001). “Whether an officer possesses probable cause . . . depends
on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pat-
tern.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010).
Probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44 n.13 (1983). And probable cause “is not
a high bar: It requires only the kind of fair probability on which
reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Kaley v.
United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (cleaned up).
An officer has probable cause to arrest someone for resisting
a police officer without violence under Section 843.02 when (1)
“the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty,”
and (2) “the defendant’s action, by [her] words, conduct, or a com-
bination thereof, constituted obstruction or resistance of that law-
ful duty.” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1266 (11th Cir. 2022)
(quoting C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181, 1185–86 (Fla. 2009)). “Our
focus is whether a reasonable jury could find that evidence of either
element was lacking at the scene of the incident.” Id. If so, the of-
ficers did not have probable cause to arrest Andrade.
The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could
find that evidence of either element was lacking at the scene of the
incident. It reasoned that the officers were engaged in a lawful ex-
ecution of their legal duty because they responded to a call about
Oade touching a woman, arrested him, and attempted to continue
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
their investigation by ordering the crowd, including Andrade, to
move away from the patrol car. The district court also reasoned
that Andrade obstructed and resisted that lawful duty when she de-
fied those orders and walked towards the vehicle after briefly back-
ing away, and resisted and obstructed Deputy Clark when he tried
to remove her from the scuffle.
Andrade says that conclusion is wrong for several reasons.
She says there is no allegation that she did anything to impede or
obstruct Oade’s arrest, she did not obstruct the investigation or re-
sist the deputies in the performance of their lawful duties, and her
presence in the area and verbal commentary alone cannot support
a finding of probable cause. She also says she was only given the
command to back up one time and she was complying with the
deputies’ orders when deputies Brown and Clark escalated the sit-
uation. And she says there are genuine disputes of material fact as
to whether she touched or grabbed Deputy Clark and whether she
resisted Deputy Clark because she was in a tug-of-war between
Clark and her ex-husband.
The deputies respond that Andrade violated Section 832.02
when, after being ordered to back up, she walked back towards the
patrol car. They say there is no dispute she defied the order to get
back from the patrol car and all that matters is that she was ordered
away once and did not obey. Thus, the deputies say that it is im-
material whether Andrade touched or grabbed deputy Clark’s shirt
or resisted Clark because probable cause existed before that hap-
pened.
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23-10438 Opinion of the Court 9
Andrade cites multiple cases to support her argument that
her conduct did not create probable cause that she violated Section
843.02. For example, she points to D.A.W. v. State for the proposi-
tion that Florida law requires more than speech to establish proba-
ble cause. 945 So.2d 624, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). There, officers
were arresting a person wielding a beer bottle as a weapon while a
fight was happening in the middle of the street. Id. at 625. D.A.W.
and a friend began harassing the individual being arrested from fif-
teen to thirty feet away. Id. The officers told D.A.W. and his friend
to leave multiple times, but they refused. Id. Once the officer de-
tained the individual, he approached D.A.W. and his friend, who
turned away and left. Id. Other officers ultimately detained D.A.W.
and arrested him for violating Section 843.02. Id.
The court held that the officers lacked probable cause to ar-
rest D.A.W. for violating Section 843.02. Id. at 627. The court rea-
soned that D.A.W. did not cause the officers fear or public safety
concerns, stayed fifteen to thirty feet away, and the officer was not
forced to interrupt the arrest to deal with D.A.W.’s conduct. Id. at
626. The court held that “when the officer is not executing process
on [an individual], legally detaining [an individual], or has not asked
[an individual] for assistance in an ongoing emergency, the [the in-
dividual’s] actions must normally be physically obstructive, not
merely verbally harassing, in order to support a conviction for ob-
structing an officer without violence.” Id.
But Andrade was closer than fifteen to thirty feet from the
patrol car and yelling at the officers, was ordered away from the
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
patrol car as the officers were arresting Oade and continuing their
investigation, and, after briefly backing away from the car, defied
the officers’ orders, returned close to the car, and yelled at the of-
ficers again. Thus, her conduct was much different from the exclu-
sively verbal conduct in D.A.W.—she was ordered to physically
move back from the patrol car and defied that order.
