USA v. Anthony Roan

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13443
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY ROAN,
a.k.a. Yayo,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cr-00045-HL-TQL-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13443
____________________
Before WILSON , L UCK, and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Roan, who was convicted of one count of posses-
sion with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, appeals his 75-
month upward variance sentence. On appeal, Roan claims that the
75-month sentence is substantively unreasonable because the Sen-
tencing Guidelines recommended a 30- to 37-month sentence and
that the district court did not properly weigh the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors when it varied upward.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer-
ential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). Where, as here, procedural reasonableness is not at
issue, we will measure substantive reasonableness by considering
the totality of the circumstances and whether the sentence achieves
the sentencing purposes stated in § 3553(a). United States v. Sarras,
575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009). The weight given to any spe-
cific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.
2007). However, “a district court abuses its discretion when it
(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due
significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or
irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in con-
sidering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
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22-13443 Opinion of the Court 3
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Yet, the simple imposition of a sen-
tence above the guideline range does not mean that the sentence is
inherently unreasonable. United States v. Hunt, 941 F.3d 1259, 1263
(11th Cir. 2019). Instead, a sentence that is well below the statutory
maximum punishment is an indicator of reasonableness. Id.
at 1264. Importantly, the maximum sentence for possession with
intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of
§ 841(b)(1)(C) is 240 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
The district court must issue a sentence “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary,” to comply with the § 3553(a) factors,
which includes the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the of-
fense, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the defend-
ant’s future criminal conduct, and provide medical care in the most
effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular
sentence, the district court must also consider the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the de-
fendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines
range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commis-
sion, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the
need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
We will not second guess the weight that the district court
gave to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable in
light of all the circumstances. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1191 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court is permitted to attach great
weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others. United States v.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13443
Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013). After evaluating for
reasonableness, we will only vacate a defendant’s sentence if we
are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case” even
where the variance is substantial. Id. at 637. “The party challeng-
ing a sentence has the burden of showing that the sentence is un-
reasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and
the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States
v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sen-
tencing Roan to 75 months’ imprisonment, instead of the guideline
range of 30 to 37 months, on the charge of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine because it properly weighed the § 3553(a) fac-
tors. Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 637.
At the sentencing hearing, the government noted, in part,
that Roan’s criminal history spanned from 16 years’ old to his pre-
sent age. The district court explained that it had considered the §
3553(a) factors and made an individualized assessment of Roan
based on the facts presented. Specifically, the court stated that it
had considered the need for the sentence to adequately reflect the
history and characteristics of the defendant, promote respect for
the law, and afford adequate deterrence. It explained that it had
considered the nature of Roan’s prior arrests and convictions,
which consistently involved drugs and obstruction. See United
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22-13443 Opinion of the Court 5
States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012) (determining
that the district court’s sentence was not substantively unreasona-
ble where the district court found that the advisory “guidelines did
not adequately account for [the defendant’s] criminal history” be-
cause the criminal history score “did not reflect the sustained na-
ture of [the defendant’s] criminal conduct”). Thus, the court
properly weighed the appropriate § 3553(a) factors and acted
within its discretion when considering which factors outweighed
others. Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 638.
Moreover, the statutory maximum for possession with in-
tent to distribute cocaine is 240 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
Thus, Roan’s 75-month sentence for possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine is well below the statutory maximum, which fur-
ther supports its reasonableness. Hunt, 941 F.3d at 1264.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we
affirm Roan’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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