Andrade also relies on Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 764–
65 (11th Cir. 2006). There, a man noticed police cars outside of his
house, went outside to determine what was going on, and asked
the officers to redirect traffic because he was worried about guests
coming to his house being diverted into dangerous driving condi-
tions. Id. at 763. The officers told him to leave and, as he returned
to his house, arrested him for violating Section 843.02. Id. at 764.
The court held that the officers did not have probable cause to ar-
rest him because he “did not physically interfere with or obstruct
the deputies,” and he testified that “he never made physical or ver-
bal threats towards [the officers], never sought to incite violence,
and never told the deputies to get off his property.” Id. at 766. The
court concluded that “[n]either an owner’s simple inquiry as to
why officers are present on his property nor a person’s attempt to
bring a dangerous situation to the officer’s attention can be con-
strued as obstruction of justice or disorderly conduct.” Id. at 767.
Andrade was not simply asking to speak with the officers and
was not attempting to bring a dangerous situation to their atten-
tion. Instead, the video shows that she congregated around the pa-
trol car with Breehne, yelled at the officers, and physically
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23-10438 Opinion of the Court 11
interfered with and obstructed the deputies when she defied their
orders to back away from the car.
Two other cases Andrade cites also fail to establish the offic-
ers did not have probable cause. In Owen v. Sheriff of Okaloosa
County, the court denied the officers’ motion summary judgment
because there was conflicting evidence about whether the officers
had probable cause to make an arrest under Section 843.02. No.
3:21-cv-906 MCR-HTC, 2023 WL 2721647 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 30,
2023). Andrade says the same is true here because the videos do not
conclusively establish that her arrest was supported by probable
cause, and because her testimony contradicts the officers’ testi-
mony about the events prompting her arrest. But Andrade is
wrong because the videos here do conclusively establish that the
officers had probable cause to arrest her for violating Section
843.02—the officers ordered her away from the car and she defied
that order.
And in J.G.D. v. State, the court held the officers had no prob-
able cause to arrest a man who protested police actions in investi-
gating crimes at an apartment building the man was visiting. 724
So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The officers ordered the man to
leave the complex and he defied that order, but the court held that
the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him under Section
843.02 because his protest was nonviolent and only verbal. Id.
Again, Andrade did much more than verbally protest Oade’s ar-
rest—she followed the officers from the beach to their patrol car,
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
was close to the patrol car and yelling at the officers, was ordered
to back away from the car, and defied that order.
We agree with the officers that the cases Andrade cites do
not establish that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest her
for violating Section 832.02. The officers were engaged in the law-
ful execution of their legal duty by arresting Oade, transporting
him to the patrol car, securing the area for their investigation, and
ordering Andrade to back away from the car. And Andrade, by
combination of her words and conduct, obstructed and resisted
that lawful duty when she defied that order.
We agree with the district court that no reasonable juror
could find there was a lack of probable cause to arrest Andrade.
Thus, we agree with the district court that Andrade’s claims for
Florida and Section 1983 false arrest, Florida and Section 1983 false
imprisonment, and Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation
should fail.
B.
We next consider whether the officers used excessive force
in arresting Andrade. Andrade argues that Deputies Clark and
Brown used excessive force when they arrested her because the
misdemeanor offense she was accused of did not warrant the use
of force, she never posed a threat to the officers, and she never re-
sisted the arrest. On the other hand, the officers say it was reason-
able to grab her arm to pull her away from the scuffle, hold her to
the ground while assessing the situation, place her arms behind her
back, stand her up, and cuff her.
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23-10438 Opinion of the Court 13
The district court agreed with the officers, concluding that
the officers’ force was permissible because Deputy Clark grabbed
her arm, did not slam her to the ground, and used de minimis force
to secure her once she was on the ground, and Deputy Brown used
de minimis force when he pushed Breehne away from the patrol car.
We agree.
Excessive force claims in the context of an arrest are judged
under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989). For excessive force
claims, we balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual against the government justification for using force and
consider (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat, and (3) whether the suspect is resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest. Id. at 396. We also consider the jus-
tification for the use of force, the relationship between the justifi-
cation and the force used, and the extent of any injury inflicted.
Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014).
“[W]e must be careful not to Monday-morning quarterback
but instead to judge ‘[t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of
force . . . from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.’”
Patel v. City of Madison, Alabama, 959 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Additionally, “the applica-
tion of de minims force, without more, will not support a claim for
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Nolin v.
Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000); see Croom v. Balkwill, 645
F.3d 1240, 1252 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that force used was de
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
minimis when officers pushed a 63-year-old woman to the ground
while she was in a squatting position and held her there with a foot
or knee in her back for ten minutes while executing a search war-
rant).
We agree with the district court that Deputy Clark’s use of
force in grabbing Andrade’s arm, securing her on the ground with
his knee and hand, placing her arms behind her back, standing her
up, and handcuffing her was reasonable and de minimis. And we
agree that Deputy Brown’s pushing Breehne back from the patrol
car, potentially causing Andrade to lose her balance, was also de
minimis.
Andrade argues on appeal that Stephens v. DeGiovanni estab-
lishes that the force the officers used to arrest her for violating Sec-
tion 843.02 was excessive. 852 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2017). But the
facts here differ from the facts in Stephens. There, an officer ques-
tioned two men working on a car outside of a friend’s apartment.
Id. at 1307. Without asking Stephens to do anything but hand over
his ID—which he did—the officer slapped a Bluetooth device from
Stephens’ ear, slugged Stephens in the chest twice, stepped on his
foot while grabbing him by the neck and slamming him backwards,
and twisted his hand. Id. at 1308. The officer handcuffed him, took
him to the station, and charged him with resisting an officer with-
out violence under Section 843.02. Id. at 1309. We vacated the dis-
trict court’s order that the officer did not use excessive force. Id. at
1328.
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23-10438 Opinion of the Court 15
Andrade followed the officers to the patrol car as they ar-
rested Oade. She came close to the car, yelled at the officers, and
was ordered to back away. She backed away momentarily but then
returned, again yelling at the officers. When Deputy Clark grabbed
her arm to pull her out of the scuffle that ensued, her ex-husband
grabbed her waist and pulled her in the opposite direction, ulti-
mately causing her to fall to the ground. Officer Clark then secured
her on the ground with his knee and hand, put her arms behind her
back, stood her up, and cuffed her. Deputy Brown’s only involve-
ment was pushing Breehne away from the patrol car, which may
have contributed to Andrade falling to the ground.
Both Deputies’ use of force was not unreasonable under
these circumstances. While the crime was a misdemeanor, the
video shows a fast-moving situation outside the patrol car. A “Mon-
day-morning quarterback” view may provide one perspective, but
a reasonable officer at the scene could have believed that Andrade
was a threat, resisting arrest, and attempting to flee because of the
intensity of the situation and because her ex-husband was pulling
her away from the officer. Even more, the deputies’ actions were
both de minimis uses of force.
Andrade also argues that her injuries sufficiently establish
that the deputies use of force was excessive. She testified that she
has lasting headaches and migraines, underwent jaw and shoulder
surgery, and lost employment as a result of her injuries. But the
videos show that those injuries could stem from the fall caused in
part by her ex-husband pulling her, not by the deputies’ actions.
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-10438
And in any event, her injuries alone cannot transform the deputies’
de minimis use of force into excessive use of force.
Thus, we agree with the district court that the deputies did
not use excessive force when they arrested Andrade, so her exces-
sive force claim must fail.
C.
Because we agree with the district court that the officers had
probable cause to arrest Andrade and did not use excessive force in
arresting her, her battery claim must also fail.
In Florida, a battery claim in the context of an arrest “is ana-
lyzed by focusing upon whether the amount of force used was rea-
sonable under the circumstances.” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241,
1272–73 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d
46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)). If an officer uses excessive force, that
use of force is transformed into a battery. Id. at 1273. But where an
officer does not use excessive force in making an arrest, there can
be no claim for battery. Id. Thus, we agree with the district court
that Andrade’s battery claim must fail.
IV.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment.
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